Underdeveloping Appalachia: Toward an Environmental Sociology of Extractive Economies by Wishart, William
 UNDERDEVELOPING APPALACHIA: TOWARD AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
SOCIOLOGY OF EXTRACTIVE ECONOMIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
WILLIAM RYAN WISHART 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION 
 
Presented to the Department of Sociology 
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
June 2014 
 
 ii
DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE 
 
Student: William Ryan Wishart  
 
Title: Underdeveloping Appalachia: Toward an Environmental Sociology of Extractive 
Economies 
 
This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Sociology by: 
 
John Bellamy Foster Chairperson 
Richard York Core Member 
Michael Dreiling Core Member 
Joseph Fracchia Institutional Representative 
 
and 
 
Kimberly Andrews Espy Vice President for Research and Innovation; 
 Dean of the Graduate School  
 
Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. 
 
Degree awarded June 2014 
  
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2014 William Ryan Wishart  
  
 iv
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
William Ryan Wishart 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Sociology  
 
June 2014 
 
Title: Underdeveloping Appalachia: Toward an Environmental Sociology of Extractive 
Economies 
 
 
This dissertation uses mixed methods to examine the role of the coal industry in 
the reproduction of Central Appalachia as an internal periphery within the United States 
and the economic, ecological, and human inequalities this entails. It also analyzes the 
related political economy and power structure of coal in a national context. Particularly 
important for analysis of the region’s underdevelopment are the class relations involved 
in unequal ecological exchange and the establishment of successive “modes of 
extraction.” 
I employ a historical comparative analysis of Appalachia to evaluate Bunker’s 
thesis that resource dependent peripheries often become locked into a “mode of 
extraction” (with aspects parallel to Marxist concepts of mode of production) triggering 
economic and ecological path dependencies leading to underdevelopment. This historical 
comparative analysis establishes the background for a closer examination of the political 
economy of the modern US coal industry.  
After sketching the changes in the structure of monopoly and competition in the 
coal industry I employ network analysis of the directorate interlocks of the top twenty 
coal firms in the US within the larger energy policy-planning network to examine their 
 v
connections with key institutions of the policy formation network of think tanks and 
business groups. My findings show the importance of the capacities of fossil fuel 
fractions of the capitalist class in formulating energy policy around issues such as the 
2009 climate legislation.  
As a contribution to the growing literature applying the concept of metabolism as 
link between contemporary and classical theory, I examine the conflict at Coal River 
Mountain from the vantage points of ecology, political economy, and human 
development in dialectical rotation. Utilizing Marx’s method of successive abstractions, 
the mountain is presented as a nexus of metabolic rifts in the human relationship to the 
earth’s natural systems and an impediment to genuine human development. Finally, I 
conclude with some implications of this analysis for building a critical environmental 
sociology of extractive economies.  
 
This dissertation includes previously published materials.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Appalachia is a place of both great natural wealth and persistent 
underdevelopment within the most advanced capitalist nation in the world system. While 
it is not unique in its underdevelopment (the timberlands of the Northwest or Indian lands 
are other examples), its long history of frequent political and scholarly attention as an 
example of underdevelopment make it a valuable vantage point from which to examine 
historical processes and problems of extractive economies. The problems of the 
Appalachian region are in some ways characteristic of what Amin (1976) has called the 
“social formations of peripheral capitalism.” I believe that what appears as exceptional 
about the region (i.e. an exception to the prosperity of the US) (Harrington 1997) can in 
fact be traced to the working of general laws of capitalist development as shaped by the 
contingencies of history (Amin 2010; Dunaway 1996a). This dissertation has the twin 
goals of, on the one hand, demonstrating the fruitfulness and necessity of a historical and 
dialectical approach for examining the social problems surrounding the 
underdevelopment of the Appalachian coalfields and, on the other, to advance the 
literature in the political economy and power structure of extractive economies. 
 The relative importance of relations of production within a peripheral area versus 
the relations of exchange that link it to the center economies has been a point of 
contention in the evolution of (neo)Marxist approaches to underdevelopment. In fact, the 
two aspects are inextricably linked through their material basis as part of the human 
metabolism with the rest of nature (Foster 1986; Foster and Holleman 2014). A main 
feature of peripheral areas is their unequal exchange relations with center economies. The 
exchange relations are unequal in both terms of labor value and natural use values. 
Approaches that neglect the latter form an incomplete analysis that misses crucial factors 
for gauging sustainable human development (Bagchi 2005; Bunker 1984; Foster and 
Holleman 2014). These unequal relations are in turn tied to special features of the 
subordinated class structure of peripheral areas. The politics and economics of the center 
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have an asymmetrical effect on the regulation of the social metabolism of the periphery 
(Amin 1977; Clark and Foster 2009; Meszáros 2008). The overarching argument of this 
dissertation is that Central Appalachia's reproduction as an extractive periphery within 
the United States has been a process of unequal exchange contributing to the 
development of the national economy while degrading the land and people of the region. 
The historical dominance of coal in the region is built upon path dependencies created by 
previous extractive practices and continues to be driven by the contradictions between 
capital and labor as well as the political and material consequences of capitalism’s 
metabolic rift. The reproduction of this regime is dependent upon the ability of coal 
capital to thwart attempts by competing class fractions, as well as from those below, to 
undermine its ability to externalize costs. This mode of extraction is able to reproduce 
itself only at the cost of deepening the underlying contradictions. 
The coal industry presents a vantage point from which to examine the political 
economic linkages that connect the class structure and developmental trajectory of this 
subordinate region to the wider capitalist system and its class relations. The development 
of industrial power upon coal was simultaneously a struggle for social power with those 
who produced it and those who owned it—those who appropriated its rewards and those 
who suffered its harms (Mitchell 2011; Salstrom 1994; Sweezy 1938). Paul Sweezy 
pointed to the centrality of social relations around coal to capitalist development in his 
earliest work on monopoly and competition in the English coal trade: 
The first half of the nineteenth century, the period of capitalism triumphant, is 
well summed up in three events…First, the opening of the Stockton and 
Darlington railroad; second, the formation of the first union among the miners; 
and third, the passage of the Act of 1831. They symbolize, as it were, the 
industrial revolution, the growth of the proletariat, and the victory of free 
trade…that such striking examples should all occur in the same trade and within 
the space of six years…It may be taken to reflect the basic character of coal, 
without which all of the other developments would have been impossible. 
(1938:55) 
Until eclipsed by oil, coal was the fundamental commodity of capitalism’s fossil energy 
regime (Foster and Holleman 2012; Podobnik 2008; Sweezy 1938). The coal industry has 
been a flashpoint of labor struggle and has sparked environmental movements from the 
local environmental justice battles to the global level in the fight against climate change. 
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The social and environmental histories of coal are part of evolving metabolic processes at 
the local, national, and global scales. While the peripheralization of Appalachia predates 
the importance of coal extraction, its continued reproduction as a periphery cannot be 
understood without examining the place of coal in the center of the political-economic 
system to which the region remains an appendage.  
Marxist Ecology and Political Economy: The Importance of Marx’s Method for 
Integrating Ecology and Sociology. 
The foundations of modern environmental sociology in the US began in the 1970s 
with criticism of the larger discipline’s tacit (or sometimes explicit) acceptance of human 
exemption from the laws governing the rest of nature (Catton and Dunlap 1978). The 
importance of political economy in shaping social-environmental relations was 
subsequently established as a pillar of US environmental sociology with Schnaiberg’s 
(1980) publication of The Environment and its “treadmill of production” approach.  There 
has since been a growing body of literature showing the integral connection of classical 
social theorists’ (i.e. Marx, Durkheim, and Weber) views on the laws of nature and what 
may be called “laws” governing human societies (Foster 1999a; 2000; Foster and 
Holleman 2012; Rosa and Richter 2008). The classical social theorists, particularly Marx 
and Weber, were less hindered by the academic boundaries of disciplines than later 
writers and it is arguably this fluidity and breadth that should give their ideas an enduring 
foundational status in sociology.  
 Once the first step is made in rejecting the “human exemptionalist paradigm” that 
treats humankind as somehow separate from the rest of nature we must also recognize 
that “[the] intrinsic unity of social and natural science is, of course, a logical corollary of 
the intrinsic unity of humanity and nature” (Burkett 2005:50). However, to deal with this 
unity in a productive way that is capable of recognizing both unity and difference in 
human social systems and the rest of nature requires a dialectical process of abstraction. 
As a historical science, this is no less true for ecology than for sociology.  
Both the internal theoretical needs of ecology and the social demands that it 
inform our planned interactions with nature require making the understanding of 
complexity the central problem. Ecology must cope with interdependence and 
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relative autonomy, with similarity and difference, with the general and the 
particular, with continuity and discontinuity, with contradictory processes. It must 
become increasingly self-conscious of its own philosophy, and that philosophy 
will be effective to the extent that it becomes not only materialist but dialectical” 
(Levins and Lewontin 1985:160). 
No figure has contributed more to the materialist application of dialectical reasoning and 
its central problem of abstraction than Marx. Marx studied materialism from Epicurus 
and Lucretius, to its foundation of the scientific revolution in Europe, and, as is made 
clear in his famous critique of Feuerbach, drew on Hegel’s development of dialectics to 
push beyond a simply contemplative materialism (Foster 2000). Marx’s influence in this 
regard is not limited to social science. Recent work has shown the interface of Marx’s 
materialist and dialectical ideas with the discipline of ecology from its earliest to days to 
the present (Foster 2013; Foster and Clark 2008; Padovan 2014). For scientists working 
to understand the complexity of life on earth, especially its social forms, the problem of 
abstraction is central: how to tease out different aspects of a complex and constantly 
changing world for study and the advance of knowledge (Haila and Levins 1992; York 
and Mancus 2009).  
 From London, Marx traced out social relations across space: the growing world 
economy, and time: back through human history. Holding to Hegel’s maxim, “The truth 
is the whole,” Marx set about his analysis of capitalism by tracing back through time how 
the system’s most developed representation came into being (Fracchia 1991; Ollman 
2003; Paolucci 2007). As his study of British capitalism informed his analysis of the 
wider world, what he found about the history of British and other contemporary examples 
of capitalist development brought into focus new aspects of his British case. His 
materialist approach also led him early on to reject the division of social and natural 
science. In a draft of their work The German Ideology Marx and Engels wrote, “We 
know only a single science, the science of history. One can look at history from two sides 
and divide it into the history of nature and the history of men. The two sides are, however, 
inseparable; the history of nature and the history of men are dependent on each other so 
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long as men exist” (1845).1  Their method of inquiry rejects attempts, common today, to 
artificially divorce questions about socioeconomic systems of production, distribution, 
and ideology from questions about the natural systems of the world that form their 
foundation and ultimately determine their sustainability. 
 Key aspects of Marx’s method include an ontology of “internal relations” that 
takes relations, and the processes they imply (rather than ontologically independent, 
externally related “things”) as the units of analysis (Ollman 2003; Paolucci 2007). A 
consequent effect is that analysis must take place from distinct vantage points within a 
web of relations, and at different levels of generality, according to the problem at hand 
(see figure 1.1).2 The interaction between processes operating at different levels of 
historical and structural generality is critical for probing social-ecological problems 
(York and Mancus 2009). For example, what can be generalized of humans as a species 
of animal like any other is distinct from what can be said of human societies in general, 
class societies in general, capitalism in general, or even capitalism’s modern form in 
particular. At each successive level the systemic relations are subject to the constraints of 
the broader levels but also exhibit emergent “laws” within these that interact with 
historical contingency. This multi-level conception of systems and causality emphasizes 
that the constraints of “higher” levels, of human societies in general, for instance, shape 
but do not determine in mechanistic fashion the operation of systems at narrower levels 
of generality, for example, that of class societies or capitalism. The potential also arises 
of chance occurrences at one level of causation forming path dependencies, i.e. structural 
constraints, at other levels.  
For example, one might argue that capitalism became self-reproducing and 
dominant first in Britain due to national level causes (be it the contingent, from a social 
vantage point, location of coal deposits or the structurally evolved economic situation of 
                                                        
1
 Some theorists within the broader tradition, such as Moore (2011), have rejected this notion that it is 
possible to abstract the relation from two sides as representing a Cartesian dualism, rather than a dialectical 
unity as Marx and Engels treat it here.  
 
2
 Levels of generality represent scales at which the abstractions of abstract/general and specific/concrete are 
made, the highest level involving the properties of matter and energy and the lowest concrete historical 
individuals (which Marx himself involved with as part of the communist project (CP))(Ollman 2003:86-98; 
Paolucci 2007:114).  
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the peasantry) distinguishing it from the general capitalist tendencies emerging across 
Western Europe. Alternatively, one could emphasize the British relationship with the 
New World colonies providing food and fiber that allowed it to overcome historical 
limits of its own land-base (limits similar to those faced by other hypothetical candidates  
 
for capitalist development) (Pomeranz 2009). However, it is clear that once British 
capitalism was fully established, it’s hegemony created constraints on all subsequent 
development in the evolution of capitalism at a world-system level. Britain’s fortuitous 
natural conditions allowed for the development of social relations that would restructure 
the world socially and ecologically (Moore 2000).  
Marx’s ecological conceptions about the natural world form a “higher” level of 
generality that structures his theories at the “lower” levels of human societies and, lower 
still, the political economy that he fashioned to express the laws of capitalist economies 
and states. Marx’s method underlines the ways in which transhistorical (including 
ecological/biophysical) problems of production in general are confronted by the specific 
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and concrete historical forms of different modes of production with their socialized needs 
and means of fulfilling them (Fracchia 2004). Historical Materialism is a non-reductionist 
paradigm that can move fluidly between the levels of generality appropriate to laws of 
ecology and laws of societies. Marx and Engels recognized in Darwin’s theories the same 
dialectical principles at work, if resting upon different key elements (e.g. random 
variation and natural selection), as the process of contingent historical development of 
society they had sought to lay out in their unpublished work The German Ideology. The 
great methodological challenge in science lies at the borders of where mathematical 
modeling and the like can be applied at a given level of abstraction and where the level of 
contingency and the unknown require a more qualitative and historical analysis (cf Amin 
2010). This challenge holds true across the disciplinary boundaries of ecology and social 
analysis (Amin 2010; Haila and Levins 1992; Lewontin and Levins 2007; York and Clark 
2011). For social scientists concerned with the increasingly dire question of societies’ 
coevolution with their environments such an encompassing approach is essential. 
Literature Review  
Contradictory processes that on the one hand homogenize societies, and, on the 
other, polarize and differentiate societies characterize capitalist development. These 
processes operate at multiple spatial scales: North to South, nation to nation, region to 
region, urban to rural. There is, of course, a natural differentiation in geography on which 
explanations of development patterns have been based, some more geographically 
determinist (Diamond 1997; Lenski and Nolan 1984) and some more dialectical (Bunker 
and Ciccantell 2005; Cronon 1992; Pomeranz 2009).3 The power of the social in the 
explanatory tension between geography/ecology and social relations for development 
patterns is arguably weighted toward the social with the historical replacement of “first 
nature” by “second nature” and the rapid development of the forces of production (N. 
Smith 1984). Capitalist development involves both an increasing division of labor and an 
expanded “division of nature” that are uneven in space (Foster 1999b). Spatial effects are 
also implied in Marx’s discussion of the centralization of capital, the uneven penetration 
                                                        
3
 Baran (1962)and Frank (1979) both make reference on occasion to geographical factors in explaining 
development trajectories (e.g. Europe’s location for maritime development and the climate in North 
America’s effect on the division of labor between it Europe, and the West Indies).  
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of capitalist forms and productive relations into different regions, the place-based power 
of landed classes and rents, and, last but not least, the importance of the territorially 
defined modern State. From a review of these, Edel et al. (1978) conclude that, while 
there are various insights, it is difficult to attribute any coherent or singular “law of 
uneven development” as applied to regions by Marx himself, though later Marxists such 
as Lenin, Trotsky, and Luxemburg do treat the issue somewhat more directly. 
Dependency and world-systems traditions in sociology have focused on the 
uneven spatial development of capitalism at the nation state level between core and 
peripheral areas of global capitalism (Amin 1974; Baran 1962; Wallerstein 1974). There 
is not a developed sociological literature on “internal peripheries” per se, rather a number 
of works have extended the core-periphery model of radical approaches from other scales 
to the regional. In their introduction to a special issue of the Review of Radical Political 
Economics, Edel et al (1978:1) set the goal of filling a gap in radical approaches to 
uneven development: “The spatial dimension has been incorporated explicitly in two 
distinct traditions of radical thought: studies of international development and 
imperialism, and studies of urban political economics. Neither of these literatures, 
however, addresses regional spatial differentiation within the nations at the center of the 
world capitalist order [emphasis mine].”4 “Internal colonialism” is a term that was used 
casually in related literature and then became a more systematic approach that was 
widespread in the early 1970s.  Many uses of the concept have been criticized for 
unconvincing application and confusion of issues of nationalism and the causes of 
regional poverty (Billings 2009; H. M. Lewis, Johnson, and Askins 1978; Lovering 1978; 
Walls 1978).5 The internal colony model too often fell prey to homogenizing the class 
                                                        
4
 Edel (1992) does note that some anarchist or utopian socialist authors have put forward proposals for 
future social organization based around regional autonomy. However, these are not connected to a broader 
and rigorous systematic framework for understanding existing relations of dependency and uneven 
development in the same way the Marxist tradition is.  
 
5
 There are scattered references to “internal colonies” in the work of dependency theorists. “It is thus no 
exaggeration to say that the main source of primary accumulation of capital in Japan was the village which 
in the course of its entire modern history played for Japanese capitalism the role of an internal colony” 
(Baran 1962:155). Similarly the “Southern states” are said to have “represented for a long time the internal 
colony of American capitalism”(Baran 1962).  
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interests within regions and focusing on distribution at the expense of productive 
relations.  
Debates about regional underdevelopment have reflected the international 
literatures’ divisions over the proper integration and relative explanatory weight of 
internal class dynamics of accumulation and the exchange relations linking an area to the 
larger system. The “staples theory,” pioneered by Canadian political economy, has 
always had a regional component, but one limited to certain types of settler societies with 
resource extraction centered economies (Watkins 2006).6 The Maritimes of the Atlantic 
region of Canada have been the subject of analysis of what can be considered an internal 
periphery (Barrett 1980). Veltmeyer (1978) locates the region’s underdevelopment in its 
large reserve army of labor in contrast to the centralization of capital in Central Canada. 
Wood (1989) criticizes Veltmeyer and suggests that the process of incorporation may 
have created an insufficient proletariat, and, instead of a reserve army contributing to 
higher rates of exploitation, the region’s rate of exploitation may have been too low to 
offset increased transportation costs. This debate also reflects controversies between 
orthodox Marxists’ emphasis on the fundamentals of modes of production and World 
System and Dependency writers’ use of exchange and transfer of surplus as additional 
explanatory factors (Foster 1986; McNally 1981). At the heart of the matter is the 
problem of social formations, integrated into the capitalist world system, that contain 
capitalist and non-capitalist productive relations and how these relate to the accumulation 
of surplus value based upon capitalist class relations. 
Paul Baran (1962) introduced the concept of economic surplus as a more 
encompassing supplement to Marx’s concept of surplus value (Baran and Sweezy 2012) 
as part of a method to deal with the complexity of peripheral social formations. Because 
the class structures of peripheries are subordinated politically and economically, the 
extraction of surplus labor at the point of production must be understood within the larger 
system that reproduces their class relations. “In circumstances such as these, the issue of 
the expropriation of surplus labor, i.e., the issue of exploitation and class, is less than ever 
                                                        
6
 Although staples theory originated from fairly orthodox considerations, it was later expanded upon by 
radical and Marxist theorists (Watkins 2006), most recently by Bunker and Ciccantell (Bunker 1989; 
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divorced from the issue of the utilization of the surplus product, which stands between 
the level of production and the reproduction of society as a whole” (Foster 1986:169). It 
is precisely because the conditions of appropriation and utilization of the surplus and 
those of its production are so complicated in the periphery that a mechanical application 
of Marx’s model of capitalist accumulation in the center is insufficient. Building on 
Baran, Samir Amin proposed a new model of “accumulation on a world scale” (Amin 
1974). For some Marxists, however, theorists like Baran and Amin  
were "guilty" of advancing an understanding of accumulation in a class society 
that did not stop at what went on within the labor process itself, but also 
considered the matter in terms of the larger multifaceted context of social 
reproduction as a whole. And this demanded the scrutiny of various parasitic 
elements like merchant capital, a deformed peripheral state, foreign capital, etc.-
even though the direct connection of these particular interests with production 
itself was tenuous at best (Foster 1986:191). 
The South, as a classic example of a social formation with complex class relations 
of production, has long been discussed as an internal periphery or internal colony of the 
United States (Agnew 1987; Baran 1962; K. Fox 1978; Frank 1979; Malizia 1978). As a 
slave economy inside capitalist nation state, the South represented a social formation 
whose productive relations could not be analyzed without the role of the larger capitalist 
system in shaping its class dynamics. Marx also commented on this relationship and its 
class and political aspects, not the least of which being the Civil War. For example, he 
noted “as soon as people, whose production still moves within the lower forms of slave-
labour, corvée-labour, &c., are drawn into the whirlpool of an international market 
dominated by the capitalistic mode of production, the sale of their products for export 
becoming their principal interest, the civilised horrors of over-work are grafted on the 
barbaric horrors of slavery, serfdom, &c. Hence the negro labour in the Southern States 
of the American Union …[came to be governed by] a question of production of surplus-
labour itself” (Marx 1990:345). The quarter century after the Civil War saw the definitive 
subordination the South to the industrializing core in the North (Agnew 1987).  
Indeed, given its long peripheral status, the evidence of convergence of levels of 
economic development in the South with the rest of the US has been a major historical 
shift in the economic geography of the US (K. Fox 1978; Malizia 1978). Fox (1978) 
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attributes this to capital’s flight from the increased strength of labor in older industrial 
regions and to a historical trend away from the importance of natural resources in 
regional development patterns. However, Fox does not give adequate consideration to the 
problem of sufficient outlets for surplus as an additional motivation for monopoly 
capital’s investment in a “spatial fix” that the capital-intensive urbanization process of the 
South offers, nor does she deal with the persistence of smaller regions such as Central 
Appalachia where natural resources continue to play a powerful role (Harvey 1996; 
Latimer and Mencken 2003). Despite a historical convergence, significant spatial social 
inequalities remain, and are now reproduced at more variegated geographic scales within 
the South along racial and rural-urban dimensions (Deavers and Hoppe 1992; Lobao 
2004; Ziliak 2012a). Such outcomes should draw our attention to the causes of persistent 
peripheralization. 
Contemporary with Fox’s study, Malizia (1978)found evidence of unequal 
exchange within the US: significantly lower wages in the South despite identical labor 
productivities. While unequal exchange in terms of “more labour in exchange for less,… 
this difference…pocketed by a particular class” was described by Marx (1991:345) as 
contributing to the benefit of the developed countries at the expense of the colonies, the 
full development of unequal exchange in labor value was completed by Amin (1976; 
2010). Amin (1977) also recognized early on the importance of non-labor unequal 
exchange in the form of destruction or transfer natural wealth between the center and the 
periphery. However, the full development of a theory of unequal ecological exchange and 
its relation to unequal exchange of labor value remains incomplete (Foster and Holleman 
2014). This is true as well at the subnational scale. One of Amin’s controversial 
contributions is that, in part, the way internal disparities are lessened in center nations is 
through increased surplus made available by penetration of monopoly capital in the 
periphery (a share of which the “aristocracy” of labor has won.)  This results in more 
polarization at the global scale. But, expansion of multinational corporations is in many 
ways an extension of the spatial division of labor that was developed first within the US 
by large corporations in the early 20th century (Hymer 1979; Porter 2006).7 Therefore, it 
                                                        
7
 These corporations practiced the discharging of new armies of reserve labor in the center as certain types 
of production moved to the periphery in stages, first national, then international. However, natural 
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is plausible that a similar process may have occurred within the US between the 
monopolistic, often unionized, industries such as steel and their suppliers of inputs. 
However, such a process creating regional effects would be checked to a degree by the 
greater mobility of labor between national regions relative to nation states.  
Dependency and World-Systems theorists’ regularly recognized such uneven 
development within the nation state as part of the global system, even as their focus 
remained on nation states. Frank’s dependency theory posited the “the contradictions of 
capitalism are recreated on a domestic level and come to generate tendencies toward 
development in the national metropolis and toward underdevelopment in its domestic 
satellites just as they do on the world scale… the regional, local, or sectoral metropolises 
of a satellite country find the limitations of their development multiplied by a capitalist 
structure which renders them dependent on a whole chain of metropolises above them” 
(Frank 1967:10-11). Amin observes “The mechanisms of centralization for the benefit of 
dominant capital also apply as between different regions of the center: the development 
of capitalism is everywhere a development of regional inequalities. Thus, each developed 
country has created its own underdeveloped country within its own borders” (Amin 
1974:27). However, “[d]ependency theory thus seems to suggest that internal peripheries, 
if they exist, are not analogous to the world periphery. Permanent or increasing 
polarization need not occur…The issue is not whether there can be internal peripheries, 
but rather what conditions might allow them to exist, and whether those conditions are 
being overcome in at least some cases” (C. K. Edel et al. 1978:7 emphasis mine). Edel et 
al. offer some orienting variables for consideration “(1) the degree of local or non-local 
control of production; (2) geographic market orientation; (3) the mix of pre-capitalist, 
competitive or monopoly relations of production; (4) the extent of local State autonomy 
and power; and (5) local resource endowments” (1978:10). These, they say, should be 
considered within the context of the wider political economy they are embedded in and 
the region’s class structure and forms of class-consciousness. Smith (1987) also 
emphasizes the analysis of contingent regional dynamics within the world-system 
processes operating at broader levels of abstraction. The uneven overlapping of state 
                                                                                                                                                                     
conditions and the development of the forces of production around transport and extraction form historical 
limits to this process.  
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regulatory, economic, and ecological processes complicate the study of internal 
peripheries. The question of state boundaries is particularly relevant for internal 
peripheries.  
Marx and Engels argued “the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of 
Modern Industry and of the world-market, conquered for itself, in the modern 
representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern State is but a 
committee for managing the affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx 1978:475). Yet to 
perform this role it follows that the state must have a degree of autonomy from the 
competing fractions of capital. Virtually all theories of the state recognize its relative 
autonomy and the importance of its role in the development process. Marxist (Miliband 
2009; Poulantzas 1978) and other class-dominance theories of the state (Domhoff 1990; 
2010; Gonzalez 2001; Mills 2000a; Mizruchi 2013) are centrally concerned with the 
political process by which dominant class interests determine their shared interests and 
maintain their hegemony over state power in the face of internal division and challenges 
from other social groups. In world-systems theory competing nation states play a key role 
in maintaining capitalism as a world economy rather than reverting to a world empire. 
Wallerstein (2004) summarizes state functions as follows: 1. They determine what 
crosses their borders. 2. They maintain regimes of property rights. 3. They determine the 
rules of the labor process. 4. They determine which costs firms must internalize through 
regulation and public investment. 5. They control monopolization of goods and activities. 
6. They levy taxes. 7. They apply pressure to the decisions of other states. Subnational 
levels of government do all of these things as well, but they do so in a manner proscribed 
by their subordinate position within the larger state structure. The variation of influence 
by different social groups at the different levels of state power can make for complex 
configurations of social regulation and conflict. Not only the willingness, but also the 
capacity of the state to effectively intervene at different scales is an important question 
affected by the balance of class forces and fractions (Bunker 1985). National boundaries 
are firmer boundaries than regional and state boundaries, they are more capable of 
regulating the flow of labor, capital, and commodities. Regions often lack a coherent 
political structure. Regions created by a shared a watershed, coal seam, or other 
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landscape features may be both united and divided among a hierarchy of multiple state 
boundaries.  
Since the peak of radical political economy in the late 1970s there have been a 
number of important studies of internal regional peripheries in the US. The foremost 
being David Walls rejection of the then dominant colonial model in favor of viewing 
Appalachia as an internal periphery in the world-systems tradition (Walls 1976; 1978). 
Some later scholars have examined the regional patterns of the US as a whole (Agnew 
1987) while others have focused more on particular regions (Driscoll and Kick 2013; 
Dunaway 1996a; Leitner 2004; Taylor 2004) and a few down to the county scale (Hanna 
1995). With the exception of Hanna, none of the literature examines the reproduction of 
Appalachia as a periphery post-Civil War, nor advances a framework to integrate the 
nature of unequal exchange occurring with the class structures that reproduce it.   
I posit that a major factor allowing internal peripheries to exist and persist over 
the long term, distinct from labor immobility or labor market segmentation as seen in 
racialized or “internal colonial” configurations, are the socio-metabolic dynamics 
involved in successive modes of extraction. Locally dominant classes in competition and 
collaboration with national elites have reproduced Central Appalachia as an extractive 
periphery, first building a metabolic regime that matured around a mode of extraction 
premised on super-exploitation and profits by deduction. Following the national 
rebalancing of class forces during the New Deal and WWII the coal economy produced a 
new metabolic regime whose central contradictions of dependent development revolved 
around the reproduction of the region as an environmental sacrifice zone. The concept of 
mode of extraction can highlight the complex and peculiar interaction of class relations of 
production and the appropriation and utilization of surplus that emerge from the 
contradiction of capitalist valuation and the natural basis of extractive commodities.  
Reformulating Bunker’s mode of extraction. A mode of extraction must be rooted 
in a particular space where the extracted resource is located. This problematizes the 
overlap of political, economic, and ecological boundaries. As Bunker remarked: 
The concept of regions, or regionally defined social formations, and of regional 
ecosystems are crucial to analysis of extraction-production relations. Modes of 
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extraction may emerge within nations dominated by modes of production; 
Appalachian mining and northwestern forestry in the United States are easy 
examples; Amazonian extraction and the growing industrial plant of south-central 
Brazil provide another. Inclusion of extractive regions under the authority of 
modern industrial states requires us to pay close attention to the different 
boundaries of overlapping political, legal, economic, social, and ecological 
systems (Bunker 1985:57). 
Theories of underdevelopment involve both the “internal” political economy of the 
region in question and the “external” articulation it has with the larger world-system. An 
extractive region is by definition peripheral because it is a social formation oriented 
towards meeting the material demands determined in productive centers elsewhere. 
Therefore, internal structures must always be analyzed in relation to the influence of the 
center or core economies to which it is tied. The relationship between center and 
periphery is one of unequal exchange, both in economic value and in natural use values 
of the earth. 
Although Stephen Bunker (1984) is widely viewed as the first modern theorist to 
directly employ the concept of unequal ecological exchange (Hornborg 2009; Jorgenson 
and Clark 2009; Rice 2009), direct and indirect references can be found in earlier 
literature (Foster and Holleman 2014). Nevertheless, his analysis had significant impact 
on the discipline. In his first major book on the subject Bunker argued “production 
models cannot explain the internal dynamics of extractive economies because the 
exploitation of natural resources uses and destroys values in energy and material which 
cannot be calculated in terms of labor or capital” (1985:22). Instead, he proposes an 
economic model with an unequal and dialectical relationship between “modes of 
production” which primarily transform materials and energy and “modes of extraction” in 
which materials are directly appropriated from nature.  
Because this appropriation and its ecological results affect the class structures, the 
organization of labor, systems of exchange and property, the activities of the state, 
the distribution of populations, the development of physical infrastructure, and the 
kinds of information, beliefs, and ideologies which shape social organization and 
behavior, I introduce the idea, mode of extraction, to suggest the systemic 
connections between these phenomena. My usage thus parallels the more 
inclusive definitions of mode of production… I will argue, though, that both 
modes of extraction and modes of production can only be understood in terms of 
their integral interdependence and their impacts on natural ecosystemic processes. 
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Orthodox Marxist notions of the reproduction of modes of production must be 
reformulated to account for these ecological interdependencies (Bunker 1985:22-
3).  
Despite initially dismissing too quickly Emmanuel (1972) and Amin’s (1976) labor value 
focused theory of unequal exchange and flirting with reductionism toward energetics, 
Bunker made some key insights that he continued to develop over his lifetime. As Bunker 
(2007) later came to recognize, Marx himself had recognized these ecological 
interdependencies and the problems of their spatial disruption in his theorizing of 
capitalism’s metabolic rift (Foster 1999a). The problem with “productive models” 
neglecting the values Bunker identified as critical to extractive economies was a real 
reflection of the contradictory functioning of capitalist production. 
Bunker advanced the linkages between the socio-natural relations of his mode of 
extraction and its correlation with persistent underdevelopment, yet struggled to 
satisfactorily theorize the relationship of natural wealth and exchange value: 
Regions whose economic ties to the world system are based almost exclusively on 
the exchange of extracted commodities (that is, resources which occur in nature 
and in whose existence or continued reproduction there is no deliberate human 
intervention), can be characterized as extreme peripheries because of the low 
proportions of capital and labor incorporated in the total value of their exports and 
because of the low level of linkages to other economic activities and social 
organization in the same region. (Bunker 1985:24). 
For Marxist labor value approaches, the “low proportions of capital and labor 
incorporated in the total value” of exports is a reflection of the high importance of rents 
and the transference of surplus value (Foster and Holleman 2014; Higginbottom 2014). 
Indeed, the concept mode of extraction should serve to highlight the implications for the 
geographical flows of value as these forms of income accrue to different classes in 
different locations. Extraction is geographically tied to the location of the resource and to 
the extent this separates it spatially from other economic activity the advantages of 
“external economies” are denied. Bunker’s work (Bunker 1989; Bunker and Ciccantell 
2005) drew more explicitly on Harold Innis’s (1956) investigation of why some areas 
transitioned out of extractive, export led, development better than others. The dependence 
of a regional economy on a single or handful of extractive commodities increases 
structural vulnerability to fluctuating markets and tends to raise difficulties in creating 
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final demand linkages (Watkins 2006) that are necessary for auto-centric development. 
Yet, these peripheral regions may be subordinated to core regions within the same or 
different nation state boundaries so that the long-term vulnerability of these regions 
varies accordingly. A peripheral region within a nation state that is ascendant in the world 
system may have better prospects for political demands for redress of the problems of 
underdevelopment.   
The development of the forces of production in extractive economies has an 
inverted relation to that in “productive” economies. By accelerating resource depletion 
productivity-enhancing innovations often shorten the period of prosperity while 
increasing dependency on capital imports from outside the region. Furthermore, the 
development of productive forces often reduces the need for labor, which can further 
limit effective demand in the region. This is in contrast to the agglomeration effects and 
external economies associated with economies of scale created by production in 
urbanizing areas (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005).  
Rather than the theoretically eclectic approach to unequal exchange upon which 
Bunker originally built his concept of “mode of extraction,” I propose to reground this 
concept within a consistently Marxist framework. I argue that “orthodoxy” in method 
(Lukács 1968) is actually essential for improving the conceptualization of a mode of 
extraction with the kind of explanatory power desired by Bunker. Marx highlighted the 
special case of “the extractive industries, such as mining, hunting, fishing (and 
agriculture, but only so far as it starts by breaking up virgin soil), where the material for 
labour is provided directly by nature” (1990:287) as an exception to the typical relations 
governing the labor process and valorization process under capitalism. The destructive 
practices encouraged by the free appropriation of these materials, their self-undermining 
character under capitalism, and the contradiction between wealth and value were, 
contrary to Bunker and others’ assumptions, not overlooked by Marx’s value theory but 
at its heart (Burkett 1999a; 1999b; Foster and Holleman 2014). The unitary nature of 
value and price cannot be made commensurable with the many-sided forms of wealth that 
exist in the relationship of humans to the rest of nature. It is this heterogeneous, 
historically specific and concrete aspect of wealth and its appropriation or destruction that 
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is so difficult to reconcile with the homogeneity of capital accumulation. Marx conceived 
of extraction under capitalism as a special case of capitalist production that could be 
identified as having general properties in the abstract, but subject to specific constraints 
based on the diversity of concrete historical forms taken. 
Reviewing Paolucci’s (2007) arrangement of the moments of Marx’s analytical 
method allows for a theoretically consistent reinterpretation of Bunker’s (1985) concept 
of “mode of extraction” in a Marxist framework. “The categories that make up 
determinant abstractions – the abstract and the concrete, the general and the specific – 
allow for four ‘synthetic unities,’ ranging from the most specific and concrete to the most 
general and abstract” (Paolucci 2007:164). The specific concrete represents history in all 
its detail and contingency while the general abstract represents the most universal laws 
within a given level of generality. These synthetic unities can therefore be applied within 
each level of generality iteratively as a process of successive abstractions.  
To be a submode – class systems as a submode of production in general and/or 
capitalism as a submode of class systems – a concrete reality must possess all the 
essential qualities of a general category (identity), and possess a unique 
institutional configuration that sets it off from other submodes of the same 
category (difference)… For example, once capitalism (general concrete) is 
abstracted out of class systems (specific abstract), it can be re-abstracted as a 
specific abstract category and then broken down again – always using 
observations of the specific concrete – into its own general concrete subcategories 
[e.g. industrial capitalism or monopoly capitalism]… (Paolucci 2007:166).  
What Paolucci is describing is the necessary relationship between abstract 
theoretical categories and concrete empirical data as Marx’s method proceeds. “This 
method of gaining historical knowledge recognizes the existence of an inescapable 
epistemological tension between conceptual and empirical analysis, and it is a method of 
dialectical movement between them. The role of theory is to reach the inner bond behind 
the empirical data, and that of empirical analysis is to correct theoretical abstraction. 
Each is necessary, and each alone is insufficient” (Fracchia 1991:172). 
Identity and difference: extraction and production in capitalism. Taking the 
capitalist mode of production as the general abstract, and the world-system as the 
general concrete, I abstract out submodes upon two poles in the method of accumulation 
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by capitals—those based primarily upon the transformation of raw materials, the subject 
of previous labor collected from any space and those situated mainly around the direct 
appropriation of raw materials, of necessity, within particular spaces in nature. The 
identity is that they are moments of capitalist production in general, and are organized 
under the drive of capitalist accumulation and the worldwide law of value (Amin 2010), 
while the difference is found in their geographical separation in space and, relatedly, the 
configuration of capitalists involved and how they appropriate and utilize surplus value.  
In the cases Bunker treats as typical of “modes of production” surplus value is 
appropriated as profit in the sense of Marx’s basic capitalist model—from the productive 
labor of workers employed directly by the capitalists involved (including both formal and 
real subsumption of labor)—with the object of labor being the product of previous labor. 
In the instances of Bunker’s “modes of extraction” the greater portion of the potentially 
realizable surplus value in the price of the commodities produced constitutes a resource 
rent (primarily differential rent, but also possibly “absolute” or monopoly rent) on a 
natural resource subject to exhaustion, rather than the value contributed by labor in the 
extractive process itself (see (M. Edel 1992) on forms of rent).8 When the resources in 
question are controlled by the same fraction of capital engaged in extractive production 
(that is “freely appropriated”), this additional potential surplus does not appear as a 
distinct rent but simply as higher profits due to greater productivity and/or monopoly 
power. The mode of extraction approach can provide a stronger ecological dimension 
rooted in the specific nature of the use values involved compared to the typically one-
sided political emphasis around “resource curse” theorizing of rentier economies (while 
recognizing that dimension as well). The importance of struggle over the size and 
realization of this rent/monopoly surplus and the constraints inherent in the appropriation 
of natural use-values is what distinguishes the class dynamics in an “extractive” mode. 
These constraints have a spatial component as resources are located in particular areas 
and rich deposits tend to be located further and further from established productive 
centers as the closest are depleted over time (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005). As a result, 
transportation infrastructure linking resources and productive centers is a key factor in the 
                                                        
8
 Of course, this value realized as rent is a claim on socially necessary labor produced elsewhere in the 
system.  
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capture of rents. While elements of this spatial differentiation of the production process in 
general exist in tributary societies and feudalism, their full development and their relation 
to the law of value is only visible in capitalist society and its world-system ((Amin 2010), 
see also (Pomeranz 2009) on the historical novelty of persistent peripheries).9  
Marx developed his own value theory out of a critique of previous labor value 
approaches in classical political economy. Classical political economy had long 
recognized the contradictory relationship between use values and exchange values. 
“Marx analyzes human history from the standpoint of the production of wealth, defined 
as use values, that is, anything that (directly in consumption or indirectly as a means of 
production) satisfies human needs” (Burkett 1999a:25).  Exchange values have a 
precondition of usefulness but also require an element of scarcity. The Earl of Lauderdale 
pointed out the paradox that a loss of useful public wealth that created scarcity could 
increase private riches through generating exchange value where before there was none 
(Daly 1998; Foster, Clark, and York 2010). Marx drew on Lauderdale, but went much 
further in developing his analysis of the underlying contradictions between use values 
that make up public wealth and capitalist forms of valuation. In classical political 
economy the theory of rent was used to explain the valuation of nature, which is not the 
product of human labor. Unlike Ricardo, Marx recognized that natural conditions could 
be degraded or improved by human activity and incorporated this into his criticism of 
capitalist agriculture and his theory of rent (Foster 2000; Nwoke 1984). Where there is no 
effective scarcity of a natural use value it is freely appropriated by capital. It is only 
where scarcity exists by virtue of the monopolization of some natural use value that the 
owner can demand a portion of the surplus value produced from capital. For Marx, the 
existence of rental charges manifested the tension between the material dependence of 
capitalist production on use values found in nature and their abstract valorization as “free 
gifts” in the production process. Likewise capital’s reliance on the reproduction of labor 
power by households, particularly when they engage in subsistence activities, constitutes 
                                                        
9
 Pomeranz (2009) argues in a historical comparative study of Western Europe and China that the creation 
of raw material producing peripheries that are persistently subject to unequal exchange required the 
historical development of a sufficient gradient of technology that could not simply be adopted by the 
periphery when terms of trade became onerous. Capitalist development of industrial technology and the 
political force of imperialism were the necessary impetus to the reproduction of resource peripheries 
through market relations.  
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another manifestation of the contradiction between use value and exchange value.  
“These activities certainly involve appropriation of natural wealth including not only 
extra-human natural conditions…but also the natural force of household labor power. But 
the maintenance and development of exploitable labor power associated with such 
domestic activities is freely appropriated by capital. It is a use value, not a value” 
(Burkett 1999a:105). Such free appropriation of the metabolic activities of households is 
a pervasive part of the modern capitalist world system and is intimately connected to the 
unequal exchange of labor values and natural use values that occurs along commodity 
chains along the core-periphery continuum (Dunaway 2001; 2012; J. Smith and 
Wallerstein 1992).  
In Europe rents accrued to a distinct landlord class, but such a class distinct from 
capital was never present in the US.  However, rent can also applied to claims on the 
surplus value made by the State. “In Marx’s view, there is no reason why such rents 
cannot be designed and enforced by the state” (Burkett 1999a:94). The State crucially is 
capable not only of claiming land and resource rents for itself but of determining the legal 
basis upon which capital may freely appropriate or be forced to pay for natural use values. 
A severance tax on minerals is an example of the former, while the granting of eminent 
domain, permission to dam or redirect waterways, and the terms of nuisance law are 
examples of the latter. The State is the venue of conflict over so-called externalities both 
through the regulatory process and the courts. Unless regulation effectively forbids 
certain environmental practices, it, in effect, sets a price for them. However, these costs 
are not and in the many cases of non-renewable resources could never be equivalent to 
the costs of reproducing the appropriated use values or the web of surrounding ecological 
relations disrupted in the process (Burkett 2006; Perelman 2003). The price of coal 
reserves, for example, is, in effect, the capitalization of the rent they are capable securing. 
“Mining rent can be defined in general terms as the difference between the market price 
of a unit of mineral resource sold in the form of finished products and the total average 
costs [including amortization and average profit] incurred in discovering, producing, 
transporting, refining, and marketing the unit of that particular mineral resource” (Nwoke 
1984). State policy that affects the demand for all coal, certain types of coal, or the 
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production process in turn affects such rents and therefore price. This brings to bear 
different class fractions upon relevant state policy. 
Marx analyzed the shifting alliance of forces between the landed classes, labor, 
and capital over agricultural and industrial policy in his day. The treadmill of production 
approach applied to the post-WII period in contemporary sociology has highlighted the 
tendency for capital to bind labor to opposition of policies that would curb capital’s free 
appropriation of nature.10  The forces giving rise to such class fraction alignments are 
particularly salient in extractive economies as the costs of natural resources and the 
limitation or pricing of externalities are contested. For an internal periphery subject to 
overlapping state jurisdictions there is added complexity from the different balance of 
class forces at local to national scales. Coal is one example where the terrain of regulation 
has repeatedly shifted from local to national over conditions affecting both supply and 
demand along the commodity chain (Clark, Jorgenson, and Auerbach 2012).   
Expressed in terms of the synthetic unities posed above, “mode of extraction” can 
thus be theorized at the specific abstract level within the general abstract theoretical 
level of the capitalist mode of production. The specific concrete examples of modes of 
extraction would include the Amazon, Central Appalachia, or the Niger Delta (see Table 
1.1).  
Table 1.1. Synthetic unities applied to differentiating extraction and production. 
                                                        
10
 In Daly’s terms the rents of the “landlords” have been sacrificed to provide growth and peace between 
capital and labor and “…it has become evident that, however, unworthy of his rents the landlord may be, 
the social cost of today’s low resource prices is being shifted to future generations, and to the other species 
whose habitats we are taking over” (Daly 2007:26). 
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This approach can avoid the confusion over the relationships between use-values, labor-
value, and exchange-value in the process of unequal exchange frequently arising from 
Bunker’s early works while building upon his insights into the path dependencies and 
unequal exchange involved in extractive regions.  
A lack of a clear theoretical relationship to the original labor-value based theory of 
unequal exchange or its connection to natural use-values has persisted and proliferated in 
literature on uneven development associated with unequal ecological exchange (cf Foster 
and Holleman 2014; e.g. Hornborg 2009; Rice 2009). A vital exception to this is Amin’s 
(2010) incorporation of unequal exchange in use values into his elaboration of 
Emmanuel’s original unequal exchange approach.  
Amin uses the concept of “imperial rent” to represent the totality of unequal 
exchange between the center and periphery—comprising both labor values and use-
values in nature. Amin distinguishes peripheral, dependent forms of capitalist 
development from the auto-centric forms of accumulation found in the center. Both the 
social and the natural basis of a “mode of extraction” inhibit the type of auto-centric 
accumulation found in the core. Both the peripheral forms of accumulation of value and 
the way in which natural wealth and labor use values are degraded or dispersed create 
barriers to auto-centric capital accumulation and human development. Delineating the 
realm of phenomena that can been modeled economically using observable exchange 
values from the broader materialist historical process that determines the parameters of 
the economic system allows us to better problematize the historically determined process 
of unequal access to, and exchange of, use values and natural wealth (Amin 2010). The 
core exploits the periphery through the political maintenance of privileged economic 
access to the globe’s natural wealth and technologies. Core monopolies in key 
technologies provide economic and, when necessary, military leverage for continued 
unequal exchange of the products of labor and the earth.11 
                                                        
11
 Viewed in this way the “transformation problem” of values and prices is more a historical than a 
mathematical problem (Higginbottom 2014). 
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Bunker and Ciccantell (2005) recognize the importance of peripheral nations 
capitalizing on their resources and increasing their rents as a way to combat their 
peripheral status, but they understate the importance of imperialism and the limits 
peripheral class structures put on the investment of rents successfully captured.12 The 
way in which Amin systematically approaches the complex historical relation between 
use values and exchange value in the unequal development of the capitalist world system 
can be used to reground Bunker’s mode of extraction. More specifically, it can be used to 
better distinguish and analyze the forces driving peripheralization specifically related to 
extraction in an “extreme periphery” like the Amazon from those associated with 
peripheralization more generally, or those associated with low-wage manufacturing.   
Paolucci reminds us that concepts should be carved at the level of generality of 
their data. The sub-modes of extraction/production should be reflected in the abstract 
across the capitalist mode of production’s history and geography but will be demarcated 
concretely by regions not likely to match state boundaries. This makes data collection and 
analysis more difficult. What constitutes a region dominated by extractive versus 
productive activity fluctuates over time. Bunker and Ciccantell’s later work seizes upon 
transportation system development as the key to the dialectical development of the 
scaling up of both production and extraction. Both commercial transportation systems 
affecting both the flow of commodities and labor and natural metabolic systems are 
important to identifying boundaries of extractive regions for analysis (Bunker and 
Ciccantell 2005). 
Appalachia. Although sociology has not always integrated spatial questions into 
its theorizing of inequality, in the US, the subfields of rural sociology and environmental 
sociology have been at the forefront of research on social problems at the regional 
level—located between the more common units of nation and city (Lobao 2004; Lobao 
and Hooks 2007). This is because they are compelled to deal with space relationally with 
a focus on the unevenness of capitalist development and how people relate to the land. 
While analysis at the urban and national level is well established, it is at the intrinsically 
                                                        
12
 For example, it is not at all clear how much difference in Central Appalachia’s development higher 
profits via coal rents would have made given the level of absentee ownership and the investment patterns of 
local capital.  
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more difficult to define subnational or regional level that theory building must take of the 
challenge of overlapping political, economic, and ecological boundaries that are 
themselves historically changing.  
The difficulty in defining Appalachia as a region reflects the complex way in 
which space and place are defined. Appalachia is one of the oldest place names in North 
America recorded by Europeans (originally in what is today Florida). By the 20th century, 
Appalachian had come into use defining not only the oldest mountain range in the world 
but also the people who resided there (Montrie 2003). The mountains stretch from 
Pennsylvania and Maryland down through Ohio, Virginia, West Virginia, Tennessee, 
Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, and into northern Georgia and Alabama 
(Davis 2000). The southern portion of Appalachia, from West Virginia on south, was 
identified by popular writers as early as the late 19th century as being peculiarly 
backwards in cultural and economic terms—an image that survives in popular culture 
today (Billings, Pudup, and Waller 1995; Scott 2010). This image of the region as an 
isolated cultural and political economic holdover, bypassed by capitalist modernization, 
persisted in the academy into the 1960s (through application of “culture of poverty” 
analyses and modernization theory) before it was challenged by a new generation of 
historians and social scientists (Pudup, Billings, and Waller 1995). These scholars, 
organically linked to the social struggles and conflict of the period, labeled the region an 
“internal colony” whose poverty was the result of the domination of outside political and 
economic powers interested only in the regions rich natural resources (H. M. Lewis et al. 
1978). This perspective reinterpreted the claims of a distinctive pre-modern culture as a 
vernacular form of resistance and perseverance against the predation of industrial 
capitalism that had fallen upon a previously independent and egalitarian people. Soon, 
however, better historical accounts and the influence of world systems theory and 
dependency approaches situated the importance of absentee ownership and external 
forces with reality of incorporation of the region as capitalist periphery from before 
colonial resettlement (Billings 2009; Dunaway 1996a; R. L. Lewis 1998; Walls 1976). 
Closer attention to the role of internal elites and the class dynamics in which they 
struggled has brought out greater appreciation of the significant variations in 
development trajectories across the region (Egolf, Fones-Wolf, and Martin 2009). Feuds 
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between rival families, such as the Hatfields and McCoys, once seen as indicative of a 
peculiar culture are now understood as intra-elite conflicts over political and economic 
power common to capitalist frontiers throughout US history (Waller 1988).  
Appalachia reentered the popular consciousness in the 1960s as a major target of 
the Johnson administration’s War on Poverty. While the Appalachian Regional 
Commission (created in that era as a regional development agency) has come to 
politically define over 420 counties as part of the region, it is in the Central Appalachian 
region encompassing West Virginia, eastern Kentucky, as well as part of Tennessee and 
Virginia that poverty and underdevelopment remains most concentrated today (Duncan 
1992; Lobao and Hooks 2007; Ziliak 2012b).13 In particular the coalfields of 
southwestern West Virginia and eastern Kentucky remain places of significant suffering 
and deprivation fifty years after Johnson stood with a camera crew in Martin county 
Kentucky to launch his initiative. In addition to the legacy of ills associated with the high 
levels of exploitation and danger in the coal industry there, today the ravages of surface 
coal mining on the environment pose an increasingly documented threat to the health of 
residents and the entire bioregion (if not the planet itself) (Austin and Clark 2012; 
Wishart 2012). To explain why this subregion has remained such a persistently 
peripheralized area, even as other parts of historically marginal Southern Appalachia 
have seen the rise of new urban growth poles and improving prospects, I argue it is 
necessary to trace the overlapping socio-metabolic relations created by successive 
regimes of resource extraction that involve the interplay of both local and national politic 
economic processes. Marxist ecology is equipped to apply such a metabolic approach to 
the contested reproduction of central Appalachia as an internal, extractive periphery 
through which large, often multinational, corporate actors exert their power to reshape the 
landscape of the region. Such domination has always been met with resistance in the 
local to national political systems that govern life in the region.   
Internal peripheries that start as part colonial peripheries in the world system but 
maintain their peripheral status, even as the nation in which they are embedded rises to 
                                                        
13
 I am using the terms Central and Southern Appalachia in a different sense than the common definitions 
applied by the Appalachian Regional Commission. The ARC includes only the southern counties of West 
Virginia in Central Appalachia and treats Central and Southern as separate rather than overlapping.   
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central status, should be of particular interest. Central Appalachia has persisted as a 
periphery and presents a case study with which to examine the utility of the mode of 
extraction concept in explaining persistent underdevelopment of a resource rich region. 
Overview of Chapters and Methods 
 I have laid out the fundamental ontological and methodological blocks upon 
which this work rests. There are many methods, tools with their own virtues and 
limitations, which can be integrated within such an approach. In this dissertation I intend 
to follow C. Wright Mills in eschewing the divorce of theory and method, still popular 
despite his canonization in sociology (Mills 2000b). I employ several different analytical 
techniques drawing on different areas of the sociological literature: historical comparative 
methods, regression analysis, and network analysis while drawing from the power 
structure, political economy, dependency and world-system literatures. It is the adoption 
of the meta-theoretical underpinning described above, and developed most fully by the 
Marxist tradition, that provides the opportunity for a more integrative synthesis using 
multiple approaches. Different tools are useful for different levels of analysis and 
explanation but their use in a consistent and integrative manner requires such an orienting 
framework as I have proposed. I will only sketch the methods to be used here, later 
presenting each chapter’s methods in more detail together with the relevant literature.  
  I begin in chapter II with the question of underdevelopment and a historical 
analysis of the Appalachian region as an internal extractive periphery in the period 
leading up to World War II. Next, in chapter III, I examine how the mode of extraction 
dominating the coalfields of Central Appalachia was reproduced in the face of political 
challenges in the decades following the Second World War and conclude with a brief 
comparison with Bunker’s study of the Amazon. In chapter IV, I employ time series 
regression to investigate whether surface mining exacerbates the negative developmental 
outcomes of coal mining in general. For chapter V I turn to the structure of economic 
competition and political coordination in the coal industry and apply network analysis to 
examine how coal’s place in the capitalist policy-planning network relates to elite policy 
positions on the 2009 climate legislation. Finally, in chapter VI (previously published as 
(Wishart 2012)), to show the linkages between all the levels of analysis in chapters II-IV, 
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I analyze one mountain, Coal River Mountain, and examine the ongoing process of 
underdevelopment and capitalism’s metabolic rifts there from the vantage points of 
ecology, capital, and human development. 
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CHAPTER II 
INTERNAL PERIPHERIES AND MODES OF EXTRACTION PART I: 
APPALACHIA AS PERSITENT EXTRACTIVE PERIPHERY 
This chapter analyzes Central Appalachia’s underdevelopment as an internal 
periphery and the emergence of a mode of extraction dominated by coal production. The 
metabolic restructuring of the social formations of this extractive periphery fed the 
developing centers of the US economy while ecologically degrading the region and 
increasing the vulnerability of the labor force to super-exploitation. As the US established 
itself as a core power in the world system the Central Appalachian region’s coal industry 
fed an unequal exchange of surplus labor and natural wealth. These relations were 
reproduced until the shifting balance of class forces at the national level undermined the 
conditions of labor exploitation through unionization associated with the New Deal. The 
subsequent realignment of capital fractions and labor are dealt with in the following 
chapter. 
The Appalachian region was incorporated into the capitalist world-system from 
the very beginning as an extractive periphery (Dunaway 1996b; 1996a). This was initially 
true of the Americas as a whole, but Appalachia’s structural position (and that of Central 
Appalachia most enduringly) remained one of an extractive periphery even as the United 
States became a productive core nation and rose to hegemonic status within the world-
system (Bunker 1985; Bunker and Ciccantell 2005; Dunaway 1996a; Walls 1978). 
Appalachia’s topography, waterways, and natural resources combined historically with 
its starting place in global commodity chains to create path dependencies shaping its 
developmental potential in an iterative process similar to the successive “modes of 
extraction” described by Bunker (1984) in the Brazilian Amazon. Comparison of the two 
regions will be used to identify analogous processes unfolding through extraction based 
capitalist development within the evolving world-system as well as divergences based 
upon their political, economic, and geographical embeddedness in nation states with very 
different historical world system trajectories. 
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Though there is a large and long running body of literature in the dependency and 
world-system traditions that examines the role of raw materials in uneven development 
and unequal exchange between core and peripheral nation-states, integration with 
ecological studies on the historical development process is relatively more recent 
(Bunker 1989; 1992; Moore 2000; Watkins 2006). Such integration is an area of rapidly 
growing interest (Ciccantell, D. A. Smith, and Seidman 2005; Hornborg, McNeill, and 
Martinez-Alier 2007; Roberts and Grimes 2002), but, as in the development literature, 
most of these studies have not attempted to analyze the dynamics of internal peripheries 
within nation-states and the complex ways in which nation-states’ world-system positions 
mediate in the connection of extractive regions to raw materials commodity chains (for 
exceptions see (Driscoll and Kick 2013; Leitner 2004)). It is precisely the interrelations 
of social and ecological forces that present an important advance in understanding 
persistent peripheralization within developed nations. Internal peripheries typically lack 
the immobility of labor so important in unequal exchange between nations. The spatial 
organization of extraction is therefore of great importance in accounting for persistent 
peripheralization (Brookfield 1975).  
Underdeveloping Appalachia: Extraction and Unequal Exchange in an Internal 
Periphery of the United States 
Building upon analysis by Wilma Dunaway (1996a; 1996b), I focus on the 
dominance of extractive industries in Central Appalachia from 1860 through 1940, 
particularly timber and coal, analyzing them as part of a mode of extraction. To fully 
understand the relation between extraction and underdevelopment at least three vantage 
points must be employed: the perspective of ecology, of human development (human 
“social” ecology), and of capital accumulation (political economy); each alternatively at 
the level of the community, the state/region, the nation, and the globe—a task beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. Therefore to first establish the most important structural 
relations and the extent they can be generalized for the region as a whole, I begin here 
primarily with the political economy vantage point dominant in the literature. The 
extension of this vantage point must still include ecological relations as these are, of 
course, not mutually exclusive categories but will not be as comprehensive of ecological 
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relations as would be necessary, for example, from Marx’s vantage point of capitalism’s 
metabolic rift focused on human development (which will gain greater focus in chapter 6). 
Abstracting Central Appalachia. Appalachia is a region in the eastern United 
States that has been historically defined by its mountainous geography. The term 
“Appalachia” originally referred only to the mountain ranges but has come to encompass 
the people and cultures that inhabit the mountains as well (H. D. Shapiro 1986). These 
mountains have been metabolically linked to human societies for over a thousand years 
(Guffey 2005). The number of humans, their social metabolism with each other, and the 
mountain ecosystems they inhabit changed drastically over the past 400 years as the 
region has been incorporated and evolved within the capitalist world system. Central and 
Southern parts of the region have followed significantly different development paths 
from other core industrial areas in the United States. Southern Appalachia is referred to 
in this work as the region from what is today West Virginia all the way south to Georgia 
and Alabama. Central Appalachia for my purposes, more narrowly, encompasses the 
entire state of West Virginia as well as the eastern parts of Kentucky and Tennessee and 
western Virginia (see Figure 2.1). The economy of Central Appalachia, particularly the 
coal fields of the Kentucky-West Virginia borderlands, has been especially dominated by 
the appropriation of materials from the land and their export in relatively unaltered form 
to core areas of the US economy but also other core and semi-peripheral areas of the 
globe (Austin and Clark 2012; Dunaway 1996a). I would modify Simon’s prescription 
“one does not study Appalachia; rather he or she studies the social relations which 
characterize Appalachia in a given instance” (1983) to encompass “socio-metabolic 
relations.” Many of these relations span the whole Southern region while others are 
specific to the Central range, but it is their interaction and overlap that explain persistent 
peripheralization. 
 Although “epochs in the history of society are no more separated from each other 
by hard and fast lines of demarcation, than are geological epochs” (Marx 1990:492), the 
material bases and productive relations characterizing Central Appalachia’s economy 
following incorporation into the capitalist world-system may be viewed as having gone 
through four overlapping successive modes of extraction. First, extraction of 
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Figure 2.1. Coalfields and Central ARC Counties 
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plants and animals through hunting, gathering and trapping; second, extraction of 
agricultural products both directly by grazing livestock on wild foods and less directly by 
converting forestland to rapidly soil-depleting agricultural practices for capitalist 
markets; third, extraction of timber for export; and finally extraction of coal, initially 
through labor intensive and later by more capital intensive forms. The spatial association 
of economic underdevelopment and extractive activity is the result of complex historical 
progression of Central Appalachia as an internal periphery within the United States. Such 
a process is particularly suited to analysis by historical and comparative methods that 
allow for better understanding of what are often referred to as “path dependent” outcomes 
(Mahoney 2000), involving reciprocal causal relationships over long periods of time that 
are difficult to tease out through quantitative models.  
 For example, absentee ownership established long before the turn 21st century (the 
period examined in chapter 4) may later facilitate both a shift toward surface mining and 
worse socio-economic outcomes. At one level these ownership patterns are a structural 
outcome of global capitalism (Dunaway 1996a), but at lower levels of generality we see 
variation that subverts mechanical determination. A historical approach can also be used 
to examine how these processes shaped and were shaped by social groups’ struggles both 
along and across class lines. Communities that are drawn into struggles around labor and 
environmental conflicts face complex and shifting power structures at local, state and 
federal levels of the political battlefield. The outcomes of these struggles at the state level, 
such as the interpretation and earlier or later abolishment of the “broad form deed” giving 
mineral rights priority over surface rights, should certainly affect the relationship of 
surface mining today to the future developmental trajectories in different states. Studies 
of the socio-economic effects of coal mining have usually relied on county level data 
because of the availability of data at that unit of analysis. However, the some effects of 
the mining process manifest themselves in the immediate sense at the community level 
(Bell 2009) while the development of mines and community responses are shaped by 
interactions at the larger level. It is at the community level that companies apply social 
pressure, environmental effects from surface mining are most keenly felt, and where 
workers wages are spent. Governments overlap in their regulation and redistribution of 
property and income in ways that are complex and vary across the region. While on the 
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one hand this means there is no “right level/scale” for analysis, on the other hand the 
methods discussed above provide a flexible approach able to bridge between these levels 
of abstraction used by chapter 4’s quantitative analysis and the richer description 
available from a historical comparative approach to which I now turn. 
Colonial-Native Articulation—Slaves, Pelts & Herbs (1600s-1780) 
Before contact with Europeans, a number of densely populated agricultural 
societies occupied Appalachian river valleys. Many of them cultivated beans, maize and 
squash as staple crops and supplemented them with walnut and mulberry orchards and by 
hunting, gathering, and fishing of wild foods (Guffey 2005). Fire was used to open up 
new areas for agriculture, enrich existing soils, create habitat for game and maintain river 
cane for building construction and weaving. These ways of life were all but destroyed by 
1600 via European diseases that killed 90 percent of the Native American population. 
This pandemic drastically changed socio-ecological structures of these indigenous people, 
even prior to the arrival of substantial European populations. Forest cover increased as 
lands fell out of cultivation and management. Bison and elk herds expanded into the area 
and grew in number while deer populations leveled off as their preferred habitat 
decreased with reduced land management(Guffey 2005). By the next century the 
Cherokee were perhaps the only remaining indigenous group with a large population 
stretching the Appalachians.  
 “Indian slaves were the first Southern Appalachian commodities to be marketed. 
When African slaves replaced Indian labor on the world market, Southern Appalachia 
provided raw materials to support core manufacturing and British re-export to the Orient” 
(Dunaway 1996a:49). Indigenous societies were restructured by articulation with 
capitalist world system through the colonialists’ demands for commodities such as deer 
or elk hides, and beaver pelts as well as by readily adopting firearms, steel traps and other 
European practices in their hunting, agriculture, and culture. By the middle of the 18th 
century they had become economically dependent on extracting and trading these 
commodities and by the end of the century, beaver, bison, wild turkeys, passenger 
pigeons, and most predators had been wiped out (Dunaway 1996a; Guffey 2005). The 
European leather industry was a practically unlimited source of demand for the native 
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deer (Dunaway 1996b). Pigs, cattle, sheep, goats and other invasive species introduced by 
European settlers also significantly altered the ecosystems as they penetrated and 
threatened existing species. European plants began to displace indigenous flora and plants 
such as snakeroot and ginseng, which were prized commodities in European and Asian 
markets and nearly vanished(Dunaway 1996a; Guffey 2005). Continued epidemics and 
entanglement in warfare between European powers and colonialists in the 18th century 
further reduced the indigenous population by another 90 percent(Dunaway 1996a).  
 The early and widespread adoption of European technologies for trade, 
subsistence and defense, day-to-day dealings with the settlers and traders, and their 
already vast knowledge of Appalachian ecosystems thus allowed the Cherokee to rapidly 
exploit animals and plants that became desirable commodities. This extractive frontier 
was so lucrative and appealing that the British felt compelled to take steps to try and 
regulate the flood of colonialists who were threatening indigenous political alliances key 
to their competition with other core powers on the continent by setting up trading 
operations to capture their own share of the profits(Dunaway 1996a; Guffey 2005). The 
Cherokee registered numerous complaints with the local governments about “long 
hunters” from nearby settlements poaching within indigenous territories in an attempt to 
cash in on the booming export market (Guffey 2005). But these new social productive 
relations resulting from indigenous societies articulation with the world-system also left 
them dependent on imports of food, clothing, and tools while local game being extracted 
were increasingly depleted (Dunaway 1996a). This dependency on European and colonial 
commodities contributed to their involvement in military conflict between the British and 
the colonialists later in the century and subsequent hardships when goods were cut off 
(Guffey 2005).14 Although the extractive “putting-out system financed by foreign 
merchant-entrepreneurs” economy of the Cherokee and colonialists was not characterized 
by capitalist productive relations, the insatiable demand of the markets they produced for 
was part of the capitalist world-system (Dunaway 1996a:49). Despite the non-wage social 
productive relations in Appalachian indigenous peoples’ and settlers’ mode of extraction, 
                                                        
14
 Shifting alliances cut off the Cherokee’s supply of guns and ammunition resulting in a return to having to 
hunt increasingly scare game, and defend against well armed foes, with bows and arrows (Guffey 2005). 
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their social metabolic relations had already become part of a capitalist social formation.15 
The ecology of the region was being reshaped by the needs of accumulation in the core 
and the rivalries of colonial powers.  
Relentlessly, the Cherokees were locked into an “unequal exchange” that drained 
Appalachian surpluses away to benefit the expanding core. Within less than fifty 
years [they] lost economic and political autonomy and became dependent upon 
the worldwide network of production…Wildlife was decimated by export 
activities, forests were destroyed as part of the hunting process. Most significant, 
however, …[b]y 1780, the Cherokees had lost nearly three-fifths of their ancestral 
lands to cement trade agreements, to pay trader debts, and to settle boundary 
disputes with the British. (Dunaway 1996a:49-50)  
Even under British rule, land tenure laws were revised away from feudal relations toward 
capitalist ones to allow for speculation that in practice went far beyond the official 1763 
boundary for settlement. By the mid 18th century Virginian and West Virginian lands 
were absentee owned (Dunaway 1996a). US independence opened up the remaining 
lands of Appalachia for native displacement and white resettlement, but there was to be 
no public-domain of access to land for average settlers.  
Although trade in pelts continued after resettlement, by 1830 it had virtually 
disappeared on account of the scarcity of game (Salstrom 1994). For Veblen this 
extractive phase that characterized the American frontier was a prime example of the 
“American plan” for “converting all public wealth to private gain”:  
First among these natural resources to fall under the American plan were the fur-
bearing animals. … it does [not] now count in any appreciable degree among the 
useful means of livelihood, in great part because business enterprise has run 
through that range of natural resources with exemplary thoroughness and 
expedition and has left the place of it bare. It is worth while to speak of it here 
only because it shows a finished instance of business-as-usual converting 
                                                        
15
 “Within its circulation process, in which industrial capital functions as either money or as commodity, 
the circuit of industrial capital, whether in the form of money capital or commodity capital, cuts across the 
commodity circulation of the most varied modes of social production, in so far as this commodity 
circulation simultaneously reflects commodity production. Whether the commodities are the product of 
production based on slavery…or of half-savage hunting peoples, etc.-as commodities and money they 
confront the money and commodities in which industrial capital presents itself, and enter into the latter’s 
own circuit and into that of the surplus-value born by the commodity capital… The character of the 
production process from which they derive is immaterial…as commodities they enter both the circuit of 
industrial capital and the circulation of the surplus-value borne by it. Thus the circulation process of 
industrial capital is characterized by the many-sided character of its origins…” (Marx 1992:189-90) 
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community goods to private gain without afterthought. It is a neat, compact, and 
concluded chapter of American business enterprise. (Veblen 1964:168) 
This, like the extractive agriculture that followed, was a general part of capitalist 
development in the US. Yet the metabolic restructuring of this phase worked with the 
property relations to build an agriculture that remained extractive and therefore self-
undermining at an important historical juncture in the regions’ integration into national 
industrialization.  
Extractive Agriculture (1780-1880) 
 This period saw the establishment of important characteristics of regional 
investment and political priorities for transportation, agricultural, and industrial extractive 
activities that produced few backward and even fewer forward linkages. It also produced 
the semiproletarian labor force in the region and ecological changes increasing the extent 
of its function as a reserve army for manufacturing and extractive industry. 
The 19th century was bleak for the Cherokee. White settlers continued to invade 
their territory, and they were soon outnumbered and displaced. In the winter of 1838 the 
last large segment of their population were forcibly removed from Appalachia to the 
Oklahoma territory by the United States government in a death march known as the “trail 
of tears” (Guffey 2005). This seizure of native people’s lands and the severing of their 
political claims to the resources there was a precondition for their “free appropriation” by 
capitalist interests. It allowed land to be reconstituted as a commodity and the settlers to 
expand into their territories and produce crops, livestock, and raw materials to help feed 
growing demands for these commodities in other regions. The way in which land was 
commodified is particularly important because in Southern Appalachia (in contrast to the 
later resettlement of the frontier west of the Mississippi) there was no homestead 
provision and precious few other mechanisms for lower class immigrants to gain 
ownership of land, even for squatters who had resided on lands prior to sale (Dunaway 
1996a). Though many locals, even landless ones (who were often paid to make required 
“improvements” for absentee owners), participated in land and resource related 
speculative activity in some fashion, the process inflated the price of land and most 
residents did not come away with land holdings (Salstrom 1994). Instead, capitalist 
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speculation on land concentrated ownership in the hands of absentee holders and a 
minority of wealthy local elites(Dunaway 1996a).  
 The high level of absentee ownership in the Southern Appalachian region (75.9% 
by 1810) was in many ways more important to the closing of the “frontier conditions” of 
resettlement than actual occupation of land, and a good deal of later swindling on the part 
of absentee and local elites helped to consolidate holdings further (Dunaway 1996a:73-4; 
Gaventa 1982). The extent varied but was pronounced in Central Appalachia—in 
Kentucky at least 56.2% of the land was absentee owned (probably 3/4ths or more in the 
eastern counties), in Tennessee 68.9%, in Virginia 89.3%, and in West Virginia 93.3%. 
Of the land not absentee controlled in Central Appalachian counties of Kentucky and 
Tennessee 25% of families owned 66%, and in West Virginia and Virginia counties the 
top 25% owned 90% (Dunaway 1996a).  A majority of the best agricultural land was 
therefore inaccessible to simple subsistence farmers because land not held by non-
residents was highly concentrated in elite hands, leaving the bottom half of farmers to 
scrape by on one-seventh of the farmed land. According to Dunaway, less than one-third 
of the agricultural labor force in Southern Appalachia actually owned farmland and the 
landless rate in Central Appalachia remained close to 50% in 1860 (1996a).  
As Marx noted “The monopoly of property in land is even the basis of the 
monopoly of capital” (Marx 1978:527). However, other studies suggest there was 
considerable variation between and within states of the sub-region. Some counties on the 
borders of Kentucky, West Virginia and Virginia appear to have had relatively lower 
rates of landlessness and more equal distributions of ownership (a majority of farmers 
owned their land in Pike, Logan, and Wise counties respectively) (R. L. Lewis 1998). 
Still, in general, it seems land’s unequal distribution discouraged true subsistence farming 
because smaller producers were located on the most marginal lands, particularly in 
mountainous regions where land ownership was even more concentrated, and within 
those parts steep terrain that might otherwise have been cheaper land affordable to 
smallholders was reserved by interests in extractive industry and tourist resorts (Dunaway 
1996a).   
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 Dunaway emphasized this regime of land tenure created a significant 
semiproletarianized landless labor force that was integral to ways in which the upper 
classes organized agricultural production for the Southern Appalachian and national 
economy. An often-underappreciated feature of semiproletarian households engaged in 
subsistence agriculture is the gendered way in which reproduction of the wage earners are 
subsidized by the other members of the household (Dunaway 2001; 2008). Drawing on 
E.P. Thompson and Nancy Folbre, Billings and Blee (2004) characterize the relations of 
production in subsistence households of Appalachian Kentucky as part of a “patriarchal 
moral economy” in which adult men controlled the labor and appropriated the surplus of 
other members of the household as governed by cultural norms of kinship and reciprocity. 
They criticize Dunaway as prematurely characterizing households as semiproletarian. 
“The question is not how much early economic actors produced for exchange (which may 
have been extensive), nor whether they consumed certain quantities of manufactured 
commodities …, but rather, to what extent Appalachian households were able structurally 
to reproduce themselves independently of these exchanges—that is, independently of the 
local slave-based and external market economies” (Billings and Blee 2004:29). The 
extent and chronology of households’ integration into capitalist productive relations and 
dependency on the economic dictates of center economies has implications for the later 
emerging modes of extraction around timber and coal commodity chains.  
The two most comprehensive works on Southern Appalachia by Wilma Dunaway 
and Paul Salstrom differ on when this ability to reproduce independently was lost for the 
majority of Appalachians with the former indicating a century or more before the latter. 
Subsistence is, in the Marxian sense, historically determined and varies according to time, 
place, and social stratum. Producers engaged in subsistence production are of necessity 
oriented toward obtaining use-values. Dunaway uses a definition of subsistence farms 
that has the virtue that it distinguishes them clearly from ownership capital in the Marxist 
sense of a social relation. Specifically, a subsistence farmer is a farm owner with less 
than 100 acres, less than $100 in assets, using only family labor, with no cash crops, no 
second source of income, and who consumed 80% or more of grain and livestock. 
Households with more assets than that have the potential, and often demonstrate the 
ability, to employ the labor of others as is indicative of appropriation of surplus labor 
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rather than subsistence relations. “Any farm that cultivates more than its family survival 
needs in order to support paid or coerced laborers or to feed surplus livestock is not 
subsistent, even if that farm consumes all its major food crops” (Dunaway 1996a:125). 
Between one-tenth and two-fifths of grain and livestock, varying by area, was reinvested 
in labor, livestock, or seed for future surplus. Although he criticizes Dunaway’s 
definition of subsistence farmers as those producing no surplus as excessively narrow 
(Salstrom 1996b), Salstrom’s use of the term is confusingly broad, including most 
households which simply consume the majority of their food crops—thereby including 
even plantations employing slaves and wage workers. Such a definition obscures key 
aspects of political economy: the extraction of surplus labor/value from others and the 
orientation toward investing that surplus in the interest of expanded accumulation.  
Values of goods and labor in the subsistence, borrow and barter economy were 
increasingly determined in relation to their value in capitalist markets (Salstrom 1996a). 
This was true even in transactions among families often held to be part of a distinct moral 
economy (Dunaway 1996a). The unequal exchange contributing to the region’s 
peripheralization did not depend on the dominance of capitalist productive relations in the 
lives of households linked to its commodity chains. These social formations were 
subordinated early on to the metabolic needs of accumulation in the core and went into 
crisis when the larger system to which they were linked did (see Billings and Blee 2000 
on the cascading collapse of promissory notes in the borrow and barter economy during 
national economic crises). By the middle of the 19th century the region was experiencing 
an agriculture decline and a stagnating economy with falling terms of trade (Billings and 
Blee 2004; Dunaway 1996a; Salstrom 1994). Despite the decline in per capita 
agricultural output, at mid century “…Appalachian counties produced one and one-half 
times more food and grains and meats than were required to meet local subsistence and 
reinvestment demands” (Dunaway 1996a:137). These food surpluses were double the 
global average and demonstrate the regions peripheral articulation into the wider 
commodity chains.  
Salstrom (1994) argues that the determining factors for agricultural households 
choosing to supplement their farming with wage labor were population pressure, soil 
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depletion and erosion that made subsistence farming more difficult in the mid 19th 
century. Indeed the catastrophic collapse of many local ecosystems and degradation of 
regional ecosystems prior to 1860 is well documented by Dunaway and must have placed 
pressure on subsistence forms of agriculture that relied on the commons (Dunaway 
1996b). “Gone now were the days when ginseng covered the hills and bought many of its 
diggers most of their store purchases. Gone also were the decades (roughly the first one-
third of the nineteenth century) when the Plateau in particular had offered an easy 
livelihood for livestock raisers” (Salstrom 1994:16).Salstrom describes such agro-
ecological consequences spreading westward across the region, but his Malthusian 
explanation must ultimately (like its eponymous predecessor) be qualified by the class 
relations dictating access to land and its use—particularly if well before his tipping point 
of agricultural decline around 1860 more than half of the acreage of Appalachia was 
controlled by outsiders and only a third of those working in agriculture owned any land 
(Dunaway 1996a). To gauge the importance of ecological factors it is necessary to look 
more closely at the extractive character of agriculture as practiced in this period and the 
wave of timber extraction that came after. 
Appalachia was directly and indirectly connected to core markets. Cities such as 
Knoxville, Tennessee and Asheville, North Carolina emerged as transportation hubs and 
bulking centers of mountain goods bound for external regional and international markets 
(Guffey 2005). Early on the region provided a significant proportion of livestock and salt, 
as well as grains and some luxury commodities like tobacco and liquor, to the Deep 
South and, often via re-export from Southern ports, the Northeast (Dunaway 1996a). Two 
major agricultural commodities were corn and hogs. Both of these could be consumed for 
subsistence, sold individually, or as inputs into other commodities for exchange—feeding 
excess corn to hogs to increase their sale price, or distilling it into whiskey (Guffey 2005; 
Salstrom 1994). Hogs were particularly well suited to foraging in the forests for mast 
from oak and chestnut (inhibiting their regrowth as well), but they were less mobile for 
export than cattle (Guffey 2005). Because elites and absentee investors always controlled 
the majority of prime farmland, poorer and later arrivals settled into more marginal 
agricultural lands in the hollows, ridges, and terraces (Dunaway 1996a; Guffey 2005). 
Foraging of livestock on wild foods, although prominent and easy during frontier 
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conditions, was increasingly supplemented with grains and by 1860 three-fifths of corn 
produced in Appalachia was used as feed (Dunaway 1996b). Efforts by large landholders 
to restrict access to their lands being used as foraging commons increased following the 
Civil War (Salstrom 1994). The first “wildlife laws” were passed to protect the interests 
of livestock producers by creating bounties for wolves and cougars and mandating their 
extermination (Guffey 2005; Salstrom 1994).  
Agricultural production for export used much more additional land and labor than 
simple subsistence reproduction would have. For example, on average livestock 
consumed three and a half times more food than a 19th century Appalachian household 
and required four times the amount of labor to produce compared with subsistence 
farming (Dunaway 1996b). More land needed to be cleared to do this, often by burning, 
and at a scale unimaginable to indigenous inhabitants. Early settlers without slaves and 
lacking the labor to clear land opened up areas by “girdling” trees to kill them and simply 
planting between them. Trees were felled later as need allowed. Cultivation without 
rotation or use of cover crops or fertilizer combined with widespread erosion to deplete 
the soil. Common responses by farmers were to simply clear more land and apply more 
labor or to sell and move on to virgin lands further on the frontier.  
Complementary light manufacturing (mostly processing raw materials) and small-
scale extractive industry that had their own metabolic effects joined this agricultural 
regime. Salt production was one such complementary industry. In Clay County, 
Kentucky salt production from local brines was vertically integrated with slave 
agriculture, whereas in Kanawha County, West Virginia the industry was more of a 
capital rather than land and labor-intensive model. Advantages in transport and a more 
flexible model of accumulation resulted in linkages to new industries in coal and glass for 
Kanawha capital that never materialized for those in Clay (Billings and Blee 2000; 
Dunaway 1996a). Slave labor, an important indicator of embeddedness in larger markets, 
was particularly important in antebellum extractive industries such as salt and iron. 
Despite variation within the region, the general trend in manufacturing was clear. 
In sharp contrast to the rest of the United States, Southern Appalachia’s 
antebellum manufacturing investments were heavily concentrated in low-wage 
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mining, quarrying, smelting, intermediate ore processing, and timbering. As a 
result, extractive industries comprised the region’s predominant employer of 
nonagricultural laborers and accounted for the second most important industrial 
category in terms of annual gross. Consequentially, the emergence of diversified 
manufacturing was deterred by investment of capital, labor, and infrastructure into 
the production of agricultural and extractive materials for export to world markets. 
(Dunaway 1996a:192-3) 
Deforestation and agricultural practices resulted in widespread soil depletion and erosion 
that was exacerbated by overgrazing livestock that destroyed seeds and young plant 
growth. Consequently, non-native plants, grasses, and weeds rapidly displaced native 
varieties and over half of Southern Appalachia had been logged by the Civil War. The 
overall ecological consequences were a highly degraded, more homogenized and less 
biodiverse regional ecosystem. This amounted to a reduction in the adaptive capacity of 
ecosystems and a reduction in their resilience sometimes resulting in catastrophic 
collapse.16 Similarly soil fecundity that was lost from the mountains will only return on a 
timescale broader than most human concerns, if ever (Dunaway 1996b).  
The greater prevalence and persistence of a significant semiproletarian labor force 
is characteristic of peripheral social formations. Before the Civil War, Appalachia’s 
agrarian capitalism was already in decline, adding agricultural workers into the reserve of 
the unemployed (comprising the “latent” portion in Marx’s terms), and, with relatively 
little other development outside of agriculture, pressure on the land intensified. Although 
food production per capita and grain and livestock exports decreased by 30% on average 
each, more land and labor went into the production of export staples, growing on average 
at twice the rate (60%) of decline in per capita food production (Dunaway 1996a:296). 
Salstrom underplays the importance of this latent portion of the reserve army of capital 
and its contribution to the economic surplus produced by the region before the 
industrialization. With his thesis focused on population growth and partible inheritance 
by petty producers employing only family labor this is inevitable. But declining 
agricultural returns and increasingly subdivided family farms after 1860 were not the 
main source of exploitable laborers willing to work for low pay if Dunaway’s figures 
correctly identify the pre-existing supply of not only intergenerational landless laborers 
                                                        
16
 Although Appalachia remains the most biodiverse region in the nation, many of the species which 
survived the glacial advances of the ice age in its mountains were lost forever during this period. 
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but also indentured, enslaved, or otherwise unfree workers. Half or more of farms in 
Central Appalachia in 1860 employed paid or coerced labor (from a low of 47% in 
Kentucky to a high of 72% in Virginia) (Dunaway 1996a:89). Rather than being driven to 
forms of wage-labor primarily by declining subsistence capability on their own land, 
lower classes had from the start largely gained access to land for subsistence farming 
through forms of surplus value producing labor including share-cropping and cottage 
tenancy. A clear picture must account for the full socio-metabolic regime of both 
ecological relation and the class-based social relations governing them. In such situations 
“the export sector drains off labor and capital from subsistence producers to augment 
production for external markets. Moreover, infrastructure and state priorities are directed 
towards expansion of external trade, to the neglect of local roads and services. Progress in 
the export sector, therefore, blocks economic growth in local market activities, and 
subsistence agriculture is actually deterred. Because of such pressures from the transition 
to capitalism, the true subsistence sector [those without dependence on export commodity 
chains] was, by 1860, very small…” (Dunaway 1996a:232).  
The forests of east Kentucky, middle Tennessee, and the Kanawha Valley in West 
Virginia had been degraded by the extractive agricultural practices there. Iron and salt 
furnaces in Tennessee, Kentucky, and West Virginia consumed thousands of acres of 
trees in their vicinities for charcoal. Extractive industries were given powers in every 
Appalachian state to confiscate land, appropriate timber and stream flow for their 
operations, transportation, and material needs (Dunaway 1996a), even in some cases to 
compel the labor of nearby residents (Billings and Blee 2000). They displaced farm land 
directly through appropriation and indirectly through damages such as flooding(Dunaway 
1996b). Like the coal industry over a century and a half later, capitalists purchased 
damaged lands at below their pre-degradation value. Because a significant portion of the 
agricultural labor force relied on the opening up of virgin forest for agriculture or its use 
as a commons (even when said “commons” was legally under absentee ownership) their 
reproduction was squeezed by the changes in the land. Semiproletarianziation and 
semisubsistence capacity, while lowering the cost of labor power can also mitigate its 
exploitability. Even when there was a recognized supply of local labor willing to work at 
low wages, capital sometimes preferred to import workers from outside the region who 
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would be more “obedient” on account of having no access to subsistence resources 
(Dunaway 1996a; R. L. Lewis 1998). Population growth, certainly favored by the 
gendered household relations of the patriarchal moral economy where it persisted 
(Billings and Blee 2004), must have contributed to the reserve army of potential 
wageworkers. Those land owning families semiproletarianized into growing industries or 
manufacture by smaller individual plots and declining yields must have been an addition 
of downward pressure on wages to the already significant reserve army of landless 
workers and sharecroppers. Already in 1860, 15 percent of tenant farmers and two-fifths 
of sharecroppers were employed in a second non-farm job; with the latter having triple 
the chances of being food deficient. Both types were more likely to be employed in 
Tennessee, Virginia, or West Virginia counties than in Kentucky counties that did not 
experience the same decline in food production (Dunaway 1996). Even though, as 
Salstrom notes, the average farm size in the Plateau region declined by half between 1850 
and 1880 (Salstrom 1994), given the skewed starting distribution, this figure is likely 
disproportionately influenced by of subdivision among heirs of the relatively larger 
landholders.  
In any case, the threat to subsistence agricultural practices posed by ecological 
degradation, although significant from agricultural and industrial activities in the period 
leading up to 1880, paled in comparison to the scale of industrial extraction that would 
come afterward with the railroad lines extending into the hinterlands. The terms of semi-
proletarianization would become increasingly tenuous as subsistence strategies were 
undermined by ecological degradation and the closing of the commons, offering capital 
not only a lower cost of labor power subsidized by subsistence but a super-exploitable 
labor force reserve army. Appalachia’s peripheral position was well established during 
the restructuring of this period’s social and ecological systems around the requirements of 
commodity chains for external markets. Because Appalachian counties were less 
politically influential in their state legislatures, they had difficulty procuring State funds 
for transportation systems. Although dominated by eager export interests, county 
governments lacked the capital pooling capacity needed for such investment. The 
inability of Appalachian counties to improve transportation linkages to markets as fast as 
other regions caused a loss of agricultural market share as early as 1845. These structural 
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conditions according to Dunaway limited the potential of Appalachia and many of its 
people:  
As privately owned public monopolies, transport infrastructure opened those 
geographical locations where extractive industries, travel capitalism, and large 
export monopolies were being developed, leaving isolated those small farmers 
and poorer Appalachians who were less articulated with external trade. (Dunaway 
1998:120)  
Whereas livestock could be shipped out “on the hoof,” bulky raw materials like 
timber and coal were largely dependent on waterways in the absence of rail or highway. 
This limited the geographic penetration of those industries and the scale of capital 
investment. In spite of efforts by Appalachian Kentucky salt makers (salt was a crucial 
input to livestock trade for meat and tanning but these were generally processed outside 
the region) and an 1840 state report that six million dollars worth of resources were being 
lost annually, investment in the desired water route was not forthcoming nor did a 
proposed rail line succeed (Billings and Blee 2000). Investments that did occur for 
improvement of water routes such as the Ohio River and canals linking it to the 
Mississippi actually marginalized Central Appalachian regions that had relied on 
overland cattle drives (Pudup 1990).  
[C]ounties and local-states engaged in policies and fiscal practices that were 
aimed at promoting the types of agriculture, commerce, and industry that spurred 
the local expansion of peripheral capitalism… Despite intensified political 
rivalries with the richer nonmountainous sections of their home states, most 
Appalachian elites aligned themselves with the planter-merchant aristocracies of 
their home states. As a result, Appalachians steadily fell behind other Americans 
in wealth accumulation, in literacy, and in the development of transportation 
infrastructure. (Dunaway 1996a:284-7) 
The effects of decisions made by state legislatures and federal authorities on how public 
transportation funds were spent (or not spent) meant that the Appalachian regions of their 
states were neglected until outside capital invested in linkages on terms that limited the 
realization of value and rents for producers. As a result, “commission middlemen drained 
off 10 to 15 percent of the surpluses that might have accrued to the original producers. 
An even larger drain of regional capital was effected by speculators who originated from 
external metropoles” (Dunaway 1996a:248). 
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The antebellum routes of major rail lines through the region shaped the economic 
interests that split the region during the Civil War. The counties that split from Virginia 
to form the state of West Virginia were led by middle classes (who dragged along 24 
additional counties and 40% of residents with more Southern loyalties) involved in 
commodity chains linked to the North by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (B&O) (R. L. 
Lewis 1998). Virginia’s major rail line, the Virginia and Tennessee, linked them (and the 
southernmost counties of West Virginia) to the South. The first trans-Appalachian 
railroad lines were initially interested primarily in connecting major markets, not the 
resource base along the way. By the 1880s this had changed. The Norfolk and Western 
line was built through the southernmost counties of West Virginia for their resources. 
They used land companies to concentrate ownership of timber and coal which they then 
leased to operators (R. L. Lewis 1998). As rail construction approached, “county seat 
wars” broke out between competing industrial and agricultural elites. In the past the 
county seat had been viewed as logically in the center of the county, but the railroad 
transformed the center from a geographical to a strategic and economic one 
corresponding to rail access. Armed conflict loomed when court battles became dragged 
on between towns over who would hold the political and economic advantage of the 
county court house (R. L. Lewis 1998). The Republican leadership of West Virginia, up 
until 1871, had treated railroads with great favor as engines of development; then 
Governor William E. Stevenson advocated to compete for investors by passage of "'the 
most liberal legislation in favor of capitalists who propose to make actual investments 
within the state, and who give satisfactory assurances that they mean to execute what 
they promise'" (R. L. Lewis 1998:61). But the Bourbon Democrats who succeeded them 
were less favorable. The B&O's refusal to pay taxes owed led to a constitution redrafting 
in 1872 barring railroad officials from the legislature and declaring railways public 
highways.  
The West Virginia Grange, while supportive of railroads’ stimulus to the state 
economy, battled the B&O on behalf of the state’s agricultural interests over rates, 
liability, and eminent domain during the 1870s but political power was already in the 
hands of industry. The depression of 1873 began a long decline for agriculture at the 
same time that capitalist monopoly power was on the rise (R. L. Lewis 1998). The 
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disruption of agricultural markets by the Civil War and the increasing productivity and 
market penetration of mid-western agriculture had greatly undermined Appalachian 
commercial agriculture. With the exception of Virginian (and perhaps Tennessean) 
agriculture, Central Appalachia lost its ability to compete by the 1870s (Salstrom 1994). 
Falling prices exacerbated tight credit for farmers in West Virginia as interest payments 
remained steady. Farmers also bore a higher share of the tax burden relative to business 
properties that were undervalued or untaxed. A study of 1895-96 showed that farmers 
possessed 65% of wealth but paid 80% of taxes. The gap between wealth and tax burden 
was highest in counties with railroads. "After 1871, big business appeared to be in control 
of both parties; therefore the Grange and then the [Farmers'] Alliance movement offered 
farmers their only voice of organized protest" (R. L. Lewis 1998:243). But the West 
Virginia Grange reflected the class structure of capitalist agriculture in Central 
Appalachia and “restricted membership to substantial farmers and questioned admission 
of farmers from the underdeveloped interior counties who practiced a mixed economy of 
small farming, hunting, and gathering or worked as part-time employees in lumber mills, 
coal mines, and factories..." (R. L. Lewis 1998:244). Given the prevalence of this 
semiproletarian demographic it severely limited its base. In 1896, when Jennings Bryan 
was defeated, the Farmers Alliance and Populist party disintegrated along with it the last 
organized agricultural resistance to railroad and extractive interests. 
Farmers understood that the railroad would connect their farms as well as the 
forests to the national markets and that competition would be dictated by the 
national marketplace rather than the local economy. They were essentially correct 
that this was a competition they could not hope to win. The process of 
deforestation fundamentally altered the agricultural economy in the timbered 
areas, first by removing the forest where farmers traditionally ranged their 
livestock and acquired much of the basic supplies for their subsistence 
agricultural system. Second, deforestation forced farmers to practice commercial 
agriculture or face ruin as free and independent producers. The commercial 
orientation of farmers in the older developed counties found outlet to the markets 
by way of roads and waterways that had gradually evolved as part of the national 
market system. The underdeveloped counties, conversely, were forced into the 
new system through swift and wrenching changes in their economy. (R. L. Lewis 
1998:245) 
 Although deforestation increased the amount of land improved for farming, the 
size of farms decreased even as the number rose. The isolation of backcountry counties of 
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Central Appalachia hindered their ability to benefit from exports but also protected their 
own markets from economies of scale elsewhere. When integration finally came it was 
often jarring. The form of extractive agriculture that depended on opening up new lands 
for planting and the forest commons for livestock could not survive the changes in the 
landscape and local agricultural markets that came with the railroads and the timber 
boom. Those that continued on in agriculture had to adopt the methods of investment in 
fertilizer and stock bred for pasture, thus bringing to a close the dominance of extractive 
agriculture. Railroad and extractive capital would use state powers for determining 
externalities, eminent domain, and the reserve army remaining on the land to overcome 
spatial isolation as an obstacle to profitability. Although the period dominated by 
agriculture can be characterized as extractive, the dominant classes of that regime were 
displaced or assimilated into a new industrialized modes of extraction whose method of 
accumulation was dependent upon a greater disarticulation of local ecology than ever 
before.  
Timber Extraction (1880-1920) 
Rail lines steadily penetrated increasingly remote areas in Central Appalachia 
during the two decades after the Civil War providing efficient transport to industrial 
markets for export of raw materials and import of core produced commodities. Shaping 
these new connections with the national and international markets were local elites, petty 
bourgeois, and American and British capitalists who scrambled to obtain land and 
resource rights. As the turn of the century approached, absentee capitalists and dependent 
local capitalists created and molded political and material infrastructure to cash in on the 
industrializing nation’s demand for resources. Industrial resource extraction that had 
started in the early 1800s rapidly expanded and became the major commodity chain 
linking the region to globalized markets. Timber and coal came to be more important 
than the old industries of salt and iron. Interests related to industry and resource 
extraction that sought to maximize their externalities to capitalize on resource rents 
dominated state policy.  
Completion of the Erie Canal in 1825 connected the pine forests of the Great 
Lakes to eastern markets. By the late 1800s those north woods had been decimated and, 
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even as discussion of a "timber famine" began, logging operations fanned out to the west 
and south— into Central Appalachia (Williams 2006). Capital from those northern 
logging operations was transferred to the region but so were ephemeral "peckerwoods" 
operations opening and closing with market fluctuations. "Two-thirds of West Virginia 
was still covered by ancient growth hardwood forest on the eve of the transition in 1880, 
but by the 1920s virtually the entire state had been deforested. Moreover, as the only 
Appalachian state entirely within the region, West Virginia serves as a microcosm of the 
region itself" (R. L. Lewis 1998:3). The lumber industry peaked in the first decade of the 
1900s just as new building materials were invading the construction market. As late as 
1902, 75% of West Virginia was forest cover; however, the industry's expansion 
inevitably led to overcapacity of land and mills setting off destructive competition. 
Borrowing to finance their operations encouraged a timetable of liquidation for loggers, 
and sunk investments in larger mills encouraged operating at a loss during downturns for 
lumber and paper operations. "Nearly fifty thousand sawmills were counted in the census 
of 1909, but three-fourths of them cut less than a million feet of lumber a year; the other 
one-fourth cut between 100 and 200 million board feet in a year" (R. L. Lewis 1998:5). 
There was also a legal shift in the principle of "reasonable use" that pitted industrial and 
extractive against farming interests. The political power of these class factions had a 
distinct geography whereby local juries favored farmers but appeals courts overturned 
them—a major departure from the legacy of antebellum Virginian dominance by agrarian 
landowners.  
The mode of extraction around timber accelerated the pressures that had been 
built up over previous decades on the semiproletarianized labor force. "The cutting of the 
mountainside forests where farmers traditionally ranged their livestock and acquired 
other staples removed the very foundation of backcountry agriculture, and within a 
generation the system collapsed. Farmers were forced to shift to a commercial system by 
acquiring better grades of stock, to rely on machinery, and to use commercial fertilizer" 
(R. L. Lewis 1998:8). They could not compete with the Midwest, and between 1880-1920 
even greater numbers of farm families were driven off the land and into wage labor in 
extractive industry. The ecological consequences of extraction accelerated this. Forest 
fires raged through over 1.7 million acres in 1908. Streams were choked and valleys 
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flooded, with vital topsoil washed away. By the time the federal government set up the 
Monongahela National Forest to preserve the Ohio and Potomac watersheds the damage 
was done. The development that industry had brought with it was largely ephemeral. 
With the ecological base of the timber and paper industries laid to waste, the lower 
classes faced the choice of joining the swollen reserve army or migrating for better 
chances. Those that stayed on in the coalfields would join labor struggles reshaping the 
entire structure of that national industry.  
The forests’ timber had been an important resource since white resettlement but in 
the first century transportation infrastructure limited the geography and scale of 
extraction.  Timber provided not only lumber for construction but charcoal for industry, 
tannin for leatherworking, and pulp for paper among other uses. Up until the Civil War 
most mills relied on waterpower and produced on demand. It was not until after the War 
that there was sufficient demand to drive levels of investment needed for steam-powered 
mills to become dominant. Those areas where smaller timber operations had preceded the 
coming of the rail lines had some advantages, and there was a great deal of competition 
between localities over who would host the rail lines. Railroads increased property values 
and taxes for farms but were unlikely to significantly improve farmers economic 
prospects by putting them in competition on the larger market. The major beneficiaries of 
rising land prices were, of course, land speculators and their local agents. 
The limited size of local capital was reflected in a hierarchy of investment within 
the timber boom. Residents with small amounts of capital tended to invest in contracting 
companies and hiring independent laborers to deliver timber. Early on these were more 
often experienced loggers from further north but as time went on more locals became 
involved. Members of the local capitalist class proper were focused on land sales and 
railroad development while external capitalists were necessary for the scale of investment 
required for major milling centers and for the market connections to move their 
production. The ownership structure of this period was predominantly individuals and 
private partnerships and, as in other industries, public corporations in timber were few 
until WWII. Of the 508 timber firms that were incorporated in West Virginia between 
1866 and 1909, 285 were resident firms. 136 (26.7%) of those had total or majority 
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absentee control, and 223 (43.9%) had some absentee control. It would be a mistake to 
underestimate the involvement of local elites as 71% of persons involved as incorporators 
were residents. While it is difficult to determine from scale of ownership the distribution 
in value of timber controlled available evidence favors absentee owners (R. L. Lewis 
1998). 
Timber companies acquired increasingly large holdings of land, often from other 
major local or absentee owners, but not infrequently by using their superior resources to 
purchase or contest the legal claims to land of smallholders. Timber processing and 
manufacturing often clustered together, but logging and milling lasted only as long as the 
local supply of timber. The dispersed ownership, both between individual and firms and 
across space, along with the diversity of firm size and range of products made 
coordination and rationalization of the industry impossible in this period.   
With thousands of producers manufacturing hundreds of different grades, sizes, 
and products, control was nearly impossible. Economic and cost structures 
presented the most difficult obstacles to industry. In medium and large-scale units 
that had substantial overhead costs, survival depended on controlling these costs. 
Therefore, the producers required stability and predictability, commodities that 
were in short supply because thousands of small producers with negligible 
overhead costs entered or withdrew from production depending on market 
conditions. Together all these operators glutted the market and drove prices down 
just as expanding demand should have sent prices up. Market pressures, therefore, 
perennially pinned prices at their lowest possible level and forced firms to cut 
relatively elastic labor costs to the bone. Aggravating these structural difficulties 
was the long-term decline in demand for wood...in building construction, a trend 
that had already begun by 1906. 
The pressures to reduce costs to their lowest possible levels resulted in wasteful 
logging methods such as clear-cutting, which were frowned on by 
conservationists. Forced to convert timber into lumber as soon as possible to stay 
in business, the lumbermen's methods of extraction and processing often served 
the moment without regard to the future. They viewed timberland as a resource to 
be 'mined' and abandoned, rather than as a 'crop' that was indefinitely renewable if 
cultivated and harvested wisely. 
The large companies operated by men with considerable experience in the 
industry, established sources of capital, and well positioned in the markets were 
most likely to survive over the long term. Their size allowed them to benefit from 
economies of scale, and their access to capital enabled them not only to weather 
the booms and busts of the business cycle but also eventually to drive the 
multitude of small to mid-sized competitors from the field. These large absentee 
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firms also acquired a disproportionate influence over West Virginia's back county 
economy, however, and with legislators and jurists eager to secure their 
investments in the law, they also acquired inordinate political influence as well. 
(R. L. Lewis 1998:101-2) 
Even at the earliest stage of the transition from frontier to industrial extraction 
that followed rail integration, politics reflected the power of capital to freely appropriate 
natural use values without much competition from state or other interests. While the 
power of extractive industry over other class fractions like farmers was not unique to 
Central Appalachia, the region was certainly among the most extreme cases and among 
the most enduring.  The West Virginia Tax Commission in 1884 issued a formal warning 
against the effects of absentee ownership of the state's resources. Already there was some 
recognition that natural resources were being exhausted without contributing to the 
development of the state. "Twenty years have passed; the treasures, untouched in 1865, 
have been considerable exhausted, vast private fortunes have been accumulated, but not 
by those who are our permanent citizens, and to-day the home population probably does 
not own one-half the property which it owned when the war ended" (quoted in R. L. 
Lewis 1998:64). The commission outlined illegal collusion between rail and coal and 
lumber companies’ leaders, under the secretive Coal and Lumber Agency. They 
complained of speculative practices in construction of the rail lines and their assumption 
of "the power to appropriate the entire net earnings of the community" (quoted in R. L. 
Lewis 1998:65) through their monopoly power over transport. This was worsened in 
cases where local governments issued bond for stock in the railway, with costs exceeding 
benefits by three to one in one county. The Commission also recognized that half the 
State's land was absentee owned. The Tax Commission was further convinced that the 
West Virginia legislature was complicit in these events but the best remedy they had to 
suggest was a railroad commission to protect the public interest (R. L. Lewis 1998).  
Central Appalachian states varied in their capacities to create investment in 
transportation and industry that required the pooling of capital beyond individual 
capitalists. The most common method, particularly when state law forbade direct public 
investment, was to grant corporations special legal privileges, for example to dam and re-
route streams and condemn through eminent domain, in order to encourage private 
capital investment. The timber industry lacked the organizational capacity of the railroads 
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to influence state governments directly. The water transport they relied on before the 
coming of the railroads did not receive the same favors for improvement (though the 
federal government did invest in some of the major rivers). Nevertheless, the timber 
industry would benefit greatly from a revolution in legal interpretations of liability that 
railroad interests spearheaded. Part of the industrial revolution across the US involved the 
discarding of the principle of strict liability rooted in a philosophy of natural rights 
carried over from British Common Law in favor of looser standards for negligence and 
consideration of the “public interest.”17 There was some variation within the region in 
how this process played out, but evidence suggests in West Virginia and Kentucky it was 
significantly accelerated by the balance of class fractions. Although agrarian gentry 
continued to dominate politics in Virginia, in West Virginia a rapid change in state legal 
standards occurred in 1889-1890.  
After 1890 the court abandoned the traditional strict liability principle favoring 
agrarian over industrial users of the land and adopted an approach that accepted 
multiple economic uses for the land. The timing of this pivotal redirection is 
explained in part by the rapid influx of capital into railroad, timber, and coal 
development. The older system was incapable of withstanding this deluge of 
capital, which accentuated the inadequacies of the traditional approach and then 
dissolved it. (R. L. Lewis 1998:110)   
Whereas in Virginia state code required railroads to construct fencing to protect 
livestock, in West Virginia farmers by contrast had to prove negligence on the part of the 
railroad. In 1919 this was pushed further by legislation fixing responsibility for fencing 
and liability for livestock on railroad right of ways on their owners. While neither state 
could provide direct public subsidy to business under their constitutions, West Virginia 
courts were “so bold in reversing the strict liability standard in nuisance and negligence 
cases that its decisions can only be interpreted as the judicial subsidization of industry to 
the disadvantage of other segments of society"(R. L. Lewis 1998:117). The court adopted 
a "reasonable use" doctrine that apportioned blame and treated industry and agriculture as 
competing interests both with rights to property use. The infringement of another’s 
property rights was "unreasonable" unless the “public good” outweighed the harm. This 
                                                        
17
 “One must quite naturally hesitate about speaking of a ‘public interest’ or ‘public utility’ which is carried 
on the books of a private corporation as a capitalised source of income. It seems incongruous” (Veblen 
1964:172). 
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change in legal standards did not reflect a change in public opinion. While there was 
widespread hostility toward railroads on the part of local juries these cases were 
overturned upon appeal.  Railroad lawyer, and coal and rail investor Zachary Vinson 
bemoaned in 1902 the bias of state court juries against railroads they viewed as rich on 
ill-gotten gains and so would take any opportunity to punish them regardless of the facts. 
He, exaggeratedly, claimed this was from a "strong and insidious current of socialism 
flowing through the minds and thoughts of the people, poisoning them to the extent of 
making them believe that it is wrong for one man to be rich and live in luxury while 
another is borne down by perpetual labor and poverty" (quoted in R. L. Lewis 1998:127). 
Transportation was the greatest obstacle to the growth of the timber industry and 
the legal facilitation of externalities on the part of the railroads would also be a precedent 
for the externalities of the timber mode of extraction. Soil from eroded hillsides choked 
streams that were increasingly polluted by factories, mills, and tanneries. The 
decomposing sawdust dumped (illegally) by lumber mills eliminated the oxygen from 
streams (a 1901 report by the West Virginia fish and game warden said "more fish are 
destroyed and driven from the streams from this than any other cause" (R. L. Lewis 
1998:283)) and combined with the toxic byproducts of the paper process to kill off life 
and clog facilities’ intake pipes. Towns were opposed to upstream mills but not their own, 
with naysayers being charged with opposition to "progress." Terrestrial sources of 
subsistence were also extirpated. "After the mountains were cutover, hunters stalked 
through the woods for weeks without sighting either deer or wild turkey, and the once 
abundant fish all but disappeared from the streams... Logging and then fires either 
removed or destroyed the plant life that created mast, depriving animals of a source of 
food. Consequently, even the small game such as rabbits and squirrels became scarce in 
West Virginia's woods" (R. L. Lewis 1998:268). West Virginia undertook some measures 
to regulate hunting and fishing and the shipping of game across state lines.18 The export 
of game, though lacking the scale of the previous trade in fur and hides, was extensive 
and involved a number of firms. While the state had some success in returning fish and 
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 Unfortunately, programs to eradicate predators to restore game species increased the holocaust of 
wildlife. In 1933-34 nearly 200,000 and in 1934-35 nearly 300,000 varmints were turned into sponsored 
competitions (R. L. Lewis 1998). 
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game to local markets by 1901, it did little to check the extractive industries 
fundamentally driving the ecological destruction. "A speaker at the annual meeting of the 
West Virginia Bar Association in 1905 acknowledged this inequity in the law when he 
remarked that 'the poor wretch who took a stick of dynamite and killed a few fish 
committed a felony,' whereas 'the corporation that polluted the waters of a stream for fifty 
miles and rendered them totally unfit for fishing or any other purpose, escaped all 
punishment'" (R. L. Lewis 1998:280). This reflects the class bias of valuation and rent 
collection by the state and the subsidy to capital provided through continued free 
appropriation of natural wealth and externalization of costs.  
In 1908 every county in West Virginia was affected by forest fires that burned 
over 1.7 million acres and caused economic losses estimated at more than $5 million. 
Estimates indicated 91% of fires were caused by trains and lumber operations with the 
remainder being clearing pasture for livestock and various causes. These fires destroyed 
the soil directly as well as increasing vulnerability to erosion afterward. No plan was 
made to evaluate or address soil erosion in West Virginia until 1937 when it was included 
in the federal Soil Conservation Service programs. A survey found that accelerated 
erosion affected 90% of the state's surface area, nearly two-thirds of the land had lost 
between one-fourth and three-fourths of its soil and 4 million out of 15.5million acres of 
the state had lost over three-fourths of its soil. It reported soil loss, low quality soil, 
unsuitable (too steep) lands pressed into agriculture, etc. (R. L. Lewis 1998). The bust of 
the timber industry discharged many into the reserve army and intensified the pressure of 
subsistence agriculture on the local ecology. Government investigators found that 
"further exacerbating the land problems were the 'squatters or industrial people 
temporarily out of work who have little interest in conservation and improvement, 
deplete the land, and leave as soon as employment opportunities arise in the industrial 
world'" (R. L. Lewis 1998:272). 
A USGS report in 1911 found that, following the railroads, deforestation had 
dried up springs and streams: "The summer sun now beats down on a bare and parched 
land, forest, stream, cool shade, and cold spring are all gone, and the land is desolate" 
(quoted in R. L. Lewis 1998:276). The disruption of the hydrologic systems by pervasive 
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deforestation was in no way unique to Central Appalachia. But unlike the deforestation 
that had preceded it further to the north, the hydrologic systems with their headwaters in 
the Appalachian Mountains flowed into densely populated and industrialized areas. The 
disruption of water flow caused mills reliant on adequate water supply to shut down 
periodically or entirely. Though the federal government had spent one-twelfth of total 
improvements on rivers and harbors in WV up untill 1907, the floods and droughts 
seriously impacted navigation. This was a significant impact on the region’s economy as 
rivers flowing through WV accounted for more than one-fifth of total river commerce (R. 
L. Lewis 1998).  
  Attempts to mitigate some of this damage started as early as 1905, when the 
governor of West Virginia declared that headwater lands of no value except for forest 
growth should be purchased by the state. In 1909 that state’s legislature empowered the 
federal government to acquire cutover lands through condemnation or otherwise for 
national forest reserves. The creation of the Monongahela National Forest in 1915 was a 
response to the deforestation related destruction designed to preserve the headwaters of 
the river and stabilize it.19 Still, West Virginia lagged behind its Northern Appalachian 
neighbors in conservation spending. In 1928, West Virginia spent only $176,000 on the 
Game and Fish Commission (also responsible for forestry) while Pennsylvania spent $1 
million on game alone and New York spent $3 million on conservation. 
In 1909, nearly half of US timber extraction was from the hardwood forests of 
Appalachia (Clarkson 1964). The unequal exchange of this resource built up some parts 
of the country while drastically reshaping the ecology of the region. While Appalachia’s 
contribution was significant it was not unique. By 1920 80% of US virgin forest had been 
cut, with half the land going into agriculture. Eighty one million acres had been burned 
and left barren. Timber extraction followed the “usual course” for staple commodities. 
The initial competitive phase was characterized by “speeding up the output…low 
prices… and a rapid exhaustion, with waste, of the natural supply” (Veblen 1964:127). 
For Veblen, the case of timber demonstrated the transition from the rapid and wasteful 
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 The 1911 Weeks Act relating to headwaters of navigable streams brought forest conservation to West 
Virginia followed by the 1924 Clarke-McNary Act for those not related to navigable waters. 
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exploitation of abundant resources into monopoly and centralized absentee ownership. 
He emphasized that the waste involved in the frantic and under-capitalized/skilled 
competitive operations directly contributed to reducing the public wealth of those 
resources to a level that could effectively be dominated by an oligopoly to draw 
substantial rents. The forms of waste involved then shifted from the accidental to 
conscientious and planned (Foster 2011b; Veblen 1904).  
Often the same people who found their previous forms of livelihood undermined 
by the timber boom became the laborers who joined migrants drawn to the area and 
accelerated the socio-ecological transformation.  
A publicist for the coal industry had seen land companies acquire property and 
lease it back to the head of household who had once owned it, “thus leaving a 
friendly guardian to keep ... their titles clear.” This is how households accepted 
wage work. They entered a feed-back loop set off by population increase and 
accelerated by forest destruction. As their old economy became more risky they 
participated increasingly in its destruction. (Stoll 2014:81) 
The tension between the independence offered by household subsistence practices on the 
one hand, and their contribution to super-exploitation of labor on the other, intensified as 
the timber mode overlapped and was succeeded by coal. In the first three decades of the 
20th century, agriculture in Appalachia remained less capital intensive than in the rest of 
the country and even with high population growth a comparatively larger percentage of 
youth stayed on becoming wage workers subsidized by their families subsistence 
activity(Salstrom 1994). The massive deforestation that spread across the region had a 
profound effect on the social formations that depended the forestlands household 
reproduction. Continuing erosion of access to viable land and this growing reserve army 
meant practices that had offered at least a modicum of resistance to resident wage-
laborers were increasingly instead a contribution to their own super-exploitation by 
extractive industry.  
Labor Intensive Extraction and the Rise of King Coal (1800-1940) 
 Mineral exploitation in Appalachia was already having a greater relative 
environmental impact in Southern Appalachia than in any other region of the country as 
early as 1810 (Dunaway 1996b). All of the regional state governments had financed 
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geological surveys of their minerals by the late 1820s, complementing a project already 
underway by private investors (Dunaway 1996a). Iron, salt, gold and copper production 
had consumed large areas of forest for charcoal and left blighted wastelands, some of 
which still persist today (Dunaway 1996a; Guffey 2005). “By 1860, timbering and 
extractive industries were underway in two-thirds of the region’s counties” (Dunaway 
1996b). "Although coal quickly dominated economic life in southern West Virginia, 
timbering came first and already had reached peak levels by 1895...Even before the 
railroads, several major commercial companies entered the region such as the Little 
Kanawha Lumber Company (from Maine)..." (R. L. Lewis 1998:60). In McDowell and 
Wyoming Counties in West Virginia the major timber operations were reliant on 
railroads from the start and so timber and coal developed together. By 1880 some four 
thousand coal miners could be found at work in Southern Appalachia (Salstrom 1994). 
The boom in timber extraction overlapped with mining but peaked earlier (around 
1912), due in part to the reckless destruction of the regions forests by industry and 
agriculture. During the preceding period companies had acquired the control of mineral 
and surrounding property rights through a combination of deception, mercenary violence, 
and manipulation of state judicial power and violence (Gaventa 1982; Wright 1978). As 
noted above, while Salstrom (1994) suggests that the system of “partible inheritance” 
significantly increased the number of families living off a given piece of land over time 
and consequentially created strains on subsistence capabilities, however work by 
Dunaway (1996a) paints the significance of this process as one of several factors. 
Nevertheless, accounts show that population growth and the subdivision of property 
within families accelerated the process of accumulation by dispossession within the 
coalfields, particularly in the Plateau region where population growth was highest. For 
example, if only one heir of many to a property decided to abandon farming and sell, the 
coal companies could often force the other heirs off their land through legal action: 
A common pattern, which extended into the 1930s, was for the Company to 
acquire the rights of a single heir to a property left to several family heirs. When 
the other heirs refused to sell, the Company would go to court and ask for a 
judgment on whether the property could be ‘fairly and impartially partitioned’ and 
on whether the ‘said property is of such a nature so that its sale could be of 
manifest interest to all parties’. Almost invariably, the court would rule that it 
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could not be divided, and that it should be sold at a ‘public auction to the highest 
bidder’- usually the [Company]. (Gaventa 1982:54) 
Given the lack of money assets that most smallholder families possessed (Salstrom 1994), 
forcing the sale at auction rather than at an appraised price must have been particularly 
devastating.   
 Around the turn of the 19th century, many struggling farmers or those looking for 
extra cash sold or “leased” their mineral rights to supplement their farming activities. 
Leases were for extremely long periods of time, often hundreds of years, which was only 
possible through coal interests ability to influence courts to ignore clear violations of 
other state laws, for example, regarding “perpetuities” (Montrie 2003; Wright 1978). 
Selling or leasing only the mineral rights to property appeared advantageous to locals but 
often was devastating for both the owner and the surrounding community in the long run. 
Those purchasing or leasing the mineral rights as a capital investment were usually free 
from most or all tax responsibility attached to “land” ownership but given effective 
superiority over surface owner rights as well (Montrie 2003; Salstrom 1994). When local 
owners would not sell, industrial interests often were able to avail themselves of the 
disorganized system of land titles inherited from the frontier period. Through superior 
access to the legal and political system industrial and speculative interests were more 
likely to persevere in cases of contested title (Eller 1982; Gaventa 1982). 
Ecological degradation and legal restriction of access to the means of subsistence 
that deepened (but did not decisively complete) the proletarianization of Appalachian 
people was combined with the creation of new socio-cultural needs for industrial goods 
as well as joint state-corporate policies to encourage immigration. There are accounts of 
frustrations by both timber operator and coal operators of the greater difficulty in 
disciplining workers from households with independent subsistence capacity. These 
workers’ willingness to accept low pay was to an extent counterbalanced by their 
resistance to attempts to ratchet up exploitation as competition put pressure on wage costs. 
For example, in 1905 local miners in West Virginia walked off the job when the 
Louisville Coal and Coke Company increased the size of coal cars without increasing the 
piece rate. The company responded, like others at the time, by implementing a policy of 
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refusing to hire those who had too much alternative means of livelihood or who 
expressed an interest in acquiring them (Stoll 2014). As in many industries in the late 19th 
and early 20th century capital brought in migrant labor displaced from other parts of the 
world system as a more vulnerable alternative when local workers proved too few or too 
restive. The Louisville Coal and Coke Company in the case above evicted the miners on 
their land within days and had a trainload of migrant laborers to replace them within a 
week. “The strategy of retreating to the hollows would never work the same way again. 
All of a sudden, survival required local men to adhere to industrial discipline” (Stoll 
2014:82-3).” Miners had the most autonomy in the labor process of perhaps any sector of 
industry, and the extraction of surplus took place in the absolute form of increasing the 
length and intensity of work by simply lowering the real wage (R. Lewis 1993; Simon 
1981). The dependence during this period on the formal rather than real subsumption of 
the labor process meant that capital focused on maintaining a sufficient reserve army and 
fought unionization on this basis, with aspects over the labor process itself distinctly 
secondary. 
The use of migrant labor was widespread and well recognized as part of a larger 
effort to create labor discipline, not simply respond to labor shortages. “Testimony given 
to Congress in 1888 revealed how mining corporations succeeded in keeping ‘thousands 
of surplus laborers on hand to underbid each other for employment ... hold them 
purposely ignorant when the mines are to be worked and when closed, so that they cannot 
seek employment elsewhere’” (Stoll 2014:82). Many of these imported workers were 
Southern blacks or recent immigrants to the US and were sometimes brought in directly 
as strikebreakers. Although miners eventually formed solidarity across racial and ethnic 
lines in many areas (most successfully in West Virginia), these tactics were temporarily 
successful in creating an exploitable labor force for the mines (Gaventa 1982; Salstrom 
1994). Although the state legislature in Tennessee had passed laws in the 1880s 
forbidding the coercion of workers on political matters, or whom they purchased goods 
and services from, as well as on mine ventilation and checkweighmen, the enforcement 
of these was totally dependent upon the aggrieved until a solitary Inspector of Mines was 
established in 1891 (Gaventa 1982). In the early 1890s there were a number of militant 
strikes in eastern Tennessee and Kentucky over proper measurement of coal for piece 
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rates and the use of, mostly black, convict labor. At Coal Creek, Tennessee this resulted 
in repeated battles with and eventual subjugation by state militia as miners freed the 
prisoners brought in as strike breakers in a remarkable case of cross-racial class solidarity 
at the time (Gaventa 1982).Whenever mining markets went bust blacks and more recent 
foreign immigrants left in disproportionately higher numbers (Davis 2000; Salstrom 
1994). 
In Central Appalachia this imported labor force combined with the latent reserve 
army of an ecologically crumbling and socially strangled subsistence economy to 
increase the exploitability of the later. In West Virginia 40% of the increase in coal 
employment between 1880 and 1930 was from migrants, which “left a large portion of 
the native population tied to the land…as much as one-third of the labor was redundant. 
But it was underemployed, not unemployed” (Simon 1981:178).When brought under the 
total control of the company town, these relations reached their extreme. First established 
by antebellum iron, coal, salt and copper mines, they increased rapidly after 1880; by 
1910 seventy percent and in 1923 “between two-thirds and four-fifths of [the coal] 
miners of these Southern Appalachians lived in ‘company-controlled communities’” 
(Dunaway 1996a; Gaventa 1982:86; Salstrom 1994).20 During this same period the wage 
share of Appalachian miners went from being similar to Midwestern miners to 
significantly lower (Salstrom 1994:74-5).21 Wages per ton fell continuously in 
Appalachia but rebounded in the Midwest with the help of unionization under the United 
Mineworkers.  
Engels pointed to the continued subsistence capacity of German workers, and the 
lower than average wages it allowed them to survive on, as a key for German 
manufacturers whose profitability was propped up by this “deduction from normal wages” 
(Engels 1955). Marx also noted that monopoly pricing power could “depress wages 
below the value of labor-power, of course only to the extent that wages would be higher 
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 At the high end, in 1923, 80% of miners in West Virginia lived in company housing (Simon 1981). By 
comparison, only 8.5 percent of miners in Indiana and Illinois lived in company towns in 1910 (Salstrom 
1994). 
 
21
 In West Virginia piece wage rates were between 62-79% of the rate of miners in Ohio, Illinois, and 
Pennsylvania during the early unionization period of 1898-1923 (Simon 1981). 
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than the physical minimum of subsistence” (Marx 1991:1003). The historical 
development of mining in Appalachia allowed coal capital to avail itself of multiple 
sources of “profits by deduction” stemming from both the reproductive efforts of 
households’ subsistence labor and the monopoly power of company stores. This 
contributed to a situation of super-exploitation as “several government studies indicated 
the below-subsistence consumption of mine workers” (Simon 1981:178). These sources 
of profitability were protected by a violent commitment to company control and 
opposition to unionization. As a result of this highly exploitative regime and the high 
quality coal reserves of the region, Central Appalachian coal operators were able to 
undercut competitors in surrounding markets, overcome distance and transportation 
handicaps and undermine attempts to rationalize the national coal industry for over half a 
century.  
Among the venerable methods of coercion used in company towns was 
indebtedness. Company stores were an important part of the profitability and labor 
discipline in the coalfields. Initially companies often paid wages in company “scrip,” a 
currency of their own minting which was exchangeable at the company store. Scrip could 
usually be exchanged for cash outside the camp but only at a discount of 60-90% (usually 
in the middle of that range), at least until laws were passed allowing companies to make 
it non-transferrable.22  There is some debate as to the degree to which payment in scrip 
was a cause versus a consequence of lack of circulation of cash but the relationship was 
surely reciprocal (Salstrom 1994; Weiner 2009). After laws were passed requiring the 
payment of wages in cash, companies continued to advance workers their wages in scrip. 
There is some disagreement over the extent to which stores were able to price gouge and 
force their employees to shop there, but, clearly, there were plenty of examples. A 1911 
study by the US Immigration Commission found that companies were able to exclude 
independent stores simply by their monopoly of land in the area. The police apparatus 
generated by companies to guard against unions also facilitated this when desired. 
Although, in at least one case in West Virginia in 1915 a mine owner chastised his 
                                                        
22
 This occurred in Virginia in 1919 and a half-decade later in West Virginia(Weiner 2009). The role of 
credit and debt would have been familiar to those moving into company towns from the reserve army of 
tenant famers and share-croppers (R. Lewis 1993). 
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operator for being overzealous in restricting access to other retailers, preferring to save 
the publicly antagonizing use of force for union organizers (Weiner 2009).23 In 1915, 
Coal Age reported the results of a government survey finding more than a few mines had 
losses in coal counterbalanced by their retail and housing monopolies, a finding that at 
least one letter to the journal reluctantly agreed with. The New York Times reported that 
many of the mines in Harlan County, Kentucky were profitable only at their commissary. 
Accounts of profits on the stores range from 10-15%, up to 80% or even 170% at one 
Harlan mine between 1934-37(Simon 1981; Weiner 2009). Coal Age defended 
companies relying on their stores arguing that losing money in one venture was no reason 
to lose it in all others. Yet writers to the journal complained it was an obstacle to 
rationalizing the industry through reducing overproduction by eliminating less efficient 
mines. Mines “can easily afford to lose three cents a ton in the cost of production if 40 
percent of the men’s wages goes into the store,” a rate by no means unheard of (quoted in 
Weiner 2009:41). This also encouraged the placement of the most indebted rather than 
the most skilled miners in the best productive seams. Such favoritism was simple good 
business for mine operators but of course also encouraged patronage of the company 
store. Other more direct forms of coercion were commonly reported. Miners at one (non-
union) mine in Mingo County, West Virginia in 1920 negotiated a nine cent per carload 
raise only to find that their work inputs had been marked up by five to twenty five cents, 
and it was compulsory to purchase them from the company store (R. Bailey 2009). In any 
case, it is certain that coal company store profits with their high rate of absentee 
ownership were more likely to be siphoned out of rather than reinvested in the region. 
“Coal company stores therefore constituted an integral part of a single industry order that 
proved unable to sustain a health economy” (Weiner 2009:50). 
The Irish, Italian, and Eastern/Southern Europeans that companies imported often 
were similarly recently displaced from agricultural life and so had similar skills to the 
mountaineers that coal operators could put to work in “captive gardens” lowering the cost 
of labor power (R. Lewis 1993; Stoll 2014).  
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 Often the only store in newly opened areas, and in such cases they offered companies customers beyond 
their miners. 
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The garden solved a problem for the coal operators. Scrip still required company 
stores to purchase food, usually from outside the region. But currency was scarce 
in Appalachia as late as the 1940s, and companies had begun to make purchases 
by check, transferring money directly to eastern banks, which compounded the 
scarcity of circulating currency. This motivated managers to link surplus family 
labor with surplus land above the mines. (Stoll 2014:83) 
At the captive mines of US Steel in Gary, West Virginia, one study estimated the average 
yearly value of subsistence gardens at $100 and the total for the camp of $15-20,000 
(Stoll 2014:84).24 Estimates in the 1920s indicated that between fifty and seventy percent 
of miners raised crops and livestock (Corbin 1981).25 In company towns this was 
sometimes mandated by rule or by circumstance and almost always encouraged with 
contests and prizes (Gaventa 1982; R. Lewis 1993; Salstrom 1994).26 The scale of the 
household subsistence activity and its subsidy to coal capital was a factor along with the 
control of the company town that made the Appalachian coal fields a destabilizing force 
in the national coal industry. In 1896 a UMWA official wondered after seeing the extent 
of subsistence gardening “If the land of West Virginia was used as an adjunct to the pluck 
[i.e. company] store in the production of coal, how were our miners in other parts of the 
country to meet this kind of competition?” (quoted in Stoll 2014:84). 
When capital controlled the land on which subsistence was practiced, the lack of 
wages was even more devastating in trying to persevere through a strike. In the major 
Paint Creek Strike of 1912, although the strike began in April, the company waited a 
month or more, until after gardens were planted, to evict the miners. Starving miners 
clashed with guards trying to retrieve their livestock (Stoll 2014). 
Beans tasted the same on the ridge as they did in the Pocahontas coalfields … but 
beans in such differing circumstances transmitted different social relations. Before 
the enclosure and clear cutting of the forest, beans on the ridge complemented a 
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 It may not be a coincidence that when US Steel agreed under pressure to voluntarily honor the National 
Industrial Relations Act codes in its Pennsylvania mines (such captive mines were exempt from the law), in 
Central Appalachian mine operations, like Gary, the company stood its ground and resisted miners 
demands violently (Myers 2009). 
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 The West Virginia Coal association estimates in 1924 indicated that 70% of miners in the southern 
portion of the state were involved in household subsistence activities (R. Lewis 1993). 
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 Such mandates were not exclusive to the coal industry. Henry Ford required as a condition of 
employment at his Iron Mountain plant in Michigan that workers plant a garden to provide a portion of 
their winter vegetables (Stoll 2014) 
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complex land use that included grazing cattle, planting rye, distilling whiskey, 
collecting tanning bark, and gathering chestnuts. Beans in the coal camps served 
the interests of capital over those of households. All their garden products must 
have given workers and families a sense of place and sufficiency, yet the ultimate 
economic advantage from these plantings belonged to the companies. (Stoll 
2014:90) 
Domination of local governments and institutions by the servants of coal capital 
was not only consciously designed to provide material control over the local inhabitants 
but also reflected the realization that “[through] control of the socializing agencies of 
government, church and school…values could be shaped” (Gaventa 1982:67). Coal 
operators had both deputies appointed by the county sheriff and private police on their 
payroll to control miners. The effectiveness of private police was enhanced by the legal 
authority they were given by state courts to arrest and evict union sympathizers (Simon 
1981). After the establishment of federal support for extension services, county agents 
were dispatched to help improve the productivity of miner’s subsistence activities in 
Mingo County, West Virginia (Salstrom 1994).Through establishment of opulent resorts 
and health spas in Appalachia’s rural regions, “the industrial order was introduced to the 
mountaineers’ society by conspicuous consumption, with an exaggerated demonstration 
of its benefits” (Gaventa 1982:63). The glamour during boom conditions encouraged both 
the sale of potential subsistence farmland and encouraged migration to (often company-
controlled) mining boomtowns. When boom conditions inevitably failed and companies 
ratcheted up exploitation, their workforce had few options for escape (Gaventa 1982). 
The forces driving boom and bust originated outside of this peripheral region. 
The integration of regional coal markets into an increasingly national one led to 
increased competition and falling prices between 1880 and WWI, which increased 
demand and prices until 1922, when a new downturn continued into the 1930s. Control of 
the industry was initially highly dispersed among different capitalists and fierce 
competition between mining companies drove a typical extractive cycle of boom and bust. 
The coal market consists of long and short-term contracts, which added pressures to cut 
prices in the bidding to secure long-term contracts. Mining has a high degree of fixed and 
sunk operating costs that encourage overproduction and prevent bankruptcies from 
reducing productive capacity as mines are usually taken over rather than abandoned. Like 
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the highly competitive timber industry it survived, coal varied in quality, e.g. from 
Anthracite to sub-bitumious, and in the degree of processing for cleaning and sizing—all 
of which contributed to difficulties in rationalizing competition. Furthermore, operators 
found it difficult to organize across regions and firm sizes. Voluntary consolidation of 
firms was hindered by the high importance of valuing not only sunk capital costs but 
capitalizing the rent-producing potential of the different coal reserves in unstable and 
fluctuating market conditions. Like timber, the coal industry had a large number of 
private rather than public companies early on. Unlike timber, coal resources were too 
plentiful for exhaustion to play a timely role in fostering consolidation. By offering 
preferential long haul rates, railroads helped increase competition between different fields, 
and a common practice of allocating cars during shortages by previous production 
provided additional incentive to keep production high.  
Coal operators had far more influence over labor costs than freight costs or 
demand for their variety of coal—particularly when their customers were monopolistic 
industries like steel or rail (Simon 1981). The wage-share of mine-mouth coal costs 
ranged from 63-84% in 1916 and 69-73% in 1918-20 for the Appalachian coalfields and 
their Eastern Interior competitors in the Midwest (Bowman 1989). Although labor was 
the highest cost of production, the price of coal was still primarily determined by 
transportation costs accounting for half or more of the price for consumers into the 1930s. 
Before WWII, there were five interdistrict coal markets: the tidewater market of the 
Atlantic ports, New England, the lake-cargo market of the Great Lakes, the central all-rail 
market of Ohio, Michigan, and part of Indiana, and the Midwestern market. Pennsylvania 
was the unrivaled top coal producing state until the late 1920s when West Virginia began 
to overtake it. Still, West Virginia coal competed in all district markets on account of a 
varying combination of favorable rail rates, higher quality coal, and lower labor costs. 
For the same reasons Appalachian Kentucky maintained a significant presence in three of 
the five districts. Lower wage costs in particular helped increase Kentucky and West 
Virginia coal operators market share in the tidewater district from 40 to 63% between 
1919 and 1934 (Bowman 1989).   
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In the late 19th century as competition increased prices fell faster than productivity, 
suggesting a loss in rents, profits, or both on the part of the industry. In 1898 the Central 
Competitive Field of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Indiana was unionized under the 
UMWA, an outcome both capital and labor hoped would rationalize competition by 
limiting price cutting. The union agreement, in practice, authorized mines at a 
competitive disadvantage due to their coal reserves or transport costs to pay lower wage 
rates (Bowman 1989). As a result these mines began mechanizing, using automated 
cutting machines and later automated loading of coal, techniques that would not be 
adopted in Central Appalachia for decades. Around this same time operators in the 
tidewater market, failing to achieve any voluntary agreement had turned to the railroads 
connecting them to the market to rationalize production. However, this only worked 
where there was no competition between railroads, and it backfired on operators in at 
least one instance in West Virginia when the railroads offered to concession in rates to 
raise workers’ wages and avoid a strike. The coal companies responded with a lockout to 
show that the railroad would not maintain its tonnage at the expense of their authority 
(Bowman 1989). The rapid expansion of production and transportation access of the non-
union Kentucky and West Virginia coalfields undermined previous efforts to rationalize 
the industry undertaken by the Central Competitive Field.  Capital investment in mining 
was attracted to internal periphery of Central Appalachia for the same reasons it would be 
drawn to the global periphery nearly a century later: higher quality deposits and lower 
labor costs (Pollin 1980). Whereas in 1885 the states of the Central Field produced 80% 
of coal consumed in their region, by the start of WWI they produced less than two-thirds 
(Bowman 1989).  Central Appalachian coal was their main source of competition. 
 Both coal operators and miners unions saw wage suppressing power of Central 
Appalachian coal operators as a destabilizing force in the industry. A period of 
consolidation during the first decade of the twentieth century, peaking in 1905, was not 
sufficient to curb price-cutting. Related divisions also appeared between Central 
Appalachian and other coal operators over mine safety with the former most opposed, 
viewing reform as a threat to their advantage (Bowman 1989). Between 1890 and 1907 
there were over a quarter million fatalities in US mines. While in Pennsylvania miners 
had a 22% chance of being killed and a 28% chance of being seriously injured, in 1907 
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West Virginia miners had rates double those. At the turn of the century Pennsylvania had 
set the minimum age for miners at 16 while West Virginia required only 14 years of age. 
West Virginia coal interests fended off state laws after the 1907 Monongah disaster that 
killed somewhere between 362 and 500 miners and made sure the 1910 Federal Bureau 
of Mines was focused on research rather than enforcement (Rakes 2009). While many in 
the coal business, as in numerous other industries, hoped the intervention of the Federal 
Trade Commission would provide stabilization and rationalization of the industry, it was 
the outbreak of the First World War and its increased demand that finally brought 
meaningful state intervention(Bowman 1989; Kolko 1963). Coal prices increased for 
consumers by 500 percent between 1915 and 1920 resulting in federal government 
control over prices and distribution—not the sort of intervention capital desired, though 
by the end of the war profits and production were stable (Bowman 1989).  
Booming industry after the war and supply disruptions from strikes kept prices 
high but proposals by the United Mine Workers, among others, to nationalize the industry 
set coal capital on edge by 1920.27 The governor of West Virginia, Cornwell, who had 
claimed to be a trade union supporter, praised the non-union mines that had broken the 
1919 strike and claimed that if the non-union fields were organized it would result in the 
nationalization of the coal industry—making his allegiance clear (R. Bailey 2009). 
Industry now opposed any binding federal intervention, even that of data collection by 
the Federal Trade Commission, as a slippery slope. After 1920, in the face of increased 
competition from oil and gas and more efficient use of coal by plants and mills, demand 
stagnated. The non-union fields responded predictably with wage and price cuts 
(Bowman 1989).  
It was against this economic backdrop that violence broke out in Mingo County, 
West Virginia. Having gained a foothold in the north of the state the UMWA began a 
push to organize the southernmost county in the spring of 1920. Following a number of 
violent incidents that year, a force of over 10,000 miners marched and rode 
commandeered freight trains south toward Mingo but were met by the sheriff and a 
                                                        
27
 Indiana passed a law in that year giving the governor the authority to set coal prices and confiscate the 
mines of operators who resisted. The following year a federal grand jury indicted 226 Indiana coal 
operators, the UMWA and the National Coal Association for anti-trust violations (Bowman 1989:141). 
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private military fielded by coal interests at Blair Mountain in Logan County. Though 
having superior numbers the miners were severely outgunned from fortified positions and 
facing aerial bombardment with homemade and leftover chemical munitions from WWI. 
Two thousand federal troops and an air force detachment of bombers arrived within a few 
days and both sides disarmed. The end result was a failure to organize the southern West 
Virginia fields.  
The stage for a massive nationwide strike in 1922 was set, and the wage structure 
of Central Appalachia was at the heart of it. Union operators had responded by 
demanding contracts at a district rather than national level and proposed cuts of 30 
percent to wages. Bowman’s analysis of industry communications at the time makes clear 
that those outside the non-union Central Appalachian fields viewed themselves as unable 
to compete with low wages there and with organization of those fields having been 
crushed at Blair Mountain by industry, state, and federal forces, outside operators moved 
against their own unions. The coal shortage from the ensuing strike brought the federal 
government back into a regulatory role through emergency legislation and allowed the 
UMWA to hold on to an agreement across Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana, but it lost 
Pennsylvania (Bowman 1989).  
Between 1923 and 1925 union coalfield production shrank from 53% to 30% of 
total production with the union losing most of the small presence it had in Central 
Appalachia (Bowman 1989). West Virginia and Kentucky’s share of national bituminous 
coal production had increased from 23% in 1920 to 41% by 1927 (Salstrom 1994). In that 
same year another strike had even worse outcomes for the UMWA leaving them at less 
than one-fifth the membership of five years earlier and all but gone from Appalachia. The 
political and economic elite of West Virginia positioned themselves as securing the 
nation’s fuel supply to legitimate their war on the working class. They responded to the 
jury acquittal of the Matewan defendants’ killing of the coal company Baldwin-Felt’s 
agents with a bill to limit defendants’ rights, which was upheld by the Supreme Court. 
They empowered coal companies to seek compensation for strike losses from parent 
unions, leading to over 200 injunction victories by coal forces by 1928. “Denied the basic 
constitutional right of freedom of speech, West Virginia’s miners believed that they had 
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not only been silenced, but also enslaved” (R. Bailey 2009:190). This ushered in a period 
of unchecked cutthroat competition and price warfare that lasted until the establishment 
of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933. Consolidation of mines that began again 
in the mid1920s was too little to change the structure of competition. Northern 
Appalachian mines, even after breaking their union contracts were still weakened 
compared to the non-union Central Appalachian operators. The depression hit the 
industry hard: “Between 1928 and 1932, the bituminous coal industry experienced the 
largest aggregate losses of any U.S. industry” (Bowman 1989:179). By the end of the 
1920s coal operators increasingly complained of “unfair” competition by competitors 
selling “below cost.” The Southern Appalachian Coal Association was the first to adopt 
voluntary codes prohibiting such practices in 1929. In 1931 the governor of Kentucky 
convened a meeting of the region’s governors at the behest of the National Coal 
Association to develop a plan for the industry. The result was an effort to establish selling 
agencies to control competition, but only a couple were actually in operation at the time 
NIRA arrived (Bowman 1989).  
Coal, like the National Association of Manufactures, was opposed to the 
collective bargaining provisions of NIRA. It was these provisions that allowed for a 
successful unionization across Central Appalachia for the first time in history and which 
had a longer effect on the industry and the region than the contested and short-lived coal 
codes of the NIRA period. “Whatever stabilization was achieved…was achieved by the 
United Mine Workers, not the state” (Bowman 1989:202). Union miners would actually 
strike violators of the code, which the state did not really enforce.28 The Appalachian 
Agreement also came out of the deal to set NIRA codes. It set an eight-hour day and 
forty-hour week, granted miner selected checkweighmen, ended company store mandates, 
set the minimum employment age to 17, and, most important, recognized the right to 
bargain collectively. The UMWA organized a drive with the slogan “the president wants 
you to join the union” (indicating they meant UMWA president John Lewis if pressed). 
The drive increased wages from a low of $1.50 a day to $4.20, around fifty cents below 
                                                        
28
 NIRA did not originally include captive mines, but wildcat strikes in western PA got US Steel to honor it 
at those mines; the coal industry held out longer, continuing to use violence, in places like Gary, WV. 
Some operators shut down rather than recognize the union(Myers 2009). 
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the minimum for the already unionized Central Competitive Field (Myers 2009). Even 
once unionized, the Southern Appalachian region squared off against other regions of 
operators who wanted government enforcement after the invalidation of NIRA—they 
wanted to maintain their ability to cut into others markets. Central Appalachian operators 
remained opposed to government intervention that would regulate prices above the 
district level. By the time an agency with the power to successfully set prices had been 
put into practice, demand from WWII had changed the situation.  
Coal operators outside of Appalachia had invested in mechanization much sooner 
and more intensely due to their higher labor costs from unionized workforces (Salstrom 
1994). In Appalachia coal companies were better able to regain profits by cutting labor 
costs through slashing wage rates and jobs. In the absence of unionized resistance coal 
companies had lowered the cost of labor-power by laying off workers (leaving them to 
eke out a subsistence as they could) and driving remaining workers harder through wage 
cuts forming a vicious cycle.29 Coal miners were relatively autonomous in the actual 
labor process and in Central Appalachia capital substituted control of life outside of the 
mine as a way of appropriating additional surplus for increased control over the labor 
process that mechanization entailed(Simon 1981) WWI had led Appalachian operators to 
rapidly increase their use of mechanized cutting of coal but in 1933 still just over one 
percent of coal was loaded by machine in West Virginia compared with nearly fifty-nine 
percent in Illinois (Myers 2009). In 1940, Central Appalachian mines were still 
employing mechanized loading at half the rate of the Midwest. Mechanization reduced 
jobs and also potential customers for company controlled retail. Typical of the 
backwardness of class structure that Baran (Baran 1962) and Amin (Amin 1976) describe 
in the periphery, the “coal operator was forsaking the uncertain profits of mechanization 
for the certain profits of the company store” (Simon 1981:175). Instead, companies 
invested in repression, with expenditures on police and spies reaching over 6.5% of the 
wage bill at one mine (Simon 1981). After finally succumbing to unionization, Central 
Appalachian coal operators utilized high coal prices to invest in catching up with their 
unionized competitors in levels of mechanization. This dramatically increased the reserve 
                                                        
29
 Gaventa illustrates this process in the case of three Central Appalachian counties early in 1931 (1980:96). 
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army in the region by reducing the labor-intensiveness of mining and spurred enormous 
outmigration, even during the war-driven economic recovery.  
 Mechanization of mining had dramatic changes first on miners’ work 
environments by increasing the level of dust and resultant black lung disease. Whereas 
British miners were already persuading the government to implement dust control and 
other safety measures in the 1930s, black lung legislation was not passed in the US until 
1969 (Salstrom 1996b). In 1950, three-quarters of coal was still mined below ground in 
the US and the majority of it from Appalachia. Facing lower quality reserves and higher 
labor costs, coal operators in Illinois and Ohio were not surprisingly some of the first to 
adopt mechanized forms of surface mining. By the 1940s around half of the coal in those 
states was produced at surface mines. Due to the steep terrain in Appalachia, contour and 
auger mining, in which the hillside is progressively cut away and the coal seam drilled 
out, preceded by some time the deployment of full scale leveling of ridges. These forms 
of production made inroads in Central Appalachian and Pennsylvania’s coalfields as 
surface mining technology by the early 1960s was on average more than twice as 
productive per man hour as underground mining (Montrie 2003). Yet, the application of 
these productivity increases was limited by two factors. First, the size of the overburden 
that could be profitably removed for a given quantity of coal was a factor historically 
determined by the state of the technology. Second, the ability of coal operators to 
externalize the ecological costs of these extraction techniques was a product of their 
power relative to other classes and class fractions in the state apparatus. The events 
leading to the increased importance of these two factors for reproducing a mode of 
extraction around coal in Central Appalachia will be examined in more detail in later 
chapters.  
Conclusion 
Unequal ecological exchange began with the incorporation of native peoples into 
the capitalist world system feeding both the leather trade in Europe and merchant capital 
in America. The limitless demand of capitalist industry extirpated many species from the 
region and restructured the forest ecology. The commodification and concentration of 
land swept ahead of the frontier of white resettlement, structuring the long-term class 
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basis of the extractive agriculture that would be practiced. While it is clear that 
agriculture in this period was extractive and unsustainable, in the early-to-mid 19th 
century industries such as salt and iron temporarily raised the possibility of greater 
internal articulation. However, the way in which transportation networks shaped 
commodity chains marginalized the competitiveness of regional industry and agriculture, 
as did the labor-intensive production methods reliant on slavery and coerced labor 
particularly in the southern counties.  
The metabolic disarticulation of agriculture was magnified by the new political 
and economic priorities of the timber boom as it moved across the region. These 
processes accentuated the precariousness of the latent reserve army of labor made up of 
households engaged in semisubsistence dependent on virgin forestlands. Combined with 
natural and migratory population growth, the unequal ecological exchange of previous 
regimes contributed to the unequal exchange in labor values that would be a major 
characteristic of the region’s coal industry before the 1930s. It is in this period that the 
dominance of coal interests most clearly creates a mode of extraction in the region’s 
coalfields. Less productive labor and higher transportation costs were counterbalanced by 
the higher rate of exploitation made possible by the semiproletarian labor force and the 
differential rents offered by the advantageous qualities of local coal seams. This allowed 
Central Appalachian coal to act as a destabilizing force in the industry on a national scale 
for the forty years before the New Deal, which brought unionization and helped equalize 
the level of exploitation between regions. The share of US coal production held by 
Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia grew from 4.4% in 1880 to 40% in 
1930 (with West Virginia alone accounting for 25%) (Simon 1981). The region received 
little in return for producing much of the coal that provided over three-quarter of the 
industrializing nation’s energy needs (Long 1989). The remarkable history of oppression 
and violence in the region’s coalfields was linked to the social and natural conditions 
inherited from previous extractive economies that put miners there, as a class, at a 
disadvantage relative to other mining regions.  
The post war period marks a shift in the balance of the contradictions driving the 
historical development of Central Appalachia’s mode of extraction around coal. Simon 
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(1983)suggests that the exchange relations around the coal sector before WWII likely had 
a greater importance for Central Appalachia’s underdevelopment than afterward when the 
character of productive relations became more determining. The prewar period was 
characterized by uncontrollable price warfare and a focus on increasing surplus extracted 
from coal miners by extending the work day and profits by deduction through the subsidy 
of household subsistence and the company store. The metabolic regime that made this 
possible was in large part the result of the worsening position of labor in the semi-
subsistence regime that had supported the previously dominant extractive commodity 
exports of agricultural goods. The boom in timber that either preceded or accompanied 
coal extraction accelerated the destruction of the natural base of this semi-subsistence 
regime. 
The social metabolism approach draws our attention to how land tenure and 
access shaped land use and vice-versa in dialectical fashion. The effective reserve army 
created by this metabolic regime, so crucial to the mode of extraction around coal, was a 
product of exploiting the land for export surpluses, population growth, deliberate 
importing of additional labor, and encouragement of continued subsistence by capital. 
Combined with the potential for differential rents from superior coal reserves, the 
difference in the productivity of labor in the Central Appalachian coalfields was 
undoubtedly less than the difference in the cost of labor power. The question of how 
much of this surplus was captured by which fraction of capital requires more empirical 
detail than can be mustered here. However, it is clear that the portion reinvested within 
the region must have been a minority. Of that portion reinvested, a greater amount was 
dedicated to increasing the exploitation of labor through maintaining the coal camp 
system than in fixed capital to increase the productivity of labor.  
The governments of states in the region, particularly in Kentucky and West 
Virginia, were an integral part of reproducing this mode of extraction in the face of 
militant resistance by miners and the efforts to control competition from other coal 
operators. The ability of coal operators to reap such “profits by deduction” from the semi-
subsistent labor force was both the contingent result of the free appropriation and 
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externalization of costs by previous extractive activity and conscious design via 
recruitment and policy. As Amin notes:  
It is true that the productivity of labor depends not only on the technologies used 
but also on the normal framework within which labor, supplied with suitable 
capital equipment, operates in a given social system. These natural resources have 
no intrinsic productivity, but they have an effect on that of labor. The social and 
economic conditions of capital's access to these resources vary, however, and a 
whole series of cases of “unequal exchanges” are characterized by factors other 
than unequal reward to labor (1977:211-12). 
Amin criticizes Arthur W. Lewis (1954) for oversimplifying the way in which the reserve 
army in marginal agriculture is reproduced and its contribution to low wages in industry, 
and the same criticism must be laid on Salstrom’s (1994) application of Lewis’s theory to 
the low wages in Central Appalachia. The semiproletarian and latent reserve army 
squeezed by a destructive social metabolism joined migrant laborers from other 
peripheral areas of the world system in becoming the most exploited labor force in US 
coal mining. The company town and the company store with their local operators and 
absentee owners represented a merger of the dependent merchant and industrial capital 
commonly seen in the global periphery. The sizable contribution of the gendered 
household reproductive labor in the semi-subsistence metabolic regime is also 
characteristic. These forms of appropriation and siphoning off of the surplus, though not 
directly related to the production process, are no less important to class struggle and the 
pattern of underdevelopment. The accounts of both miners and coal operators leave little 
doubt that the rate of exploitation of was higher in the extreme periphery of Central 
Appalachia and the patterns of surplus extraction and investment were significantly 
different than in other parts of the country. Despite the general similarities with 
peripheral regions around the globe, the dramatic transformation of this regime came 
about because of the regions status as an internal periphery. Events at the national level 
transformed this internal periphery through the unionization fostered by Federal policy 
and the outmigration of much of the reserve army by the push of mechanization and the 
pull of wartime full employment opportunities. Both the superordinate political 
governance and the mobility of labor are peculiar to internal peripheries.  
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What Bowman’s (1989) analysis of collaboration and conflict among capitalists in 
the coal industry highlights are exactly the dynamics around the importance of rents and 
transportation that characterize modes of extraction. The location of resources is fixed 
and so the annihilation of space by time through transport infrastructure becomes 
paramount. As the potential for differential rents in Central Appalachian coal quality 
combined with growing transport connectedness, coal operators also brought to bear a 
favorable balance of class power with labor. Anxieties that are essentially about the effect 
of legislation on rents available to different types of coal deposits recur repeatedly in 
documents recording the opinion of coal interests. In the new political economic system 
emerging after WWII, the importance of the State’s regulation of the way in which the 
natural conditions of production could be appropriated in the coal extraction process 
would come to rival and even eclipse those regulating labor. The mode of extraction 
established in the region would increasingly rely on the ability and the intervention of 
class forces at the national level for its reproduction.
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CHAPTER III 
INTERNAL PERIPHERIES AND MODES OF EXTRACTION PART II: THE 
SHIFTING CONTRADICTIONS OF COAL’S SOCIOMETABOLIC REGIME 
National level events had overwhelmed the socio-metabolic regime of the Central 
Appalachian coal operators. NIRA had finally brought the unionization they had resisted 
with previous state and federal cooperation. This set into motion major changes in the 
structure of the coal industry. The post-war period coal industry was characterized by 
consolidation and increasingly rationalized competition in response to changes in the 
energy market. With labor costs bounded by unionization, coal operators turned to 
increasing the surplus extracted through greater capital investment in productivity 
enhancing technology and increasing political investment in maintaining the 
externalization of the ecological costs of coal production and consumption. This new 
socio-metabolic regime was challenged in the 1960s and early 1970s at the state and 
national level but ultimately the mode of extraction was reproduced, designating the 
region as a national sacrifice zone for cheap energy. 
The shifting of capital’s contradictions between capital and labor onto ecological 
conditions was reflected in patterns of changes in mining techniques. The price increases 
of NIRA had encouraged more marginal mines into production. The region’s roadways 
were expanded by the WPA and gave rise to new “truck mines” going after coal seams 
previously deemed unattractive. Utilizing free public roads and non-union labor (often 
only 5-6 men), these small but highly profitable mines were particularly prevalent in 
Kentucky, accounting for nearly 38% of production (Eller 2008). In general, however, the 
increased labor costs provided a check on smaller mines and encouraged those who could 
(mainly larger mines) to increase mechanization, including surface mining. The rapid 
mechanization of the 1930s was driven by a confluence of factors. A national agreement 
with United Mine Workers of America (UWMA) setting a wage floor coincided with low 
interest rates and capital costs as well as an increase in demand for coal in 1934-5. The 
increasing share of production in large mines offered the opportunity for returns to scale. 
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John L. Lewis, the UMWA’s president, was able to block a proposal to oppose 
mechanization at the 1934 UMWA convention, over rank and file opinion (Myers 
2009).30 Towards the end of the decade, smaller marginal mines increasingly folded. The 
throwing out of NIRA by the Supreme Court in 1935 did not undo the agreements made 
with the UMWA, so price competition resumed but with the wage floor. This increased 
the pressure for mechanization but adoption still came slower in non-union strongholds 
like McDowell County, West Virginia where operators didn’t embrace mechanical 
loading until the labor shortages of the war (Myers 2009). The rapid expansion of 
mechanization and surface mining was the result of contradictions in the socio-metabolic 
regime brought to a head by changes in the larger political economy.  
Although a significant portion of Central Appalachian coal was being 
mechanically cut after WWI, this had relatively little effect on the labor process within 
the mines. Furthermore, as long as the coal being cut was still loaded manually, it could 
actually serve to increase rather than decrease the demand for labor (Eller 2008). 
Mechanical loading, which required the reorganization of labor into “work crews” was 
relatively insignificant in the region until WWII (R. Lewis 1993). Federal agencies 
helped finance mechanization of the mines during the war and wartime jobs fueled 
outmigration leading to an actual labor shortage in the region. An estimated 19% of the 
population of eastern Kentucky left between 1940 and 1942 (Eller 2008). It was not until 
the implementation of the “continuous miner” system in the 1940s, which integrated 
cutting and loading that mechanization revolutionized the labor process and led to 
dramatic declines in employment.31 In 1946 the UMWA, having organized 90% of 
production, began a series of strikes for a period of years to fund their Health and 
Retirement Funds and so mines large enough to do so invested further in mechanization 
(Couto 1993; Eller 2008). At the same time that coal faced increasing competition from 
other energy sources, the post-war boom came to an end in 1948, bringing home to 
capital and labor the precarious state of the industry.  
                                                        
30
 Lewis had also been a key force in thwarting the popular support within the union for nationalization of 
the coal industry (Jameson forthcoming).  
 
31
 With the continuous miner system 10 men could mine three times as much coal as 86 had been able to 
load by hand (Eller 2008:20). 
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The Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA) in 1959 made a historic 
agreement with the UMWA to secure uninterrupted production for their customers and 
further mechanize production to bring down costs, thus securing a future in the growing 
electrical power market (Couto 1993). In return for increased wages and the funding of 
benefits sought, the UMWA committed itself to the process of mechanization. To offset 
the inevitable loss of jobs a royalty was placed on each ton of coal to provide for those 
displaced. Yet, John Lewis would not allow the royalty to rise to a point that might harm 
the competitiveness of coal visa vie other energy commodities and so the amount of 
benefits and the number of beneficiaries of the program were reduced below the already 
insufficient quantity—leaving many displaced miners abandoned by their union (Couto 
1993). The agreement marked a pivotal moment in the establishment of a “treadmill 
coalition” (Schnaiberg 1980) between coal capital and labor, one that would continue to 
undermine the union’s role in representing the class interests of coalfield communities. 
Between 1950 and 1970 employment in coal mines dropped by 75% nationally and only 
slightly less, 70%, in West Virginia (R. Lewis 1993). Many of the region’s small and 
medium sized mines were forced under. In the 1970s automation of mines increased 
underground with the development of long-wall mining, while above ground surface 
mining dramatically expanded to new scales. Between the 1940s and 1970s some three 
million people left Appalachia (Eller 2008). The region’s underdevelopment, exacerbated 
by falling mining employment, raised a potential challenge to the legitimacy of the State 
in post-war capitalism, and the policy response created political opportunity structures for 
both reproducing and challenging the mode of extraction around coal.  
Development Policy in Appalachia and the War of Poverty 
Many Central Appalachian counties lost more than 70% of their farm populations 
in the 1950s, often leaving fewer than 100 families per county. Even the livestock 
business “all but disappeared with the elimination of woodlands for pasturage as a result 
of mining, logging, and absentee ownership” (Eller 2008:29). State planners, like the 
Appalachian Regional Commission, often encouraged such depopulation as an inevitable 
outcome and solution to poverty. The region lagged behind in manufacturing growth and 
suffered rising unemployment, with rates in the coalfields reaching three or four times the 
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national average. Per capita incomes were a third or less of national averages. Education 
levels had continued to lag far behind other regions with half the average spending and in 
1960 the region had a high school attainment rate of less than one-third of adults. The 
previously established patronage system of local government contributed to a poorly 
functioning education system. Eller (2008) argues that as the outside corporate interests 
which had dominated many areas lost direct interest, local economic elites expanded their 
existing influence over land, and credit, and etc., to control a patronage system of state 
funds and programs—creating powerful political machines. The core of these machines, 
which included many middle class professionals, were the land developers, real estate 
brokers, and lawyers who had always managed the affairs of absentee capital. “These 
local entrepreneurs accumulated small fortunes where the majority of their neighbors 
lived below the poverty level, and they were not opposed to using the political system to 
maintain their good fortune” (Eller 2008:36). 
In coal counties, local operators dominated political structures. The Harlan 
County, Kentucky Republican Committee was chaired by the secretary of the coal 
operators association while the Democratic Committee was chaired by the president of 
coal operators association (Eller 2008). These local power structures facilitated the spread 
of small strip mining operations by providing public infrastructure, favorable credit, and 
freedom from regulatory enforcement. They blamed the union and the lack of 
infrastructure as responsible for coal’s declining position. When Kentucky created a 
development agency, the Eastern Kentucky Regional Planning Commission, it had an 
advisory council of some 200 citizens but the commission itself was dominated by coal 
and land interests(Eller 2008). The same problems of the 19th century, priorities for 
extractive infrastructure but insufficient sources for public or private investment, repeated 
themselves.  
The endemic corruption at the local and state levels led to calls by concerned 
individuals and organizations for more national level intervention (Eller 2008). However, 
in addition to local and state level influence by coalitions of extractive interests, federal 
institutions also contributed to ensuring continued dependent development around coal. 
The Tennessee Valley Authority had originally been established in 1933 with a broad 
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development and planning mission of rural electrification, soil and forest conservation, 
and flood control. However, by the 1950s, the TVA increasingly narrowed its mission to 
focus on the provision of cheap electricity, building some of the world’s largest coal-fired 
electrical plants (Nolt and Bustos 2005). To this end it provided financing and purchasing 
agreements for non-union and surface mined coal, becoming a significant owner of coal 
rights across Kentucky and Tennessee. In 1957 a series of disastrous floods swept the 
Central region and government investigators identified surface mining and logging as 
prime contributors (Eller 2008). While these TVA policies were justified in the name of 
development, workers in the mines it backed had poorer wages, safety conditions, and 
benefits than the UWMA-BCOA established standards (Couto 1993). These policies 
helped coal become the US’s largest source of electricity by 1961. TVA also demanded 
that mines subject to the agreement meet the low prices of its sponsored operations. 
UWMA president Lewis succumbed, while waging economic war against these TVA 
sponsored mines, to pressure to allow wage variances and further cut pension and benefit 
costs to meet this objective (Couto 1993). However, “few coal miners realized that the 
reason for the sweet-heart contracts, the withdrawal of UMW hospital cards, and the 
starvation economy was in part the steam coal policies that TVA was pursuing quietly in 
Knoxville” (Branscome 1978:287). 
By 1960, as West Virginian coalfield poverty was receiving presidential 
campaign attention, the governors of the other Southern Appalachian states were 
releasing a “Declaration for Action Regarding the Appalachian Region,” framing the 
problems in the area in terms of “underdevelopment” and calling for national investment 
and planning (Eller 2008).32 The region faced the problems that it was unattractive to 
private capital and could not meet the requirements of for federal programs that depended 
on population and matching funds by state or local government. When the UMWA health 
program collapsed in 1962 with the failing economy, class warfare broke out in the coal 
fields with “jobless families on one side and coal operators, businesspeople, and local 
                                                        
32
 This conception of underdevelopment should not be confused with that of dependency and world-
systems theories. Although the head of the study group which would eventually give rise to the 
Appalachian Regional Commission compared Appalachian underdevelopment to that in Latin America 
(Eller 2008), it was with an understanding based largely on Rostow’s  (1960) stages of development. In the 
same way, when the region was discussed as an underdeveloped nation “within” the US, it was usually 
without the implication that its underdevelopment was related to US development.  
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government officials on the other” (Eller 2008:68). Wildcat strikes and attacks on mines 
that had avoided payment of union-required royalties involved widespread violence and 
property destruction. The following year more disastrous flooding struck. As the region 
became a national icon for poverty in the midst of plenty, the Appalachian Regional 
Development Act (ARDA) was passed in 1965. To distinguish it from the Lyndon 
Johnson’s War on Poverty initiative and the Economic Opportunity Act (also launched by 
a press event in Central Appalachia), the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) 
created by the ARDA would focus primarily on infrastructure desired by local elites, to 
the neglect of human development goals that were originally proposed.33 In addition to 
the dubious inclusion of additional counties and states for political support, the final bill 
removed proposals that might have competed with private business (Eller 2008). Four-
fifths of the Appalachian Regional Commission’s spending would go towards road 
building. Less than one quarter of the funds would go to the Commission’s central 
Appalachian counties of southern West Virginia, east Tennessee and western Virginia 
over the first decade. Such transportation funds, channeled through local power networks 
would help feed the rise of non-union and surface mines.  
The War on Poverty’s Office of Economic Opportunity’s anti-poverty Volunteers 
in Service to America program and some Community Action Agencies would have 
unanticipated and unintended effects in the region’s coalfields. Although conceived of in 
the “culture of poverty” frame of analysis and intended to instill middle class values in 
“deficient” communities, some of its volunteers would generate a more radical praxis. 
While by and large the federal programs could be coopted into patronage networks of 
local elites, some of the student volunteers turned from their service and education 
mission to political organizing against local power structures around issues of welfare 
rights and strip mining (Eller 2008; Walls 2009). As these Appalachian Volunteers 
increasingly came to see from their time in coalfield communities that the economic and 
political power of local and absentee elites were structural causes of poverty and 
underdevelopment, they provided new energy and skills to old traditions of resistance and 
class consciousness. By the late 1960s the anti-poverty programs were widely seen as a 
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 The agency would take a relatively more human development focused approach during the Carter years 
but infrastructure remained primary. 
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political threat by the Appalachian county elites who feared the poor masses mobilizing 
against them. In West Virginia this threat took the form of election reform. In Mingo 
County, which the miners’ army had set out unsuccessfully to liberate in the mine war of 
1921, election corruption was rampant, and, even after a statewide reform campaign, 
estimates were that two-thirds of votes were bought in 1964 (Eller 2008:143). A central 
point of contention in mobilizing resistance to coal’s hegemony was the new socio-
metabolic relations around surface mining.  
New Metabolic Relations in Central Appalachia’s Mode of Extraction 
 Surface mining reached significant levels first in eastern Kentucky’s truck mines 
in the 1940s and later that decade in West Virginia. The practice came in earnest to 
Tennessee and Virginia in the 1950s. The use of diesel powered earthmoving equipment 
to cut away at exposed hillside seams was the earliest form employed. This created a 
“bench” as the hillside was cut away along the contour of the ridge and left a “highwall” 
of sheer rockface that was often unstable. Additional coal could be recovered by use of 
large drills, or augers, to remove coal from the seam after the size of the highwall became 
prohibitive of further excavation. Such contour and auger mining was initially more 
common due to terrain than open cut mining that removed the entire surface layer of 
overburden to expose the coal underneath. The latter type of mining expanded across 
Kentucky and West Virginia in the late 1960s, eventually reaching a scale appropriate to 
being called Mountaintop Removal as equipment began to allow for just that in the 1980s 
(Montrie 2003). All types of surface mining produced the risk of acid mine drainage and 
sedimentation, which increasingly threatened residents’ water supply while landslides, 
floods, blasting, and a lack of reclamation threatened homes and productive lands 
(Shover, Clelland, and Lynxwiler 1986). The ecological effects of surface mining are 
discussed in more detail in chapter VI.  
Contesting the mode of extraction. Some of the earliest challenges by 
environmental movements of middle class reformers and working class sportsmen to 
surface mining were supported by UMWA locals who saw the mostly non-union 
operations as threatening not only community interests through their environmental 
degradation but also as a threat to unionized underground jobs. West Virginia was the 
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first state to implement regulations in 1939 while Kentucky did not do so until 1954 
(even then, the enforcement agency was abolished by the subsequent governor) and 
Tennessee had no legislation until 1967 (Montrie 2003). As a rule, state legislation was 
weak with little resources for enforcement and minimal penalties and standards. During 
the early 1960s, TVA, under pressure from citizens and some state officials, did add 
language to its contracts requiring control of runoff during mining and reclamation 
afterwards. However, the agency would continue to lobby strongly against effective 
federal controls over the next decade(Vietor 1980). In political battles over regulation, 
protecting productive agricultural lands and steep slopes prone to landslides or flooding 
were of prime contention. Usually some type of bond payment was required in advance 
to insure the costs of reclamation in case the mining company went bankrupt. But in 
practice these funds were inadequate to restore the land to its previous condition, which 
was often impossible because no amount of labor or capital could restore the previous 
ecosystem. For this reason, opponents of strip mining often compared the reclamation 
process to “putting lipstick on a corpse” (Montrie 2003).  
In struggles over legislation and regulation, the underlying power of capital 
employed in coal extraction to freely appropriate natural use values and externalize costs 
was both de jure and de facto. While weak regulatory regimes allowed for the latter, in 
Kentucky the broad form deed was a critical example of the former.  
Written in finely printed legalese… the broad form deeds often signed over the 
rights to “dump, store, and leave upon said land any and all muck, bone, shale, 
water, or other refuse,” to use and pollute water courses in any manner, and to do 
anything “necessary and convenient” to extract subsurface minerals (Montrie 
2003:66).   
While courts in West Virginia ruled that such deeds only applied to the use of mining 
techniques known at the time (primarily the late 18th, early 19th century), in Kentucky 
courts upheld the superiority of mineral right owners over surface owners—even going so 
far as to release them from any liability to surface owners property in the mining process 
except where “oppressive, arbitrary, wanton, or malicious” (Montrie 2003:67-8). The 
Kentucky courts were so deferential to coal that they overturned legislation passed to 
reign in the use of the broad form deed, which was only ended by a 1988 constitutional 
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amendment through popular referendum. Local groups trying to protect residents’ land 
from the strip miners used civil disobedience, protest, petitioning, industrial sabotage, 
and threats of violence. Anti-poverty volunteers who had helped organize community 
opposition across the state were arrested by the Pike County, Kentucky sheriff following 
an investigation by the Independent Coal Operators Association and charged with 
sedition. The head of the Coal Operators Association took aim at Kentucky governor 
Breathitt, who had been somewhat sympathetic to landowners, and, according to the 
Operators, “outsiders, and communists” (Montrie 2003). Breathitt’s request to the federal 
government to cut off funds for the more active groups did not persuade the threatened 
local establishment and a candidate who ran on a platform to run the anti-poverty groups 
out of the state replaced the governor in 1967.  His successor, governor Nunn made good 
on his promise in part by creating the Kentucky Un-American Activities Committee (G. 
Carawan and C. Carawan 1993; Montrie 2003).  
 Despite the passage of more stringent regulation in 1967, the ecological and 
economic impacts of surface mining in West Virginia continued to grow as enforcement 
failed. For every acre directly strip mined another three to four acres were degraded 
(Montrie 2003). As momentum built for a ban, coal operators had support from district 31 
and the International vice president of the UMWA and the West Virginia Labor 
Federation. The latter state body of the AFL-CIO argued a 6.6 unemployment rate meant 
regulation should be given one more chance. Contrawise, West Virginia Black Lung 
Association president Arnold Miller (and future UMWA president under the Miners for 
Democracy reform ticket) rallied underground miners in support of a ban. The West 
Virginia Surface Mining Association (WVSMA) launched a media campaign 
emphasizing reclamation laws and the economic importance of the industry. The 1971 
compromise bill that passed placed a two-year moratorium on stripping in the 22 counties 
that did not currently have mines (only half of whom had coal to begin with). A measure 
of the impact on the coal industry was the WVSMA’s praise of the bill as “fair and 
equitable” (Montrie 2003:123). The Stanford Research Institute, whose president was a 
board member of the parent company of the second largest strip miner in the state, 
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Consolidated Coal Company, was commissioned to study surface mining in the state.34 
Their results unsurprising recommended that existing regulation was largely adequate 
(Montrie 2003:124-5). A number of anti-strip mining political candidates did well in the 
subsequent election but Democratic candidate John D. Rockefeller was soundly defeated 
in the governor’s race, resulting in his transformation from a proponent of surface mine 
abolition to one of its most prominent defenders.  
The energy crisis of the early 1970s caused a dramatic increase in demand for 
coal, triggering a new boom in the industry and cementing its connections to the larger 
energy industry. The increased presence of the coal in the national power structure 
achieved over the previous decades facilitated favorable federal policy and helped stifle a 
national movement for federal surface mine regulation (Vietor 1980). The 1965 ARDA 
had commissioned a federal study of the effects of surface mining, and the following year 
the results concluded that over 700,000 acres had been affected across the wider region 
with less than three-eigths undergoing reclamation (Montrie 2003:133). While state 
regulation was shown to be a dismal failure, but there was hesitancy among the policy 
formation network on all sides to pursue federal regulation of diverse mining conditions 
across multiple states. In the mid-1960s secretary of the Interior Udall had compared the 
degradation of surface mining to the Dust Bowl of the 1930s, and in 1970 the New York 
Times editorialized along similar lines calling for a federal ban on the practice (Montrie 
2003). This public sentiment and the threat of federal abolition bills brought large coal 
capital to take a more conciliatory position (Shover et al. 1986). It also reflected a 
growing tension between establishment coal operators and the union in Central 
Appalachia. By 1970 two-thirds of the coal mined in Appalachian Kentucky and 
Tennessee was non-union, largely from surface mines (Montrie 2003:23). Underground 
coal production had peaked in 1950, and after 1970 surface mining continued to grow 
rapidly overtaking underground production after 1973. The use of surface mining as a 
method to lower labor costs would divide and eventually fatally undermine the UMWA 
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 The vice president of Consolidation Coal had two years earlier addressed the American Mining Congress 
and attacked those pressing for improved mine reclamation as “stupid idiots, socialists and commies who 
don’t know what they are talking about” (quoted in Montrie 2003:140). 
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in Central Appalachia. The seeds of this divide emerged in the early 1970s as movements 
pressed for federal intervention to curb surface mining. 
The late 1960s and early 1970s were a period of dramatic struggle within the 
UMWA. Union leadership under Tony Boyle had collaborated with coal capital to try and 
crush the rank and file movement for workplace health and safety and legislation for 
Black Lung compensation. Rank and file workers won these through multiple forms of 
agitation and the “longest political strike in modern U.S. labor history,” efforts that were 
all against the orders and lobbying efforts of the union leadership (Nyden 2007:41). The 
same social movements fighting surface mining, which recognized the damage to miners’ 
bodies as another unpaid cost of the industry, aided miners in these battles (Judkins 1993). 
The increased productivity underground created by more powerful machinery had also 
elevated new dangers for miners, such as black lung disease, which undercut the 
reproduction costs of labor, foisting them back upon households left to care for those 
crippled by occupational disease. The removal of these externalities, through miners 
success at forcing regulation, was a major factor in declining productivity for the industry 
in the early 1970s (Darmstadter and Kropp 1997).   
After Boyle ordered the assassination of democratic reform candidate Joseph 
Yablonski and his family, the Miners for Democracy movement elected Black Lung 
Association president and anti-strip mining activist Arnold Miller to the presidency in 
1972. While the UMWA under Boyle had mirrored the coal industry’s position on federal 
regulation, first denying its necessity and then supporting regulation over a ban, Miller 
was an old ally of the leading abolitionist, Ken Hechler, who had played a key role in the 
Coal Mining Health and Safety Act of 1969. Both Hechler and Miller had campaigned in 
1971 for abolition of surface mining in West Virginia as a route to more underground 
union jobs and a necessary protection for affected communities. Once in office, however, 
Miller faced internal divisions, ultimately supporting a policy of protecting the small 
number of union surface mine jobs and trying to organize the non-union majority. The 
per-ton royalty payments for the union healthcare and pension funds were an important 
consideration independent of the lower number of jobs. Although initially taking a strong 
position on regulation and reclamation, arguing for permitting surface mining only where 
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it was the only economically feasible choice, by the time president Ford had vetoed a 
second regulatory bill in 1975, the union had overturned Miller’s initial stance and began, 
like the coal industry, to testify against federal regulation (Montrie 2003).  
The mine safety, black lung, and anti-strip mining movements were part of a 
larger counter-hegemonic mobilization catalyzed by the influx of anti-poverty volunteers. 
The coalfields of the late 1960s and early 1970s reflected larger political forces at work 
in the nation.35  
Nothing quite united Appalachian activists, small landowners, and mountain 
intellectuals across state borders in the late 1960s and 1970s like the anti-strip 
mining movement. Few causes touched on a broader range of social issues 
confronting the region: landownership, taxation, jobs, environmental quality, and 
even traditional values. (Eller 2008:161) 
The Miners for Democracy movement within the UMWA could have marked a 
significant turning point in the formation of continuing counter-hegemonic movements in 
the region, but ultimately the union succumbed to treadmill forces. By the late 1960s the 
anti-poverty organizations’ federal funding was being withdrawn and repression was 
dismantling their operations. Although the union launched a wave of strikes in the 1970s 
to capture for its membership a share of the rising price of coal and improve working 
conditions, by the 1980s it was again on the defensive as firms began to break away from 
the BCOA industry wide agreement. By 1977 the union was in a weakened state, 
producing only 50% percent of the nation’s coal, down 40% from 30 years earlier, and 
the strike beginning that year was the longest and least effective since the BCOA 
agreement began (Couto 1993). The fateful decision to attempt to organize rather than 
suppress surface mining would progressively deepen the rift between the UMWA and 
other progressive movements opposing the capitalist exploitation of land and labor 
(Burns 2007).  
Although one might have expected the oil shortage to secure coal against 
competition and allow it to absorb the costs of expanding deep mining, the major effect at 
the national policy level was hostility to anything that might increase energy costs and 
                                                        
35
 “‘The same values and national priorities which allow this country to inflict massive destruction upon the 
Vietnamese,’ declared one Appalachian movement publication in 1971, ‘are responsible for poverty, 
cultural imperialism, and the attacks upon the land and people of Appalachia’” (Eller 2008:173). 
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threaten economic growth. Working class and petty bourgeoisie movements Appalachia 
reached their peak influence in calling for a total or partial ban on surface mining in 
1971-2 as part of the National Coalition Against Strip Mining with mainstream 
environmental groups (Eller 2008; Montrie 2003). The ecological contradictions of coal 
extraction were dramatized by the 1972 Buffalo Creek disaster were a coal waste dam 
broke, killing 125 and displacing thousands (Bryant et al. 2007). A split emerged in the 
years following between more radical regional multi-issue organizations who saw the 
social relations of extraction within the region rendering rational regulation of surface 
mining impossible and national conservation groups most concerned with the non-human 
nature damaged by surface mining and political legitimacy. Yet even the Issac Walton 
League remarks reflect on the unequal ecological exchange affecting the region “Our 
economic system is the best in the world but it sometimes exposes a questionable face… 
for it is paradoxical that we are destroying the beautiful mountains and valleys of one 
area to create an Eden in another” (quoted in Montrie 2003:137).   
Coal representatives had been united in opposition to federal regulation in the late 
1960s, but by the early 1970s the largest industry groups responded to the threat of 
serious restriction of their ability to externalize costs with a more conciliatory approach. 
In the period leading up the passage of the Surface Mine Control and Reclamation Act 
(SMCRA) in 1977 divisions between regions and between larger capitals and smaller 
played out.36 The largest coal companies feared for the value of their Western assets as 
lawmakers from states like Montana proclaimed they “do not want our beautiful 
state…ruined…in order to decrease the air pollution in the East when the true motive 
behind strip mining is a higher margin of profit for coal companies” (quoted in Shover et 
al. 1986:34). State lawmakers had voiced hesitancy to enact regulatory programs that 
might undermine their coal industry’s competitiveness, but also recognized that uniform 
regulations would benefit some states over others due to natural conditions. By claiming 
to support “reasonable” federal regulation but working to defeat any specific bill 
proposed coal interests progressively weakened the bills passed in 1974 and 1975 and 
                                                        
36
 This divide was visible in the organization structures employed. The large companies operated through 
the American Mining Congress and National Coal Association while smaller companies formed the Mining 
and Reclamation Council of America.  
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convinced President Ford to veto them on energy supply and employment grounds 
(despite concession in those areas by lawmakers). With the election of President Carter 
the equation had changed, some form of federal regulation seemed inevitable. 
Uncertainty over future regulation was inhibiting the attraction of investment capital and 
planning for increasing the scale of operations. The need for rationalization applied 
particularly to the largest companies who were also more likely to have Western 
operations. In 1977 the Independent Coal Operators Association representing 
Appalachian producers expressed fears that without some form of regional coordination 
they would face increasing loss of market share to western strip mines (Shover et al. 
1986). Such fears would prove well founded. While the industry unanimously reversed 
their earlier position supporting “reasonable” federal rules and opposed SMCRA in 1977 
on the grounds that state regulation was now sufficient, for many Eastern operators the 
opposition was more desperate. Due to their average size and the Appalachian landscape 
they were more vulnerable to the higher costs and requirements around mitigating 
environmental damage, particularly the law’s provision for restoring land to its 
“approximate original contour.” The industry was united however, in opposition to 
provisions for public comment on permitting, citizen lawsuits over compliance, and 
analysis of hydrological impacts. In this sense, although much weaker than the previously 
vetoed bills, SMCRA represented a defeat for the industry, as one study put it strongly: 
“there is nothing…that indicates the act was a consequence of efforts by enlightened 
corporate liberals to dampen competition or to control markets. It might even be said that 
are no enlightened corporate liberals in the coal industry” (Shover et al. 1986:125). The 
bill was much stronger than the coal industry would have preferred but contained key 
provisions granting primacy of enforcement to the states, which would allow the coal 
industry to bypass this threat to the mode of extraction by exercise of direct as well as 
structural power at the state and federal levels.  
The failure of regulation and the reproduction of extractive relations. SMCRA 
created the federal Office of Surface Mining (OSM) within the Department of the Interior 
to establish a broad regulatory framework of standards that would then allow for states to 
create their own tailored to local issues. Immediately after passage of the bill the coal 
industry unleashed a barrage of legal challenges that were largely ineffective in doing 
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much besides delaying promulgation process. The level of autonomy shown by the OSM 
was shocking to both coal companies and state officials who perceived the agency to 
more sympathetic to environment groups concerns (Shover et al. 1986). State level 
politicians revolted, with former abolitionist gubernatorial candidate and now West 
Virginia senator Rockefeller introducing legislation just two years after passage to 
weaken SMCRA. The states, who, given their history of capture the OSM had held at 
arms length, opposed both the stringency of the regulations and particularly requirement 
for greater citizen participation in the enforcement process that undermined their rent 
allocating abilities. Major Central Appalachian coal states feared capital flight to areas 
where coal production had less costly to mitigate social and ecological consequences. For 
Appalachian producers the added costs per ton to meet the OSM standards were 
estimated to be $5.24, compared to only $1.80 in the Midwest or $0.57 in the West 
(National Resarch Council 1981). The economic downturn and problems in the steel 
industry softened demand, and although more concentrated than ever, the industry still 
could not hope to pass on all the costs of regulation to consumers.  
There is a fundamental lesson here: local state agencies serve as a proxy for 
capital in their battle against relatively autonomous federal-level state managers. 
Local state managers are more responsive to economic conditions than are 
federal-level managers. In revolting against the OSM, local state managers were 
not acting as instruments of capital, they were simply doing their job, “steering” 
the local economy by promoting a good business climate (Shover et al. 1986:122).  
Were the regional mode of extraction was an important part of the larger state economy it 
was not simply a matter of regulator capture but the very structure of accumulation.   
Between the political and public relations campaigns claiming economic 
cataclysm waged by the industry the OSM was already weakening its enforced 
compliance approach in favor of more flexibility for states when Ronald Regan assumed 
the presidency. Following the recommendation of the Heritage Foundation to “make and 
example of OSM and its regulatory excesses” Regan appointed some of the agency’s 
most vocal opponents as its top officers (quoted in Shover et al. 1986:150). In contrast to 
the earlier career regulators and bureaucrats, the new OSM leadership created a revolving 
door with industry, gave great latitude to the states in their own enforcement policies, and 
established rules forbidding federal intervention once a state had taken over primacy 
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except in cases of “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” The bounds of such 
discretion would become the center of many legal battles as mountaintop removal mining 
became increasingly common (Burns 2007). SMCRA had banned the highwalls left by 
contour mining and so the coal industry increasing employed ever-larger equipment to 
remove the entire mountaintop. State level control gave coal companies the ability to 
ignore some aspects of the law such as the requirement to return land to its approximate 
original contour, and face minimal repercussions for violations of others such as waived 
or reduced fines, and late payment of fines with impunity. 
The victims of surface mining and their Citizen groups working with the 
Highlander Center were able to secure ARC funding for a 1978 study of land ownership 
patterns (Appalachian Land Ownership Task Force 1983). The results of the study 
showed further how the mode of extraction with its absentee ownership contributed to 
underdevelopment and were important to tax reform in some states but ultimately could 
do little to change the underlying property relations. Mineral wealth across the region was 
subject to low rates of taxation making the counties richest in coal the most underfunded 
and dependent on state and federal transfers to meet their responsibilities. When in 1976 
Kentucky lawmakers had attempted to levy a 31 cent per $100 value tax on unmined coal, 
mineral owners simply refused to file and the state abandoned the effort after two years; 
instead, they directed local assessors to try and gather a mere 10th of a cent per $100 
value. Subsequently, in Martin County, the property tax revenue from the largest coal 
interest owning over half the county was insufficient to “buy a bus for the county school 
system, and the $76 it pays on its mineral rights would not even buy the bus a new tire, to 
replace the wear it receives on the county’s unpaved and rough coal-haul roads” 
(Appalachian Land Ownership Task Force 1983:61). Kentucky community organizations 
rallied public outrage over such conditions to make improvements to the tax code over 
the following decade but fundamental structural problems remain(Szakos 1993).  
Whereas Western coal states Wyoming and Montana created permanent 
coal/mineral trust funds in the mid 1970s that have been used to fund alternative forms of 
economic development, Central Appalachian states often did not even levy state 
severance taxes on minerals until later and then without long term planning. Kentucky 
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enacted a severance tax on coal in 1972 but West Virginia did not until 1987; neither has 
implemented a similar trust fund (Central Appalachia Regional Network 2012). When the 
recession hit in 1983, Central Appalachia was particularly devastated and over the next 
two decades the region’s position relative to the rest of Appalachia and the nation, which 
had converged in the 1970s, widened yet again. ARC investments had taken an urban 
growth center approach that further polarized urban-rural development patterns.  Like 
their national counterparts, extractive community capitalists preferred to invest in the 
rapidly urbanizing transportation hubs of the region (Eller 2008). The recovery in coal 
production took place through much larger more mechanized mines, while smaller mines 
folded and the elites who had accumulated wealth from them often left for urban areas. 
Older more marginal metallurgical coalmines that had depended on the US steel industry 
were pushed under by its decline. Appalachia lost 70% of coal jobs between 1980 and 
2000 (Eller 2008:225). The changing structure of the coal industry increased its ability to 
adapt and subvert environmental controls and launch a new offensive against labor. 
The UMWA continued to weaken as it lost ground to the aggressive tactics of 
Massey Energy in the 1980s. During this decade, the A.T. Massey Coal Company began 
to use its subsidiary structure to avoid union agreements and undermine the BCOA 
standards. A key issue in the strike against Massey, and later Pittston, was their shirking 
of payments to the pension and benefit funds that retired and disabled miners depended 
on (Couto 1993). The last great mobilization of the union and wider community 
organizations together was the 1989 Pittston strike, which still ended in a compromise 
that emboldened more mines to break their union contracts (Eller 2008; Sessions and 
Ansley 1993). As coal continued to shed jobs through mechanization the externalities of 
mining accelerated the depopulation of the coalfields. The Clean Air Act of 1970 had 
already spurred increased surface mining of low sulfur coal in southern West Virginia 
and eastern Kentucky. In 1978 the Appalachian Alliance had warned of the region 
becoming a national sacrifice zone for cheap energy and by the 21st century this was 
firmly established (Eller 2008; J. Fox 1999). The Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 
were an example of rifts and shifts that further set up part of the region as a national 
sacrifice zone. This reflected the difference in power structure, which divided coalitions 
around clean air in urban areas and the continued hegemony of extractive industry at the 
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state level. While urban growth coalitions brought fractions of capital into opposition 
with citizen groups against the national coal coalition on air pollution (Gonzalez 2005; 
Vietor 1980), the mode of extraction in the coalfields produced no such fractures. 
By 2000 nearly half of Appalachian coal came from MTR and Central Appalachia, 
again, had a poverty rate twice the national average. Most of the counties determined to 
be “economically distressed” by the ARC in 1960 remained so. The gap in college 
education between Central Appalachia and the rest of the national had increased. The 
same problems of tight control of politics and economics by local elites remained, and 
falling coal employment did not reduce coal’s hegemony in state politics (Bell and York 
2010). Outmigration from the coalfields continued as coal companies, in the opposite 
policy of a century earlier, adopted policies of persuasion and coercion to encourage 
outmigration (Burns 2007). Coal’s needs were no longer primarily for an exploitable 
labor force but for freedom from regulatory or legal challenge to their destruction of 
natural values in the process of coal extraction. The mode of extraction continued to 
operate in the economic and political realms, but on the basis of a new soico-metabolic 
regime. These issues are examined in more detail in chapter 6.  
Conclusion 
The coal industry in Central Appalachia responded to the loss of its advantage in 
labor costs by investing heavily in labor saving fixed capital. The increased labor 
productivity of underground mining equipment also increased the risk of different types 
of injury and disease such as black lung. Miner and community struggles against these 
profits by deduction faced not only capital but also their own union’s collaboration.  
Simultaneously the increased productivity of surface mining and its ability to bypass the 
organized labor pool of underground miners, lowered barriers to entry and increased 
competition within the industry. The major labor saving advantages of surface mining, 
and thus their ability to increase profits, rested on the ability to freely appropriate and 
destroy use values. These included not only ecological use-values such as the function of 
hydrologic systems of mountain watersheds that unavoidably transverse capitalist 
property boundaries but also the homes of working class and smallholder agricultural 
families through the broad form deed. The disruption of residents’ lives by this new 
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social metabolism of mining also brought challenges both direct and through the State. 
Residents attacked not only mining practices but also evasion of taxation on land and 
mineral rights that had starved local governments and contributed to the neglect of 
infrastructure for human and economic development. However, the political dominance 
of coal capital at the local and state level continued to thwart attempts to reign in mining 
practices drove regional and national level mobilization.  
Having managed to maintain their dominance at the state and local level coal 
owners, operators, and their allies faced the threat of national level action. This 
possibility of superordinate State intervention distinguishes internal peripheries. A coal 
coalition had already begun to emerge around the threat of national air pollution 
regulations (and their implementation after 1970) when surface mining became a national 
issue. By the time the industry faced both new air quality and surface mine regulation in 
1977, it was better prepared to challenge the environmental movement thanks to greater 
economic concentration and political organization (Vietor 1980). This was true both on 
technical grounds through its own network of experts on establishment of standards that 
threatened profitability and in designing the enforcement process to allow for subversion 
of those they could not block. The stagflation of the 1970s allowed for the coal industry 
to claim that any restrictions would raise energy prices and harm the national economy. 
While other significant sectors of capital were aggrieved by air pollution, the 
underdevelopment of the dominant mode of extraction in Central Appalachia left little 
internal class division over restrictions in that area. While the rentier classes of urban 
growth coalitions have incentives to oppose ecological degradation that devalues their 
assets (Gonzalez 2005), in the coalfields the assets the rentier classes seek to protect rest 
on the profitability of extraction that results in the destruction of the ecological commons. 
Thus in an area dominated by a mode of extraction, ecological protection and economic 
development limit the scale and destructiveness of extractive technology and so result in 
a devaluation of those assets. Although earlier bills would have required surface owner 
consent before mining in all cases, the final version of SMCRA protected only lands 
where the mineral rights were federally owned, located only in the West. When energy 
and coal interests captured the executive branch and devolved regulatory authority back 
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to the already captured states it ensured the continued reproduction of the mode of 
extraction in the region.  
While conflict with labor remained an unresolvable contradiction, its primacy was 
displaced. Unions continued to lose ground to aggressive companies employing surface 
mining and renewed union busting. As they grew progressively weaker, they could at 
best offer symbolic support for rule of law and a balance between environmental 
protection and community health and at worse threw real political weight against any 
restrictions that might lead to loss of jobs. Major symbols of class struggle in the region’s 
history have had their meaning turned upside down. The site of the pinnacle of class 
conflict in the West Virginia coalfields in 1921, Blair was added to the National Register 
of Historical Places in 2009. However, property owners, some of whom had already 
begun the early stages of preparation of surface mining, successfully petitioned the 
National Park Service to have it delisted (in part by including the names of land owners 
already deceased or otherwise without standing in their petition). While the UMWA has 
expressed support for its listing on the Register, it has done little else. Union president 
Cecil Roberts who once declared “class warfare” in the 1989 Pittston strike can sing 
“which side are you on” arm in arm with coal executives who were former class enemies, 
indicating they are now on the same side and environmentalists on the other.  
The emergence of a treadmill coalition between capital and labor in the coal 
industry following WWII both helped maintain the political power of the coal industry 
and set in motion changes in production toward surface mining that would undermine 
labor in the industry while increasing unequal ecological exchange by increasing the 
industry’s ability to externalize costs. The existence of a mode of extraction in the region, 
with a powerful influence on the states of Kentucky and West Virginia in particular, was 
well established by the Second World War. The economies of the region and these states 
have been vulnerable to fluctuation in the markets for the raw materials they produce and 
the competition of other sources and substitutes throughout their history.   
Land ownership studies of the 1970s were updated in West Virginia in 2013, 
indicating similar patterns of absentee ownership. Concentration overall had declined 
from a dozen firms holding a third of private lands to the top 25 holding nearly 18%, but 
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the southern coalfields of the state remain the most concentrated with the top ten owners 
still controlling more than half of the surface rights (West Virginia Center on Budget and 
PolicyAmerican Friends Service Committee 2013). Consolidation Coal Company was the 
top landowner in 1972 but by 2011 was only tenth, while timber management companies 
that emerged from the financialization of the 1970s have become the dominant owners 
(Gunnoe and Gellert 2011; West Virginia Center on Budget and PolicyAmerican Friends 
Service Committee 2013). Today coal is in what most analysts agree is a permanent 
decline within the region as it faces the exhaustion of most of the prime deposits and 
increased competition from natural gas as well as limitations on the environmental 
externalities it produces as an energy source. The “exhaustion” of the region’s socio-
ecological relations (Marley and S. Fox 2014) is characteristic of the self-undermining 
features of a mode of extraction (Bunker 1984). 
 It is an open question whether the calls for rethinking the region’s future as an 
extractive sector will lead to state intervention for an alternative development path or 
whether the region will see continued decline accompanied by a continued reliance on 
extraction for an ever-smaller number of people in an increasingly degraded environment. 
This question will depend in large part on what happens in the national context. 
Therefore, let us first examine the relation of Central Appalachia as an extractive region 
in the US in comparison with Bunker’s original analysis of the Amazon within Brazil. 
Internal Peripheries of Core versus Semi-peripheral nations: Some Initial Comparisons 
with Brazil’s Amazon 
There were initially broad similarities between Appalachia and the Amazonian 
highlands. “On a world scale, Southern Appalachia’s role was not that different from 
many other such peripheral fringes at the time, including inland mountain sections of 
several Caribbean islands, Brazil, the West Indies, and central Europe” (Dunaway 
1996a:196). Bunker (1984) describes Brazil’s Amazon as transitioning though modes of 
extraction based first around spices and animal products, followed by collapse and 
stagnation and then reorganization around rubber production, and finally followed by a 
mix of mining, large scale ranching, and timbering. The first mode of extraction, as in 
Appalachia was organized by an external colonial class and drastically reshaped 
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indigenous societies in organizing labor for the extractive economy. Similarly, the key 
export plant and animal species were decimated and the sustainable farming techniques 
of the indigenous were lost to later inhabitants. However, unlike the Appalachian case, 
the Portuguese relied on extensive and prolonged enslavement of indigenous peoples for 
their extractive labor force resulting in the death or displacement of the major population 
base along the river system. Native peoples in Appalachia, while suffering great 
population losses from war and disease, ultimately faced later displacement by settlement 
policies. 
 The greater colonial state support for settlement of North America and parts of 
Appalachia by the British and the duration of the supportive relationship of the colonies 
which became the US (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005) stands out as a key difference 
between Appalachia and the Amazon. Whereas Appalachia has been characterized by “a 
relative abundance of labor but a scarcity of local capital,” (Dunaway 1996a:314) the 
Amazon since the collapse of the initial mode has been hampered by a scarcity of labor 
and capital. When responding to the rubber boom after 1839, the landed classes had to 
import labor into the region from other parts of Brazil (Bunker 1984). They extracted 
surplus from the tappers through the system of aviamento. By controlling river access to 
the territories, worker debt, and a monopsony on rubber purchases the aviadors achieved 
a high rate of exploitation making up for the inefficiency of the labor structure and 
expensive food imports (Bunker 1984). In contrast to Central Appalachia, the 
overwhelmingly imported labor force in the Amazon was totally dependent on food 
imports, indeed they were often prohibited from growing their own food (Bunker 
1985:66).  
By the late 19th century the increasing integration of the region by rail created 
rapid changes in this pattern across Appalachia. Central Appalachia had a significant 
settler population, but during the timber boom of 1880-1920 there were also labor 
shortages and efforts to recruit and coerce labor through debt peonage (R. L. Lewis 1998). 
However, the earlier penetration of the railroads into the region and pattern of settlement 
density meant that labor exploitation took different form than that of the aviamento 
system. In many ways, the aviamento system had much more in common with the way in 
 100
which economic surplus had been extracted from Cherokee society. Instead of forbidding 
subsistence production, timber and coal often grew out of the regional semiproletarian 
labor force with capital supplementing it with imported workers when demand or the 
need for labor discipline called for it. While debt peonage also took place in timber 
production it lacked the centrality for the appropriation of surplus as a wider range of 
productive relations from petty production to wage labor were also employed. One may 
still apply Bunker’s description of the Amazon’s rubber boom to timber in Appalachia: 
“even though market opportunities inspired the local reorganization of modes of 
extraction, the specific socioeconomic forms that modes of extraction took were 
influenced more by the socioeconomic and environmental conditions created by prior 
modes of extraction than by the political and economic characteristics of the capitalist 
world-system” (Bunker 1985:70).  
Early on Amazonian rubber was a commodity chain more directly connected to an 
industrializing core than was seen in Appalachia where much of the region’s exports 
went to other peripheral or semi-peripheral regions such as the Deep South or Midwest 
who were producing commodities for core markets in the Northeast and Europe. 
Ultimately, however, the result was the same, in both cases much of the value of 
commodities was realized by middlemen at key trade junctures outside the region. Also 
similar in both cases is an orientation in private investment toward export markets and 
state policy that thwarted endogenous industry. This was due to two factors, first, lack of 
internal markets due to high inequality, unequal exchange, and lower multiplier effects of 
raw materials production and processing. Second, the competition of increasingly 
advanced manufactured goods, returning via transport networks built for taking away the 
regions’ extractive commodities, undercut local manufacturing.  
As with rubber, Appalachian timber faced resource substitution and development 
of competing source areas but the end of the boom was brought about by exhaustion, not 
competition from alternative sources and substitutes. The dilemma posed to Bunker in the 
form of the higher labor value of the imported goods compared to the exported rubber 
does not present itself in the same way in Appalachia’s timber economy. However, this 
can be explained by the global monopoly on rubber and its ability to draw an absolute 
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rent, whereas there would have been only differential rents available to Appalachian 
lumber. This logical accounting of capitalist valuation does not undermine the importance 
of unequal ecological exchange natural wealth in these cases. In both cases the bust phase 
of extraction and the emptying hotels, theaters, and opera houses after 1910 revealed the 
ephemeral nature of the peripheral region’s articulation within the larger social formation 
(Bunker 1985; R. L. Lewis 1998). However, the unequal exchange of timber had gone to 
center economies within the US, while rubber had fed centers outside of Brazil. The US 
had transformed the South and established itself as a core power in the second half of the 
19th century while Brazil remained a periphery.  
In both regions some of the migrants from the previous boom stayed on in a 
mixture of subsistence and market production, however the destruction of Appalachia’s 
forests (and exacerbated soil depletion) had put greater limits on previous diversified 
extractive/subsistence strategies that remained available in the Amazon. While in both 
cases the forms of extractive activity that continued in the interwar period produced 
ecological degradation (depletion of valuable keystone species in the Amazon, traditional 
game in Appalachia, agricultural practices in both), Central Appalachia’s social 
formation was moving away from the semisubsistence mixture of agriculture and 
extraction that the Amazon was now adopting. The earlier integration into national 
markets by transport networks further undermined Appalachian agriculture as a source of 
market exchange and facilitated development of a new mode of extraction in the 
coalfields.  
Bunker does not explore in as much detail the period between 1910-1950 in the 
Amazon, which was decisive in Central Appalachia’s mode of extraction around coal.  
Coal had linked the region as a periphery to the industrializing Northeast before the turn 
of the century. The US State had come to play a strong role in managing the dependent 
development of the Appalachian region as a vital energy source for industrialization and 
military power. The dependent development in the Center-South of Brazil to which the 
Amazon became an internal periphery, was slower to develop, as was the capacity of the 
State. When mining came to that region it was in the late 1940s as a joint venture of 
domestic and foreign capital employing the latest mining technologies in an enclave 
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economy. Highways brought extraction to the Amazon beginning in the late 1950s, 
creating an echo of the displacement in Appalachia, but including remaining indigenous 
as well as peasant communities. The legal institutions were still in frontier form, 
employing customary practices and a mixture of legal forms dating back to the colonial 
period. As in Appalachia these came under challenge as highways connected valuable 
land and resources to markets. Early peasant arrivals were displaced by later capitals, 
largely in timber and ranching, and became part of the labor reserve. This accelerated 
under military rule after 1964 and took place on a scale not possible under the US 
republic.  
Like Appalachia growth in government expenditure was the largest contributor to 
regional income growth. The State also supported some industrial projects in the region’s 
most urban areas with similar issues of draining investment and labor from the rural 
surrounding area. State investment beyond infrastructure was much more intensive in the 
Amazon going beyond the TVA’s and ARC’s efforts and was more linked to foreign 
capital. By 1970 the Brazilian state also faced a legitimation crisis around the rapacious 
development in the Amazon as well as problems repressing landless peasants in the 
Northeast. It implemented a program of resettlement into the Amazon and new steps to 
control the lawless land tenure situation. The major association of agribusiness and 
ranchers counter mobilized and was able to relax limits on land holdings and restore 
subsidies on export production. The Amazon’s chronic labor scarcity persisted and 
eventually the Brazilian state was to intervene directly with a settlement program. 
Conversely, federal programs in the US sponsored out migration from Appalachia during 
the war on poverty (Eller 2008). 
The relatively greater integration of the mountains of Appalachia with its more 
densely settled agricultural and commercial communities (which Bunker points to as a 
path not taken between the terra firma and várzea) reproduced on a smaller scale the 
semi-periphery—periphery dynamic. State level authorities in Appalachia pursued 
industrialization policies a century before the Amazon’s. While the Southern 
Appalachian region as a whole would remain underdeveloped until after WWII, it is in 
the Central Appalachian coalfields where the extractive path dependencies fell most 
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heavily and that the greatest effects are seen even as other parts of the region reached 
national averages of development. The hegemony of the US after the war and enormous 
economic surplus created the capacity for immense transfer payments to the region on a 
scale impossible for a semi-peripheral country like Brazil. Even where the economic 
forces of peripheralization are similar, core states offer greater countervailing forces. As 
Hanna concludes in his case study of one Appalachian county: 
Policies of core states [such as federal transfer payments and development 
programs in Appalachia] are among the most important factors causing the social 
relations of production and the general measures of socio-economic conditions 
within their internal peripheries to be closer to those of the rest of the country than 
to those in the world-economy’s periphery. It is this kind of mediation of core-
periphery relations by state institutions and policies that defines internal 
peripheries. (Hanna 1995:475). 
The Brazilian state has viewed the Amazon a resource trove to be exploited for its 
benefit but also had anxieties about territorial security. The coalfields of Appalachia have 
been largely ignored since the subsidence of the poverty campaigns of the 1960s and the 
labor unrest of the 1970s, but as oil prices climbed in recent decades they have been held 
up as a source of energy independence. This has also meant their treatment as a national 
sacrifice zone for energy. While the coalfields have lagged behind the rest of the US in its 
core nation trajectory, the sociometabolic regime around surface mining and mountaintop 
removal arguably is further accentuating underdevelopment in those Central Appalachian 
counties where it is more prevalent. The following chapter examines the empirical 
evidence for this process.  
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CHAPTER IV 
SOCIOECONOMIC OUTCOMES IN COAL PRODUCING COUNTIES 
This chapter examines the extent to which different trajectories within the Central 
Appalachian region may be related to differences in the sociometabolic regime of mining. 
The increasing ecological contradictions of mining in the region may be seen as 
exacerbating the negative socioeconomic effects of extractive dependency generally. 
Previous chapters have addressed why the region as a whole has had such a different 
developmental trajectory as an internal periphery. This chapter attempts to evaluate the 
impact that changes in the type of mining have on some standard indicators of social and 
economic development within the counties of the Central Appalachian coalfields.  
There is a great deal of quantitative research on the problems of the “resource 
curse” facing areas dependent on extractive activity. For example, James and Aadlad 
(James and Aadland 2011) found a negative impact for resource extraction generally 
across the US at the county level between 1980-1995. There is also a long history of 
quantitative study of socioeconomic outcomes around mining, including coal mining in 
Appalachia. However, there has been little research to date on how the ecological effects 
of the shift to surface mining may be affecting socioeconomic outcomes. This is a 
difficult problem to analyze given the complexity of forces surrounding development and 
the frequent coincidence of both underground and surface mining in the same areas. More 
negative ecological impacts do not always translate into worse outcomes on 
socioeconomic indicators. For example, although industry in Appalachia tends to be more 
polluting than elsewhere, it is also associated with better socioeconomic outcomes within 
the regions (Maxwell 2011). While chapter 6 examines the impacts of surface mining on 
human development as distinct from capitalist conceptions, this chapter focuses on the 
typical measures of per capita income, poverty, unemployment, and educational 
attainment.  
Measuring Coal Mining’s Socioeconomic Effects 
The cause of uneven development between core industrial and peripheral 
extractive economies should be understood not only as consisting of capital flows and 
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labor markets but also as “linked to the costs of environmental degradation, which results 
from economies dependent on extraction” (D. A. Smith and Nemeth 1988:237). Mining 
is an extractive economy that has a more significant impact on the surrounding 
community than others, fishing, for example. Frickel and Freudenburg indicate that the 
ability of mining to create sustained development has decreased over time (Frickel and 
Freudenburg 1996). They attribute this trend to “historically contingent levels of 
extractive capacities, pre-existing competition, linkage specialization and transportation” 
(Frickel and Freudenburg 1996:445). In Appalachia “to the extent that coal dominates an 
area, other businesses may absent themselves because of environmental damage that coal 
production brings, poor schools, corrupt policies, unbalanced taxation, outright 
opposition from coal interests, or associated reasons” [emphasis mine] (see also Latimer 
and Mencken 2003; Perry 1985:99). Given the tendency for the greater costs of 
environmental externalities there is reason to hypothesize that surface mining may have 
greater negative effects on long-term economic development than underground 
production.  
The past thirty years have seen continuing debate over the ability of extractive 
industry to bring economic benefits to rural or non-metropolitan areas. Three of the most 
commonly used indicators for economic health in studies of the effect of extraction based 
economies are income, poverty, and unemployment. A meta-analysis of 301 studies of 
non-metropolitan mining regions by Freudenburg and Wilson reports that 46% of the 
studies found mining produced negative economic results as opposed to only 29% that 
found positive results (2002). The ratio of more negative than positive outcomes 
associated with mining was statistically significant for poverty and especially for 
unemployment, if neutral outcomes were ignored. The greater proportion of positive to 
negative outcomes for income per capita was only statistically significant if all neutral 
outcomes were counted as positive.  
Freudenburg and Wilson (2002)also found that, overall, the studies were 
consistent with evidence gathered by Nord and Luloff (1993) showing that positive 
economic outcomes from mining have declined precipitously since the early eighties. 
Both studies showed that community economic success from mining is mainly limited to 
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the Western US and has been dwindling even there. In the South the ratio of negative to 
positive economic outcomes for mining in general was almost two and a half to one 
(Freudenburg and Wilson 2002). Nord and Luloff’s (1993) study of the interaction 
between region and mining dependency found that coal mining in particular was 
associated with negative outcomes within the South in 1979/80 and had dramatically 
worsened by 1989/90 even as it appeared to have more beneficial or at least benign 
effects in the West. However, a more recent study has found coal mining, but not other 
types mining, to have a newly emerging negative relationship to poverty in Appalachia 
(Partridge, Betz, and Lobao 2013). Cleary, this further highlights the importance of the 
historical developmental context in which extraction takes place. Quantitative analyses of 
the socioeconomic effects of coal mining within Appalachia have found economic 
dependency on mining to be a key factor (de Young 1985; Latimer and Mencken 2003; 
Perry 1985). Perry’s study of factors leading to the transformation of coal production into 
economic wellbeing in eastern Kentucky found that those factors most positively 
correlated with economic health from coal production were “income equality, income per 
capita and alternative means of production” (Perry 1985:107). However, the larger the 
proportion of economic activity that coal production represented within a county the less 
likely that county was to have income equality or alternative means of production. Local 
governments are often impaired in their capacity to counter this trend as coal dependent 
counties in central Appalachia have local government revenues and expenditures that are 
consistently just half of the national average, with per capita spending also steadily 
lagging (Latimer and Mencken 2003). The fact that the coal industry is estimated to be a 
net drain of nearly 115,000,000 dollars on the state of Kentucky’s budget suggests that 
extractive industry with sufficient political influence may draw state support in 
competition with other spending priorities (undefined author and J. Bailey 2009). The 
increased desirability of surface mining methods may accentuate industry elites, absentee 
owners, and local compradors classes’ desire to prevent economic development near coal 
deposits that would limit their ability to utilize surface mining techniques like high 
explosive blasts (Burns 2007).  
Perry’s (Perry 1985)conclusions about the disconnect between income per capita 
and income equality are also reflected in Freudenburg and Wilson’s (Freudenburg and 
 107
Wilson 2002) finding that even when higher incomes are associated with mining, higher 
levels of unemployment and poverty often are as well. Furthermore, in reference to 
Appalachia, Freudenburg and Wilson hypothesize that part of these conflicting findings 
may come from the mechanization of mining (which would include the shift to surface 
mining) which is producing much fewer higher paying jobs that some of which may tend 
to go to those with white-collar professional skills rather than the traditional blue-collar 
miner demographic. Deaton and Niman (2012) found that between 1960 and 2000 
increased mining employment was associated with lower poverty in the short run, but 
higher poverty in the long run. Such temporal complexities associated with the effects of 
boom and bust apply particularly strongly to the ecological legacy of surface mining.  
 In some cases, the contradiction between higher incomes and poverty or 
unemployment may be further explained by some researchers’ reliance on income data 
collected from employers in an area rather than employees which would incorrectly 
include employees who live outside the area (Freudenburg and Wilson 2002). The skills 
needed to operate strip mining equipment are often similar to those common to 
construction work, e.g. front loaders and dump trucks(Montrie 2003) and studies have 
suggested companies hire outsiders to avoid concerns with the local effects of mining 
within their workforce (Bradley R Woods 2010:168). More mechanized forms of mining 
do need some specialists but with skills that people living near rural mining locations 
may not posses. In fact, there is evidence they may be less likely to posses them. A 1985 
study found that, in contrast to agricultural and manufacturing sources, income from coal 
mining in eastern Kentucky showed no educational benefits and even had a significantly 
negative correlation with several indicators (de Young 1985).  
Although education spending per capita in coal dependent communities in central 
Appalachia is similar to national averages, a greater proportion of that money must go 
towards transportation costs due to the area’s geography (Latimer and Mencken 2003). 
After examining the relationship of property wealth to education spending McHaffie 
(1998:204) notes that within the central-southern Appalachian region “the particular 
characteristics of the coal economy (relative to timber, tourist, or retirement economies) 
seems to engender a specific geography of resistance to education spending.” Therefore, 
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although per capita expenditures may be comparable with national averages, these local 
governments still spent less than would be expected given the value of properties and 
their mineral assets. Latimer and Menken (2003) report coal dependent counties had 
percentages of adults not graduating from high school that were often twice the national 
average. There is evidence that the relatively high paying, low skill jobs during the coal 
boom of the 1970s lead to increasing numbers of high school dropouts in coal producing 
areas (Black, McKinnish, and Sanders 2005). This was consistent with Nord and Luloff’s 
(1993) finding of a negative relationship between coal dependency and high school 
completion in the South as a whole.  
With the growing number and scope of strip mine sites in the region, community 
and government leaders are faced with choices about mine permit requests that will have 
consequences far into the future. Proponents of mountaintop removal surface mining 
(MTR) claim it produces needed flat land for development and provides good paying jobs. 
Yet, research has found the increasing number and size of MTR mines is not associated 
with increased mining employment (Brad R Woods and Gordon 2011). Additionally, 
there is a rapidly growing body of literature on the lack of post-mining development but 
continuing ecological and human health effects of surface mining in the region that is 
discussed in detail in chapter 6. These factors may impact labor markets, property values 
and tax base, capital investment and consumption decisions, as well as damage to 
property that would contribute to negative socioeconomic outcomes. There is also 
anecdotal evidence of surface mining driving outmigration, hiring practices that 
discriminate against local communities, and other social practices that would reduce its 
contribution to county level socioeconomic conditions relative to underground mining 
(Burns 2007). Partridge, Betz, and Lobao (Partridge et al. 2013) recently produced the 
only study to attempt to measure the effects of mountaintop removal on poverty 
outcomes. However, they do so only indirectly. Their primary independent variable is the 
change in proportion of employment in mining and the presence of MTR is indicated by a 
dummy variable. Thus, there is no accounting for the extent of or intensity of surface 
mining or the share of employment that is from surface mining. Between 1990 and 2000 
their results do not find a significant relationship between MTR and poverty or the 
interaction of the MTR dummy with mining employment. Between 2000 and 2010, 
 109
however, they report their dummy for the presence of an MTR mine has a significant 
negative relationship to county poverty rates. Also, noting that increased coal 
employment share in this decade is associated with decreased poverty, they suggest that 
this may indicate that mining negative effects are dissipating and MTR is brining poverty 
reducing-jobs to those counties.   
There are a number of problematic aspects of this study as an indicator of the 
long-term effects of mining and its ecological effects. First, as the authors note, they do 
not control for population change that could be caused by outmigration of those in 
poverty from MTR affected counties. Second, their binary MTR variable (and its 
interaction term with coal employment) does not indicate the prevalence of surface 
mining or surface mine employment relative to underground. My analysis here differs in 
two significant ways. First I am comparing only coal producing counties with each other, 
not coal with non-coal counties. Second, I use coal production data to measure the effect 
of the scale and type of mining directly. This presents a more straightforward route to 
estimating the impacts of surface mining independent of coal’s extractions overall impact 
on socioeconomic outcomes.  
Data and Methods 
For my analysis I use a fixed-effects panel model. The counties which are 
included in the model are those in Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Kentucky 
defined as “Appalachian” by the Appalachian Regional Commission (Appalachian 
Regional Commission n.d.). My social and demographic data come from the U.S. 
Population and Housing Census (Minnesota Population Center 2004). Coal production 
data is drawn from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Agency’s 
annual reports on U.S. coal production.37  
                                                        
37
  This includes reports DOE/EIA-0584(98-99) and DOE/EIA-01118(77,80,88-90, 00). Changes in the 
agency’s recording methods over the period of interest include the exclusion of data from mines producing 
less than 10,000 short tons of coal a year from the 1980s until the late 1990s and the shift from counting the 
production of mines which cross county lines in both counties to only counting in the county in which the 
mine first opened from 1998 to the present.  However, the coal production data after are not included in the 
model, only for referential purposes, and so do not pose a significant problem. 
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My dependent variables are the proportion of families in poverty, the proportion 
of the labor force unemployed, the proportion of the adults with less than a high school 
education, and per capita income. See Table 1 for a list of all variables. All dependent 
variables are used as defined by the US Census. The proportion of families in poverty is 
used as a common measure of socioeconomic wellbeing. It is expected that surface 
mining will have a positive relationship to the proportion of families in poverty due to 
greater negative externalities and weaker contributions to employment.  
The proportion of the labor force unemployed is also a standard dependent 
variable in the mining dependency literature. However, because the census records only 
those actively seeking work in recent period as unemployed there is almost certainly an 
underestimation of joblessness because parts of Appalachia with chronic economic 
distress likely have a significant number of discouraged workers no longer seeking 
employment and who are therefore no longer included in the unemployed figures (R. 
Lewis 1993). Because surface mining tends to employ fewer people, creates 
environmental liabilities, and requires a coal industry strong enough to counter opposition, 
I expect a positive relationship between its prevalence and unemployment.  
I have also included the proportion of adults with less than a high school 
education as a dependent variable, although it is less commonly used in the literature, in 
order to supplement the economic measures with one tapping a human development 
outcome. Surface mining may affect education levels within a county either indirectly or 
directly. Directly, destruction of the scenic landscape, contamination of drinking water, 
and damage to buildings from blasting may lower property values impacting school 
system revenues. In another example, some parents from Marshfork Elementary in 
Raleigh County West Virginia have complained of fear or illness caused by their schools’ 
location adjacent to a large strip mine and coal processing plant (Morrone and Buckley 
2011). Indirectly, in addition to the general influence of coal production on educational 
spending and attainment (de Young 1985; McHaffie 1998), surface mining externalities 
may lower property values and thereby available revenue for education. If surface mining 
does place greater constraints on long-term economic diversity those with higher 
education may also be more likely to leave for places where their skills can find work.  
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My last dependent variable, per capita income, is standard in the literature but the 
effect of mining on it is less clear. Some studies suggest higher per capita income may 
accompany mining as mechanization creates more skilled and highly paid positions 
(Freudenburg and Wilson 2002) while others have found that mining dependency is 
associated with per capita income at only 65% of the national average in Central 
Appalachian counties (Latimer and Mencken 2003).  
My primary independent variable is the proportion of coal that is produced by 
surface mining. In an attempt to better represent the general influence of coal production 
in counties which can fluctuate somewhat from year to year, the models are estimated 
with the coal production of three years averaged together for each panel data year. This 
average conveys a more accurate measure of coal mining activity by smoothing some of 
the random fluctuations present in a single year snapshot. The year for which decennial 
census data is actually collected is also the center of the averaged production years. For 
example, coal production in 1988 1989 and 1990 is averaged together and included in the 
panel with the 1990 census that is based on data collected in 1989—the center of the 
averaged coal production. Because coal related variable are lagged in the model 
temporality is not an issue. In addition, the composite measure for coal production 
increases the number of county-year observations from 153 to 170 and unique counties 
included from 81 to 89 while the average observations per county remains 1.9. A side 
effect of this approach is that a number of counties that only produced small amounts of 
coal are included in the model, which alters the results slightly, however after examining 
the effect on the model the composite measure is still preferred on theoretical grounds.38  
It is necessary to control for total coal production to distinguish between the 
developmental effects of simply more mining from those of the type of mining that are 
the primary focus here. Many of the mechanisms through which mining dependency is 
described as operating in the literature (e.g. absentee ownership, political corruption, tax 
evasion, vulnerability to market fluctuation) are likely to be more or less equally 
                                                        
38
 When using the nominal year totals instead of the three-year averages there are some minor variations. 
The relationship between surface production and poverty becomes slightly weaker and falls just under 
significance whereas the relationships with the other dependent variables are strengthened and become 
slightly more significant. Given the common fluctuations in year-to-year production an average is still 
preferred for analysis of long-term trends.  
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associated with both types of production while others (e.g. environmental degradation, 
reduced employment) should be more strongly associated with surface mining at a given 
level of production. Total coal production is standardized by county size in square miles 
to better represent the anticipated ecological impacts that could mediate some of the 
relationship between coal mining and dependent variable socioeconomic outcomes. 
 My other control variables include the percentage of a county’s population who 
are urban residents, total population, change in the total population (using the census 
definition of total population) and the proportion of people employed who work in 
manufacturing and service jobs other than public administration. Often in the literature on 
mining outcomes researchers will restrict the population to non-metropolitan counties; 
here the proportion of the population considered urban serves as a control for the 
developmental advantages of agglomeration economies around metropolitan areas. Total 
population is also included as a control for this agglomeration economy effect because 
the absolute magnitude of population contributes in combination with urban-rural 
distribution. Total population is logged to correct for skewedness. Population change is 
included as a proxy for migration because the literature suggests that mining induced 
hardships can create outmigration that would mask a relationship with higher rates of 
poverty or unemployment (Bell forthcoming suggests a particular connection to surface 
mining). Likewise in-migration of wealthier retirees may also affect poverty and per 
capita income measures. Population change is left as a count because total population is 
already included in the model.  
Measures of the proportion of workers currently employed in the manufacturing 
and service sectors provide some controls for economic diversification. A proportion with 
employed workers as a denominator is used to measure the employment structure as 
separate from the level of employment. It is possible to argue against controlling for the 
extent of non-mining economic activity when trying to measure the effects related to 
mining dependency because the literature suggests that mining can influence the 
dependent variables through mechanisms that operate precisely by limiting such 
alternative economic development (e.g. Perry 1985). Therefore, the proportions of jobs in 
the manufacturing and non-public administration service sectors are added as controls for 
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economic diversification in the full model for comparison with the preferred model that 
does not control for those likely intervening variables. Further discussion of model 
preferences consistent with this hypothesis is included in the results section.  
As a note of caution, total manufacturing includes a small amount of coal-related 
manufacturing. The census provides the subcategory of manufacturing jobs related to 
coal and petroleum together but it is missing in many cases and was not readily available 
for all years making disaggregation impossible. An estimate based on the 1980 census 
indicates that in 10 counties combined coal and petroleum related manufacturing was 
greater than 5% of total manufacturing and in 3 counties it was greater than 10%.   
Across all 170 county-year coal production observations, underground and 
surface coal production have a correlation of .48 and the total tonnage produced has a 
correlation of -.34 with the proportion of coal from surface mines. Over the three 
observation periods available the correlation between underground and surface 
production increases ( .35, .52, .68) while the correlation between total production and 
the proportion from surface mines shifts as well (-.41, -.38, -.22). Because the coal 
production variables are lagged in my models the last period is not included in my 
models but is reported here to give a better indication of the trend.  
I analyze data for the census years 1980, 1990, and 2000 using panel analysis with 
fixed-effects at the county level. I chose the 1980 census as the starting point both 
because the EIA has not published mine production data prior to 1977 and because it 
avoids some confusion that would result from comparing the effects of surface mining 
before and after the implementation of the federal Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977 (Montrie 2003; Shover et al. 1986). However, there are still 
factors that may limit or obscure the effect of shifts in the proportion of surface mining in 
the 20-year period examined. As my previous chapters have indicated, the developmental 
trajectory of counties economically dependent on coal production is arguably well 
established by the period examined in these decades. Coal dependency exerts itself 
through economic patterns, land ownership, and political influence in a geographic 
manner that there is little reason to believe has varied substantially within the years 
examined here. For example, coal dependent counties’ lower than average government 
 114
expenditures have remained steady since the 1970s, apparently relatively unaffected by 
fluctuations in the coal market (Latimer and Mencken 2003).  
Surface mining can be hypothesized to differ from underground mining in both 
immediate and longer-term effects on socioeconomic wellbeing. To focus on the long-
term ecological and social effects, coal production variables are lagged 10 years, in effect 
socioeconomic data are analyzed with coal production data from the previous panel.39 
This also neutralizes possible confounding effects of changes in the Energy Information 
Agency’s coal production data reporting methods between 1990 and 2000 as only 1980 
and 1990 production data are used in the model.  
  Due to the potentially large number of time constant variables affecting the 
relationship between coal production and economic wellbeing in counties (e.g. county 
size, the extent and qualitative aspects of coal seams that were originally formed there, 
proximity to navigable waterways for shipping etc.) and the limited number of controls 
included, the fixed effects model allows for a more conservative evaluation by reducing 
omitted-variable bias (Peterson 2004). Because the number of time periods is small, there 
is also a tradeoff to be made between the more efficient use of the data by the random 
effects model and danger of assuming the unmeasured time-constant variables are 
independent of the measured variables, as is done in all cross-sectional analysis (Peterson 
2004). A Hausman test shows systematic differences between random and fixed effects 
coefficients, therefore a fixed effect model is preferred to avoid likely omitted variable 
bias.40 
 A final note of caution is warranted regarding the use of proportions as three of 
my dependent variables in an OLS model. Because such bounded variables do not have a 
linear relationship toward the high and low end of values (generally between 0-.2 and .8-
1 in proportions), resembling a sigmoidal figure, there is the possibility of distortion from 
                                                        
39
 The use of lagged production data effectively sacrifices one panel from the model as production data 
from the last panel and socioeconomic data from the first are not analyzed. Lack of available coal 
production data before 1977 and socioeconomic data from the census after 2000 make this unavoidable.  
 
40
 It should be noted that a fixed effects model answers the question of how the dependent variables co-vary 
with the amount and type of mining activity within individual counties while a random effects model 
answers the somewhat different question of how do counties compare on the dependent variables relative to 
differences between and within them over time. 
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violating OLS’s assumption of linearity as well as the prediction of logically impossible 
values (Long 1997). Values for poverty and unemployment in particular are in the low 
range with a mean at or below 0.2 (see Table 4.2). This is a limitation of using OLS with 
my data. However, an examination of predicted values in all models shows impossible 
values in only 2-5% of cases.41 I therefore still prefer OLS, rather than a tobit model, 
given the more intuitive interpretation possible and the low level of misspecification.42 
Results and Discussion 
Table 4.1 lists my variables names, describes their composition, data sources, and 
expected relationship to socioeconomic wellbeing. Table 4.2 contains the means, 
standard deviations, maximums, and minimums of each of the variables as they are used 
in my analysis. These are based on 89 counties with 170 county-year observations. As 
Table 4.2 demonstrates, the range and standard deviation of variables included in the 
regression models should be sufficient to provide the variance required to detect the type 
of relationships of interest. A correlation matrix of my variables is provided in Appendix 
A. 
In the preferred model for proportion of families in poverty (see Table 4.3), when 
controlling for the total amount of coal production in the previous decade, a change from 
completely underground production to only surface production would predict an .03 
increase in the proportion of families in poverty. This relationship is significant (p=.06).43 
When the proportion of employment in manufacturing and (non-public administration) 
service jobs are added as controls in the full model the predicted increase in the 
proportion of families in poverty drops to .007 and is no longer significant (p=.328).  
 
 
                                                        
41
 There are no values predicted above one. The number of predicted values below zero are as follows: 
Proportion of Families in Poverty Full-7, Preferred-9; Proportion of Workforce Unemployed Full-3, 
Preferred-5; Proportion of Adults with Less Than a High School Education Full-3, Preferred-4. 
 
42
 A tobit model produces similar results for the key independent variable of coal from surface production. 
 
43
 Reported P-values are for two-tailed tests, although given my expectations about surface mining one-
tailed may be appropriate. 
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Table 4.1. Definition of Variables 
Variable  
Type Variable Name Description Data Source 
Expected 
Effect 
Dependent  Poverty Proportion of families 
living in poverty.  
U.S. Population and 
Housing Census. 
Minnesota 
Population Center 
2004. 
Inap. 
 Income  Per capita income. U.S. Population and 
Housing Census. 
Minnesota 
Population Center 
2004. 
Inap. 
 Education Proportion of adults 
(18 years and older) 
with less than high 
school education. 
U.S. Population and 
Housing Census. 
Minnesota 
Population Center 
2004. 
Inap. 
 Unemployment Proportion of the 
workforce 16 year of 
age and older 
unemployed. 
U.S. Population and 
Housing Census. 
Minnesota 
Population Center 
2004. 
Inap. 
Independent  Surface Mining Proportion of coal 
produced from surface 
mines (lagged10 
years). 
Annual Coal Report. 
U.S. Energy 
Information Agency.  
— 
Control Tot. Production 3-year average of total 
coal production in 
hundreds of thousands 
of tons square mile of 
county area (lagged 10 
years). 
Annual Coal Report. 
U.S. Energy 
Information Agency. 
— 
 Urban Proportion of the 
population that is 
urban. 
U.S. Population and 
Housing Census. 
Minnesota 
Population Center 
2004. 
+ 
 Pop. Change Change in county 
population in 
thousands.  
U.S. Population and 
Housing Census. 
Minnesota Population 
Center 2004. 
— 
 Manufacturing Proportion of those 
employed who work 
in the manufacturing 
sector. 
U.S. Population and 
Housing Census. 
Minnesota Population 
Center 2004. 
+ 
 Service Proportion of those 
employed who work 
in the service sector. 
U.S. Population and 
Housing Census. 
Minnesota Population 
Center 2004. 
+ 
 Tot. Population Total population 
(logged).  
 + 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Poverty 170 .215 .080 .090 .459 
Unemployment 170 .102 .035 .051 .220 
Education 170 .397 .104 .137 .615 
Income 170 11067 3264 5153 20354 
 
Surface Mining 170 .532 .378 0 1 
Tot. Production 170 .078 .112 .000018 .52 
Urban 170 .204 .210 0 .878 
Manufacturing 170 .156 .096 .019 .494 
Service 170 .336 .075 .132 .589 
Pop. Change 170 -.934 3.869 -23.795 12.066 
Tot. Population 170 10.06 .713 8.49 12.56 
Unique "Appalachian" Counties 89     
County/Year Lagged Coal Production 
Observations 
170     
      
 
Table 4.4 presents the regression results for the proportion of the workforce 
unemployed. For my preferred model a statistically significant increase of .02 (p=.09) in 
the proportion of workers unemployed is predicted for a 0 to 1 increase in the proportion 
of coal from surface mines.  This is consistent with the argument that surface mining 
produces fewer jobs per ton of coal produced during production and is associated with 
relatively poorer employment in the longer term as well.  
When the proportions of employment in manufacturing and service sectors are 
included in the model the coefficient for the proportion of coal from surface mines and 
unemployment decreases by about half and loses statistical significance (p.=359). 
However, this is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that surface mining is more likely to 
suppress economic diversification than underground varieties, as controlling for 
employment in other economic sectors would obscure this effect. This is discussed in 
more detail below. 
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Table 4.3. Proportion of Families in Poverty  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here the model also detects a negative relationship between total coal production and 
unemployment, which is statistically significant for the preferred model (p=.024), but not 
in the full model (p=.945).  
Examining the relationship of surface mining prevalence to the proportion of 
adults with less than a high school education, we see a pattern similar to that for the 
poverty rate (see Table 4.5). In the preferred model a change from 0 to 1 in the lagged 
 Full Preferred 
   
Surface Mining 0.012 0.030* 
 (0.012) (0.016) 
Tot. Production 0.052 -0.168** 
 (0.068) (0.082) 
Urban 0.082** 0.027 
 (0.040) (0.052) 
Manufacturing -0.279***  
 (0.098)  
Service -0.476***  
 (0.062)  
Pop. Change 0.001 -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Tot. Population -0.180*** -0.189*** 
 (0.041) (0.055) 
Constant 2.208*** 2.106*** 
 (0.419) (0.557) 
Observations 170 170 
Number of FIPS 89 89 
R-squared 0.64 0.34 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
  
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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proportion of coal from surface mines predicts an .044 increase (p=.055) in the 
proportion of adults who never completed high school 
Table 4.4 Proportion of Workforce Unemployed  
 Full Preferred 
 
Surface Mining 
 
0.009 
(0.010) 
 
0.020* 
(0.012)  
 
Tot. Production 
 
0.004 
 
-0.142** 
 (0.054) (0.061) 
 
Urban 
 
0.018 
 
-0.020 
 (0.032) (0.039) 
 
Manufacturing 
 
-0.243*** 
 
 (0.078)  
 
Service 
 
-0.312*** 
 
 (0.049)  
 
Pop. Change 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Tot. Population 
 
 
-0.049 
(0.033) 
 
-0.057 
(0.041) 
 
Constant 0.732** 0.674 
 (0.335) (0.414) 
 
Observations 
 
170 
 
170 
Number of FIPS 89 89 
R-squared 0.59 0.35 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
  
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
. In full model the relationship falls away in both magnitude and significance 
(p=.592). Again, the lagged total coal production is statistically significant in the 
preferred model but with a relatively larger effect size predicting a difference of ~.23 
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decrease in the proportion without high school for a change from the minimum to 
maximum observed value of total coal production.  
 Finally, Table 4.6 presents the results for per capita income. In the 
preferred model I find that a 0 to 1 increase in the previous decades’ proportion of coal 
from surface mines predicts a $2726 decrease in per capita income (p=.014). This effect 
shrinks only to an $850 decrease (p=.165) when manufacturing and service sector 
employment are added in the model. The total tonnage of coal produced is also 
significant in the preferred model (p=.000) registering a increase of around $10550  if a 
county were to shift from the lowest to the highest observed value of lagged total 
production.   
My findings require a careful interpretation. In my preferred model I find a 
positive relationship predicted between higher proportions of coal from surface mines 
and higher proportions of poverty, unemployment, and high school dropouts as well as a 
negative relationship to per capita income. These relationships are based on relative shifts 
in the proportion of surface coal production. For all counties in my model the mean 
lagged proportion of coal from surface mines declined by approximately .06. However, 
30 counties still saw an absolute increase in the proportion of coal from surface mines. Of 
those 30, 17 saw less than the average reduction of families in poverty while 13 were 
above the mean.  
The relationships between my socioeconomic indicators and surface production 
lose half or more of their magnitude and fall below conventional significance in the full 
model when controls for economic diversification are included. Proportion of workers 
employed in the service sector is the strongest predictor for all four dependent variables. 
The proportion employed in manufacturing is well below significance for per capita 
income. There is also a negative correlation between mining output and the proportion of 
workers in the manufacturing sector (see Appendix) and controlling for total coal 
production may affect the influence of manufacturing. 
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Table 4.5. Proportion of Adults with Less Than a High School Education  
 Full Preferred 
 
Surface Mining 
 
0.007 
 
0.044* 
 (0.012) (0.022) 
 
Tot. Production 
 
-0.072 
 
-0.468*** 
 (0.070) (0.118) 
 
Urban 
 
0.094** 
 
0.004 
 (0.041) (0.074) 
 
Manufacturing 
 
-0.208** 
 
 (0.100)  
 
Service 
 
-0.865*** 
 
 (0.063)  
 
Pop. Change 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
 
Tot. Population 
 
-0.226*** 
 
-0.234*** 
 (0.043) (0.079) 
 
Constant 
 
2.977*** 
 
2.753*** 
 (0.430) (0.798) 
Observations  
170 
 
170 
Number of FIPS 89 89 
R-squared 0.88 0.58 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01  
 
The weakened effect of surface mining when controlling for economic 
diversification in the full model as compared to the preferred model is consistent with the 
literature suggesting that the negative outcomes related to mining economies is largely a 
product of mechanisms by which other economic sectors are affected. The direction of 
the relationship of surface mining stays consistent in all models. This suggests that 
surface mining may be related to poorer socioeconomic outcomes in large part by 
discouraging other industries (e.g. tourism), producing fewer paychecks to circulate in the 
local economy, or encouraging land and mineral owners to oppose development near 
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sites they may wish to strip mine, and that controls for distribution of the economy in 
these two major sectors capture and account for that same variation. 
Table 4.6. Per Capital Income  
 Full Preferred 
 
Surface Mining 
 
-850.323 
 
-2726.069** 
 (605.669) (1084.852) 
 
Tot. Production 
 
2503.929 
 
21059.143*** 
 (3420.802) (5730.908) 
 
Urban 
 
-3434.323* 
 
461.190 
 (1994.754) (3611.035) 
 
Manufacturing 
 
322.743 
 
 (4901.412)  
 
Service 
 
40819.820*** 
 
 (3098.178)  
 
Pop. Change 
 
281.104*** 
 
894.067*** 
 (76.280) (112.300) 
 
Tot. Population 
 
11743.981*** 
 
11860.737*** 
 (2077.369) (3821.308) 
 
Constant 
-
119629.923*** 
-
107728.902*** 
 (21015.927) (38698.216) 
 
Observations 
 
170 
 
170 
Number of FIPS 89 89 
R-squared 0.91 0.67 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
When the proportion of workers employed in non-public administration service sectors is 
used as the dependent variable in the model, the proportion of coal from surface mines 
ten years previous has a negative relationship (coefficient -0.04, p=.07, two tailed). A 
similar regression for proportion employed in manufacturing is insignificant. 
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That total coal production within counties over time (net the influence of the type 
of mining) is associated with better socioeconomic outcomes in my preferred models for 
all dependent variables is less surprising given that the analysis is only within coal 
producing counties, not between coal and non-coal counties. In order to better evaluate 
the relationship between coal production and economic dependency on coal extraction I 
replicated the measure of dependency used by Latimer and Menken (Latimer and 
Mencken 2003) of coal income as a percentage of total personal income in a county.44 
This measure of the proportion of income from coal has a correlation of .76 with total 
coal production in my sample. Latimer and Menken consider counties with more than 
10% of total income from coal to be coal dependent. In 1980 37 counties met this 
standard but in 1990 only 23 did.45 During this time average coal production increased by 
28% but coal dependency decreased by about 40%. The betas for total coal production 
are therefore likely not very efficient proxies for coal dependency. Furthermore, the 
coefficients for total production reflect the effect of increased coal production controlling 
for the type of production. Increased coal output in tons, putting the methods used aside, 
tends to mean more jobs and is different from coal production or employment as a 
proportion of county economic activity. Part of the danger of dependency on extractive 
industry is that fluctuations in demand and prices create havoc for workers and 
governments dependent on their revenue. It suggests, for example, counties who 
weathered the “bust” phase of the 1980s better therefore had better outcomes in the 1990s. 
Worsening outcomes when production fall within a county should be unsurprising in this 
context. 
Finally, it seems likely there is a non-linear relationship between coal production 
and dependency related outcomes. It may be that as coal production and relative 
dependency increase together outcomes become poorer but once dependency is 
established more coal production results in more positive outcomes as coal production 
has already become important to the exclusion of other aspects of the economy. A test for 
                                                        
44
 I prefer this type of measure to one focused on employment because there is substantial evidence that the 
political economic influence of the industry has endured despite declining employment (Bell and York 
2010).  
 
45
 Imputation of counties for which coal income was redacted suggests that a handful more may also be 
coal dependent. 
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an interaction effect between the coal dependency measure and my coal variables proved 
inconclusive. 
Conclusion 
 Evidence available from my analysis provides tentative support for the 
hypothesis that an increase in the prevalence of surface mining is associated with more 
negative long-term socioeconomic outcomes on my selected indicators. My models also 
suggest, in line with previous literature, that ecological effects from greater surface 
mining on these indicators are mediated through effects on economic diversification.  
This empirical evidence is consistent with the effects of a mode of extraction around coal 
as outlined in earlier chapters.  
Quantitative modeling is always a form of abstraction that must be done as part of 
a larger historical materialist framework that is reflexive and explicit about the limits to 
the analysis (Amin 2010). I argue in chapter 6, the ecological and human effects of 
surface mining must be evaluated in their own right as well as in relation to their effect 
on the economics of capitalist development if we are to form a dialectical understanding 
of the problems involved. Future research should seek to apply more direct measures of 
mining’s material impacts and introduce controls for outmigration (rather than simple 
population change) to avoid the common mistake of confusing the displacement of 
capital’s contradictions with their resolution.  
Furthermore, additional investigation is needed of the relationship of mining 
dependency beyond that indicated by mining employment (as in the case of Partridge, 
Betz, and Lobao (2013)). Although mining employment has been in decline the political 
and ideological power of coal interests has not declined in proportion (Austin and Clark 
2012; Bell and York 2010; Burns 2007). Because it is through these power relations that 
many of the processes of underdevelopment operate, including the externalization of 
ecological costs and free appropriation of natural wealth, quantitative modeling will 
capture their effects only to the extent they are effectively included.  
Another difficulty that must be recognized in the problem of abstraction is the 
way in which the region, as a periphery, adjusts “unilaterally” to the dominant tendencies 
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at the center of the system into which it is integrated (Amin 2010). Therefore, while 
modeling differences between areas within the region may confirm the importance of 
ecological relations to typical measures of socioeconomic outcomes or show them to be 
incidental, we should not lose sight of the way in which the political economic process at 
work on a larger scale are overriding factors. Because the demand for coal is determined 
primarily outside of the coalfields the speed and the fashion in which its inevitable 
decline arrives are also highly subject to external influence. Analysis of the effects of 
increased surface mining on socioeconomic indicators tells us under what conditions 
coalfield communities are likely to face the exhaustion of the sociometabolic regime 
around coal, but given coal’s seemingly robust hegemony at the state level, for 
understanding when and how this exhaustion will come we must look to politics at the 
national scale 
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CHAPTER V 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COAL IN THE US POWER STRUCTURE: 
MONOPOLY CAPITAL AND THE POLITICS OF COAL AND CLIMATE 
 
 Of all the historical threats to the reproduction of the coal-based mode of 
extraction in Appalachia, the regulation of greenhouse gasses is perhaps the most 
formidable. Because the costs of ecologically significant emissions reductions for coal-
fired power plants are prohibitive, regulation of C02 would impact demand for both 
surface and underground production. Therefore, effective climate legislation represents an 
existential threat to the coal industry. Previous studies have examined the way in which 
capitalist interests have influenced US environmental policy related to coal in the past 
around both air quality and surface mining (Gonzalez 2001; 2005; Shover et al. 1986; 
Vietor 1980). These studies help point to the importance of industry trade groups and the 
elite policy-planning network that shapes legislation and its implementation. This chapter 
employs a power structure research approach and network analysis to understand the 
divisions that emerged within the elite energy policy-planning network surrounding 
efforts to pass climate legislation in 2009. Both the structural location of the coal industry 
and environmental organizations within the network of director interlocks and the 
importance of coal and other fossil fuels as the basis larger sociometabolic regime for 
capitalist accumulation (Krausmann and Fischer-Kowalski 2013) help explain both the 
weakness of the climate bill and the overwhelming difficulties it faced in legislative 
passage.  
Environmental sociology was founded as a subdiscipline around questions 
regarding the rise of environmental movements and conflict over environmental 
degradation and state regulation in the 1970s. From its origins, the subdiscipline’s 
approach to the State rejected the pluralist models still dominant in social science, largely 
in favor of neo-Marxist approaches. Yet the rise of environmental regulation also seemed 
to indicate at least relative autonomy on the part of the state, and there were initially few 
empirical examinations of environmental policy applying sophisticated state theories 
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(Buttel 1985). Theories of the State must account for the class basis of the capitalist state 
in terms of the structural constraints posed by the requirement of accumulation as well as 
the forms of intra and inter-class conflict that occur through the political process.  
Although preceded by Anderson’s pioneering work (1976), Schnaiberg’s 
treadmill of production (1980) approach was the most influential in the early 
subdiscipline. Schnaiberg’s approach was in part an analysis of the politics resulting from 
the ecological contradictions of capitalist accumulation (Foster 2005). The State was 
structurally constrained between its function in facilitating accumulation and its need for 
legitimation (cf O'Connor 2001). In setting up his conception of the nature of this 
contradiction, Schnaiberg drew on Sweezy and Magdoff’s (1975) analysis of monopoly 
capital and stagnation and Gabriel Kolko’s (1963) argument that oligopolistic sectors of 
the capitalist class looked to the state to provide rationalization of the economy. While 
ecological problems could undermine the economic interests of important fractions of 
capital, non-capitalist social movements also had an important influence resulting in the 
“managed scarcity” compromise between forces of accumulation focused on exchange 
value and social groups focused on preserving use values in nature that characterizes the 
best of US environmental policy (Schnaiberg 1994).  
Although later influenced by Skocpol’s (1980)state autonomy argument 
(Schnaiberg 1994), in many ways Schnaiberg’s original work (1980) is more prescient of 
the politics of climate change in 2009, a period of significant movement mobilization, 
deep economic stagnation, and greater than ever dominance of monopoly (now 
monopoly-finance) capital (Foster and McChesney 2012). The structure of the capitalist 
response to climate change reflects both the real divisions between capitalists over the 
threats and opportunities they face from climate regulation as well as the continued 
hegemony of opposition (from the most powerful class fractions) to policies that would 
threaten accumulation in general. Given the preponderance of scientific evidence of 
climate change’s catastrophically destructive effects many capitalist state actors were 
compelled to act to retain legitimacy and avoid threats to their institutional interests.46 
                                                        
46
 This is not to deny the simultaneous corporate offensive to undermine the science, which has been 
relatively successful in the US (McCright and Dunlap 2000; 2003). However, it is significant that this 
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However, the fossil fuel industry, and coal in particular, have a historically prominent 
position within the US power elite (Strangfeld 2006) and were unwilling and unable, 
given the state of available technological fixes, to agree to any serious emissions 
reductions. 
There is an extensive body of literature dedicated to the analysis of the 
contradictions inherent in the prospect of trying to reduce fossil fuel use on a scale 
necessary to avoid catastrophic climate change within a capitalist economy (K. Anderson 
and Bows 2012; Baer 2012; Foster et al. 2010; Koch 2011). My focus here is to examine 
the way in which capitalist collective action played out in the failed attempt at passing 
climate legislation in 2009 and the influence of the coal industry. I next examine the 
literature on how coal industry interests are linked to broader ownership patterns, their 
antagonistic as well as mutual interests with other class fractions/sectors, and sketch how 
these corporate actors intervene in environmental and energy policy formation. I update 
key elements of Vietor’s (1980) comprehensive study of the “coal coalition” of corporate 
interests influencing environmental policy in the late 1970s. I bolster the power structure 
research approach with attention to changing macro structural features of the coal 
industry. I analyze the network of directorate interlocks of the top coal companies and 
their industry associations within the corporate power structure and their connection to 
the energy policy planning network (EPPN) (Crawford 2012) for the year 2009. 
Environmental Politics in the Power Structure Literature 
The victories of the environmental movement in demanding the passage of major 
environmental legislation at the federal level in the 1960s and 1970s were viewed by 
some social scientists as evidence of a pluralistic political system in which capitalist 
interests were fundamentally divided. In this view, environmental policy was simply one 
particular “issue network” that pits various special interest groups against each other. For 
others, it was evidence of the relative autonomy of the state and the way in which the 
career goals of state actors and state institutional interests allowed it to draw 
                                                                                                                                                                     
offensive and the partisanship around the science increased precisely as the science around the 
incompatibility of capitalist growth and emissions reductions became clearer (Klein 2011).  
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independently on the arguments and proposals of different interest groups as well as 
produce its own.  
Reviewing studies of corporate power and environmental policy in the US 
Gonzalez (2001) contends, in line with Domhoff’s (1980; 1990)general argument, that 
analyses of environmental legislation from the pluralist and state autonomy perspectives 
falter by missing the capitalist class dominance through the policy planning network. 
Rather than autonomously drawing on diverse independent interest groups who compete 
for influence, state managers craft policy from a pool of ideas dominated by capitalist 
interests. Furthermore, even in the case of seemingly major defeats for corporate interests, 
final policy decisions disproportionately reflect the contributions of the most corporate 
dominated groups (Gonzalez 2001; 2005). The policy-planning network they argue is an 
example of class dominance because of the way it organizes and projects power for the 
corporate community.  
Of course, not everyone who owns large amounts of capital is active in managing 
the affairs of the capitalist class. Some are simply socialites devoted to particular causes, 
others dilatants of one variety or another. Social scientists have long used the existence of 
networks of individuals linking capitalist firms and institutions to study the actual 
exercise of class power (Domhoff 1967; Kolko 1962; Mills 2000a; Sweezy 1939). The 
“corporate community” is made up of the boards of institutions controlled by the 
capitalist class either through ownership, as in the case of corporations, or through non-
profits controlled by their purse strings and upper class presence on their boards. One 
way these groups are linked into a “community” is through interlocking directorates. 
Interlocks are formed when members of one board also serve on others, thus directors 
link institutions and intuitions link directors. The existence of such networks of interlocks 
is an example of the organizational capacity for the capitalist class to come to understand 
and act on its class interests. Formal network analysis was increasingly used after the 
1970s to analyze the potential for capitalists to organize and act as a class and, by the 
1980s, to investigate the political behavior associated with these networks (Bond and 
Harrigan 2011). For example, interlocks have been shown to predict political cohesion at 
the individual level in studies of campaign contributions, the similarity of political 
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ideology at the organization level and the similarity of congressional testimony as well 
(Bond and Harrigan 2011; Burris 2001; 2005; Dreiling 2000; Dreiling and Darves 2011; 
Mizruchi 1992). The influence of the corporate community is further revealed by the 
frequent appointment of its members to government positions and their presence on 
official advisory boards, further undermining the autonomy of the State. In this way, the 
capitalist class is able to maintain a strong degree of hegemony over State action around 
the environment even in the face of widespread public challenge from social movements.  
The policy planning network consists of foundations, think tanks, and policy 
discussion groups that are dominated by the capitalist class, in particular those members 
of the corporate community who make up the extensively interlocked boards of directors 
for capitalist firms. The capitalist class provides funding and leadership for the major 
foundations, think tanks, and policy-discussion organizations (Domhoff 2014). It is the 
key structure through which the capitalist class is able to formulate and pursue its 
political agenda. The interlocks between firms have been shown to contribute to political 
cohesion and diffusion of business strategies, but the interlocks between policy planning 
groups are more consistently stable and meaningful (Burris 2005; 2008; Dreiling and 
Darves 2011; Mizruchi 1992). Brulle (2000) has shown that although the Ford 
Foundation was a critical source of impetus and start up funds for many of the largest 
environmental organizations today (such as Resources for the Future and the Natural 
Resources Defense Council), overall, foundation funding priorities marginalize 
environmental organizations associated with the environmental justice movement in 
favor of organizations whose goals do not directly threaten capitalist priorities. Many 
environmental groups involved in policy formation not only receive significant funding 
from the foundations of the network but are also connected to the corporate community 
via shared directors on their governing boards. These groups have also helped train future 
appointees to government office (from the very beginning of the EPA under Nixon) 
usually providing a moderate conservative approach favored by the corporate community 
(Domhoff 2014:85).  
Kolko’s conception of political capitalism provides an explanation as to why the 
capitalist class would support the formation of new social and regulatory bodies around 
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the environment. “Political capitalism is the utilization of political outlets to attain 
conditions of stability, predictability and security—to attain rationalization—in the 
economy” (Kolko 1963:3). The dominance of large firms in many sectors of the economy, 
even when insufficient to provide for voluntary coordination, makes more feasible 
political coordination of efforts to stabilize the economy and allows for more secure 
planning of investment, while shielding off political threats. The functioning of political 
capitalism does not require a fully developed class consciousness and unity on the part of 
the capitalist class. Indeed, rifts and rivalries inevitably exist between monopolistic and 
competitive sectors and rivals within sectors. The dominant organizations in the policy 
planning network are divided politically into moderate-conservative and ultra-
conservative factions that reflect some of these divisions (Burris 1992). Since the 1970s 
there has been a distinct rightward shift in the center of the network toward the ultra-
conservative pole (Burris 2008). Despite consistent public support for environmental 
protection, even at the cost of growth (Jones and Dunlap 1992), the corporate community 
became more aggressive in opposing any limits to growth. For example, in his study of 
changes in US policy around electrical utility regulation Prechel (2012:372)concludes: 
The reconfiguration of corporate–state relations between 1978 and 2008 was the 
outcome of political capitalism, which placed a high priority on economic growth 
and a low priority on environmental sustainability and public health… The 
analysis provides little evident [sic] to support the rhetoric that energy firms are 
committed to the new ‘corporate environmentalism’. Instead of moving towards 
environmental sustainability, energy companies engaged in political capitalism to 
circumvent the Clean Air Act and other environmental legislation. 
Underlying this trend is the increased organization and influence of the energy 
industry within the larger power structure (which adds to their already formidable 
structural power within the economy). Strangfeld found(2006) that more comprehensive 
director interlocks between energy firms and the policy planning network (particularly 
members of its inner circle) were associated with more cohesion in formulating and 
pursuing a corporate policy agenda in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 as compared with 
the Act of 1979. Policy planning groups were the key to increased ties between energy 
industry associations. Consistent with Burris (1992) and Domhoff (2013), the most 
central policy groups such as the Business Roundtable, Business Council, and Committee 
on Economic Development played a key role in linking large multinationals firms, with 
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moderate conservative ties, to smaller or more domestically oriented firms (such as 
utilities), with closer ties to the ultra-conservative wing (Strangfeld 2006). While both 
energy bills reflected the positions of the core moderate policy groups like the Business 
Roundtable, by 1992, along with the general shift to the right in elite politics, those 
positions of the moderate center were more reflective of the energy industry as a whole 
(Strangfeld 2006).  
Crawford (2012) describes and analyzes the sector-specific energy policy 
planning network (EPPN) consisting of the top 20 policy planning network organizations 
identified in the literature as well as major industry lobbying groups and some 
environmental groups with a significant energy policy presence. Consistent with 
Strangfeld (2006), the American Petroleum Institute and National Petroleum Council 
were among the most central policy groups; however, in 2002 the Chamber of Commerce 
appears to have increased its proximity to energy firms (Crawford 2012).47 I believe this 
is part of an increased polarization of the energy sector around the ultra-conservative 
wing of the corporate community. This polarization is arguably tied to the lines drawn 
around the increasing threat of climate change-related regulation. Coal, despite providing 
over half US electrical power between 1961 and 2008, had historically been a junior 
partner to major multinational players such oil and gas within the US power structure. 
Changes in the structure of the energy industry suggest this was not the case in 2009.  
The Structure of Accumulation, Competition, and Collusion 
Like other sectors, the coal industry has struggled to control price competition and 
maintain a favorable power relationship to workers and government. Yet coal is in many 
ways special because of its significance as the vastest reserve of fossilized solar energy 
tapped for industrial capitalism. The development of the forces of production in 
extraction and transport, together with labor relations formed the basis upon which 
competition between capitals and their interaction with the state proceeded. Industries 
that had reached the phase of monopoly capital were the primary players in Schnaiberg’s 
(1980) political analysis of the national growth coalitions supporting the treadmill of 
                                                        
47
 There was unfortunately an error in the original analysis that excluded the Business Roundtable, therefor 
the results should be taken with caution.  
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production. In the history of US capitalism, Veblen (1964) identified coal as one of the 
first mature and oligopolized industries whose leaders wielded great political influence. 
However, Veblen seems to have overstated the case for the coal’s maturity in a monopoly 
stage at his time, at least outside of the vertically integrated captive mines of the steel 
industry. As an industry with high sunk costs due to the nature of capital investments and 
their rural, isolated location (Barham and Coomes 2005), and with a relatively high 
proportion of fixed costs, coal capitalists are under particular pressure to break with 
corespective competition and cut prices, even to operate at a loss during market 
downturns (Bowman 1989). This is because the sunk nature of their investments makes 
divestment difficult and there is the hope that a market upturn will be quick in coming or 
the collapse of competitors who cannot survive will open up new market share.  
 Because the market structure of the coal industry has tended to have many sellers, 
relatively few buyers, difficulties in storing inventory, high fixed costs and sunk 
investments, as well as heterogeneity of product quality, firm cost structure, and 
transportation costs, it has not historically lent itself to the type of oligopolistic forms of 
competition seen in other mature sectors in the era of monopoly capitalism. The 
instability and character of competition in the industry are discussed in chapter 2 and 3. 
Due to the critical importance of this resource to the overall national economy, and to the 
local economies of several states, government has intervened at various times to stabilize 
both the flow of coal and capital-labor relations. The origin of the National Coal 
Association in 1917, for example, was under State pressure to stabilize the industry 
rocked by class struggle. Major federal intervention occurred again during the depression 
years and during the Second World War. The need for a pricing agreement is more 
pressing for firms with inflexible production costs because they cannot increase profits as 
easily by lowering prices (Bowman 1989:26). Such agreements have been the exception 
rather than the rule in the coal industry’s history, as even in its most desperate hours it 
has traditionally been more hostile to state mediated rationalization than its mature 
industry peers (Kolko 1984). These factors contributed to widespread failures of firms 
but this was until relatively recently, also counterbalanced by low barriers to entry.  
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Recent decades have seen some key elements of the market structure change 
favorably for oligopoly. Concentration and centralization have proceeded as every major 
market downturn has seen more consolidation as smaller firms fold. In 1929 the 87 
largest bituminous operators were responsible for just under 43% of output (Bowman 
1989). In 1976 the 20 largest producers accounted for about 49% of production. In 1991 
the top 20 still accounted for only 54.5% (Energy Information Agency 1993), and a year 
later the market share of the top four firms was 21.7% (Pryor 2001). The percentage 
share of production held by the top four firms was fairly steady in the low 20s from the 
late 1970s through the 1980s. Then, dramatically, this top four share nearly doubled to 
40% during the 1990s and rose another 10% over the following decade so that in 2011 
the top four producers were responsible for more than half of US output (Energy 
Information Agency 2013). However, production and distribution markets are shaped by 
economic and technological shifts, they don’t really exist at the aggregate national level 
in terms of inter-firm rivalry. The Energy Information Agency’s Western Region, which 
includes the massive Powder River Basin deposits, was the most concentrated in 1991 
with the biggest four firms controlling almost 38% of regional production (1993). In 2009 
the share of the top four in the West was nearly 80%. Concentration in the Eastern 
Region among coal producers also appears to have doubled from 20% to 42% while the 
Interior Regions saw a more modest jump of around 39% to 53% from its top four 
(Appalachian Voices n.d.).48 As a contributor to this trend, barriers to entry have 
increased significantly with greater up-front regulatory costs for safety and environmental 
requirements as well as a massive increase in the scale of mining. Average mine size 
increased from 105,000 tons per year in 1976 to 330,000 in 1991. Though the greatest 
increases in scale have occurred in the Western surface mines, underground mining has 
become increasingly capital intensive as well with the adoption of longwall mining 
methods. On the international scale, there was an increase in foreign investment and 
control of US coal production as foreign conglomerates purchased major coal producers, 
but this had leveled off at around 30% of companies with foreign direct investment  (10% 
stake or more) by the mid 1990s; it fell sharply in 1998 to around 20% and then 
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 While concentration continued to increase nationally after 2009, between 2000 and 2011 the share of 
production held by the four largest firms nationally in Appalachia dropped from 45% to 27% reflecting the 
overall drop in production levels there (Energy Information Agency 2013) 
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rebounded to around 27% before sliding to less than 15% in 2006 (Energy Information 
Agency 2007). Coal has remained, by and large, a domestic industry in contrast to oil or 
gas. 
Differential exposure to costs of different types of environmental regulation, such 
as sulfur dioxide emission limits or surface mining restrictions, have been points of intra-
industry conflict (Shover et al. 1986; Vietor 1980). For example, acid rain protections 
favored many of the producers of low sulfur coal in the West, compensating for their 
higher transport costs to Eastern markets. As more utilities have installed pollution 
control equipment the premium on low sulfur coal reserves has lessened. The Western 
mines’ greater efficiencies of scale are offset by their high transport costs to Eastern 
markets (80% of consumer price on average) and their lower coal quality; whereas 
Appalachian producers face higher costs due to underground safety issues and greater 
ecological and public health scrutiny of surface mining, but they can still capitalize on 
higher quality coals and lower transport costs due to proximity. Concerns over regulation 
of mountaintop removal mining also continue to distinguish Western and Appalachian 
producers. The largest producer in the US, Peabody coal, spun off its Appalachian 
holdings into Patriot Coal Corporation in 2007 in recognition of these differences (and 
potentially to avoid its obligations to the unionized workforce’s pensions) (Quinnell 
2013).  
However, all producers are threatened by the potential of limits on CO2 emissions. 
The regulatory policies that constrain the free appropriation of natural use values and 
externalization of costs paradoxically encourage the centralization of capital that 
increases the political organization and efficacy of surviving firms to influence future 
regulation. The increasing firm size, despite the complexity in relationship to competitive 
practices, arguably facilitates political action when coal interests are aligned and 
improves their capacity to organize with other class fractions.49  
                                                        
49
 Although in the 1970s large producers tied to oil and gas dominated the industry, more recently other 
diversified controllers have entered the market. We can expect price competition to be curtailed by 
concentration and particularly if the largest producers have increased their ability to absorb temporary 
losses caused by price warfare and exert price leadership. Large diversified firms can more easily draw on 
profits from other areas or creditors. This, along with rising barriers to entry and strategic excess capacity, 
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The History of the Coal Industry in the US Corporate Power Structure  
Following WWII the coal industry was in decline as other energy sources (oil and 
nuclear) received better state support and captured more market share. The thousands of 
coal operators lacked the ability to economically rationalize their industry (Vietor 1980). 
Towards the end of the 1950s coal industry executives joined inter-industry associations 
and gained appointments to governmental councils providing the needed coherence to 
start to stabilize and rationalize their business. Influence over the state was crucial both 
for rationalizing competition within the industry and for minimizing the “internalization” 
of the human and environmental costs of coal production and combustion. Most pressing 
to the minds of coal operators, though, was the need to counteract government policy in 
favor of competing energy sources. In 1944 congress passed the Liquid Synthetic Fuels 
Act, which allocated tens of millions of dollars into coal to liquids research. However, the 
process came to a halt when the National Petroleum Council paid for a study to show the 
process was grossly inefficient. Meanwhile, the US continued to help develop 
commercial nuclear, build oil infrastructure and give tax credits for foreign exploration, 
and regulate the price of natural gas below that of coal (Vietor 1980). By 1957 the head 
of the National Coal Association was explicit about the need for more organization for 
greater political power (Vietor 1980). 
With fewer producers after mid-1950s mergers, coal producers formed the 
National Coal Policy Conference with railroads, mining equipment manufacturers, 
electric utilities, and labor in 1959. They also won a department of coal research, 
although within the Department of the Interior rather than independent due to oil industry 
opposition. The stronger position the coal industry achieved through consolidation and 
government support made it an acquisition target for firms who had been riding the post 
war boom and now had large surpluses to invest. In 1950 all but captive steel industry 
mines were independent, but by 1976 all but 3 of the top 40 coal companies were 
subsidiaries. Oil and gas companies flush with profits from the OPEC embargo and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
should provide a threat of retaliation with a greater impact on competition than simply the concentration of 
production among firms would imply on its face. More careful examination of the importance of transport 
infrastructure and its ownership is also necessary to understand market boundaries and competitive 
dynamics. The connections between these dynamics and political action are a subject for future research. 
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facing limits to domestic reserves were particularly interested in shoring up their energy 
supplies, and in 1976 they controlled 37% of total coal production and 38% of reserves, 
the largest share of any group (Vietor 1980:20).  
“By the mid-1970’s, an identifiable coalition of coal interests had emerged, its 
foundation resting on seven industrial sectors: coal production, oil and gas, metals, 
electric utilities, railroads, mining equipment manufacturers, and commercial banks” 
(Vietor 1980:21). Each coalition sector had reasons to oppose environmental (or labor) 
regulation that would limit growth, and so each contributed resources to politically active 
association groups as well as often engaging in political action themselves. Labor is 
absent from this coalition as outlined by Vietor. The UMWA feared the resilience to 
strike action created by king coal’s new owners, the oil industry’s financial resources in 
particular, and in a 1973 editorial suggested “A coalition with other unions, 
environmental organizations, and consumer groups would be necessary…” to pass anti-
trust legislation to force big oil to divest from big coal (Vietor 1980:29). The Marine 
Engineers’ Beneficial Association who desired to push big oil into more foreign 
investment that would create shipping jobs for their membership joined the UMWA in 
pushing for anti-trust action (Vietor 1980). However, as discussed in chapter 3, such a 
coalition with environmental and consumer groups failed to materialize, with the union 
siding with industry against federal surface mine regulation.  
Large-scale incorporation into the oil industry brought big oil’s formidable 
financial and political influence to bear on behalf of the coal industry. As subsidiaries of 
these and other dominant capitals like the steel industry, coal companies’ director 
interlocks increased dramatically. Interlocks with large commercial banks, previously 
rare, provided new communication lines for coordinating policy. Beyond increased 
interlocks, major banks invested in long-term projects for increased coal use that tied 
their own business interest to avoiding regulatory burdens on coal. The scale of 
investments corresponded to the scaled up production of larger machinery along with 
dedicated rail lines and shipping facilities for utilities that were also building new 
generation facilities and looked to coal for a stable cheap energy source. Only the largest 
companies could finance such investments out of profits, the rest turned to financial 
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markets, which in turn created new network connections. Chase Manhattan Bank even 
became a member of the National Coal Association (Vietor 1980). 
The coal coalition’s place in the policy formation network. In the 1960s the coal 
industry outmatched environmentalists seeking to influence regulators in their control and 
use of data necessary to make or contest arguments for policy. Local and state regulators 
were particularly easy to intimidate (Vietor 1980:9). For example, as discussed earlier, in 
the case of the coal producing Appalachian region, particularly West Virginia, 
government was tightly interlocked by a revolving door with the coal industry (Burns 
2007; J. Fox 1999). Vietor (1980) points to Nixon’s National Industrial Pollution Control 
Council as a particularly grievous case of government and corporate collusion in closed-
door policymaking. However, as the environmental movement continued to grow, 
industry found itself under increasing pressure to respond and did so on multiple scales. 
  In 1970s the political organization of the coal coalition was stratified at four 
levels. First, state and regional trade groups operating mainly from the state down to the 
county level. Because their interests were divided by particulars of geographical 
differences in production and markets, they did not coordinate very well with each other 
or national groups. Second, national level trade associations that did the bulk of lobbying 
and studies aimed at federal policy. Third, inter-industry associations including the 
National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce, but the National 
Coal Policy Conference and the American Mining Congress were more important for 
organizing against environmental policy threats. Finally a fourth level consisted of 
government industrial advisory councils working directly with government. Because 
these are interrelated in their development, I review Vietor’s findings at each level and 
discuss some evident changes since his research before turning to an empirical analysis of 
the national and inter-industry associations in the 2009 EPPN.  
The effectiveness of state level organizations in shaping policy was influenced not 
only by the industry’s centrality to the individual State’s economy but by their ties to 
larger more powerful organizations. Vietor (1980:41-2) illustrates the point by 
comparison of the shortcomings of the insular Pennsylvania Coal Mining Association and 
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the more successful large producer dominated, nationally and cross-industry networked 
West Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association.  
At the national level, the National Coal Policy Conference (NCPC) emerged with 
UMWA’s infamous Tony Boyle on board with coal, mining equipment manufacturers, 
utility, and transport interests. It was initially dedicated to pushing federal policy away 
from oil, gas, and nuclear and toward coal. However, when air pollution became a policy 
issue in the late 1960s, NCPC was influential in weakening clean air legislation but by 
1971 it dissolved due to conflict with labor, the new influence of former rivals in oil 
among its members, and the increased power and sophistication of the National Coal 
Association (NCA), which became a new center of power for the industry. Although 
founded in response to WWI coal demands, the NCA did not become truly influential 
until the late 1960s when it cultivated leadership with strong ties to the federal 
government and expanded its membership and activities. It had the extensive staff to be 
an effective lobbying organization.  
The American Mining Congress (AMC) was an important source of inter-industry 
collaboration. AMC members, rather than staff, were its primary political operatives. Out 
of 471 members in 1974, 135 had business interests in coal and thirty-one made coal their 
primary business (Vietor 1980:49). The AMC’s board of thirty-two directors had a year 
earlier contained twenty-two with coal interests but only two for whom coal was primary. 
AMC was therefore broadly concerned with the mining process and some of the 
industrial end uses of coal such as smelting. This was an important link for coal capitals 
not already tied through big oil and gas owners to the larger mining community. “More 
than any other single institution, the American Mining Congress has come to represent 
the inter-industry political coalition of coal” (Vietor 1980:51). 
Influence was wielded most directly on the government advisory boards. Nixon’s 
National Industrial Pollution Control Council (NIPCC) was a major venue for coal 
interests to influence executive branch policy. They met in secret and were able to use the 
Department of Commerce as a public relations tool, publishing numerous reports praising 
industry initiative and warning of economic consequences from environmental protection. 
The NIPCC collaborated with the AMC, Edison Electric Institute (EEI), and other 
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members of the coal policy network to produce studies that dramatized the economic 
costs of environmental clean air protections and, critically, pushed to have cost-benefit 
considerations added to regulation process. In 1973 when the NIPCC’s ability to meet in 
secret was revoked by Congress it was substantially weakened. NIPCC members had 
contributed over $700,000 to Nixon’s campaign and several were investigated for illegal 
contributions.50 Because of horizontal integration by oil companies, the National 
Petroleum Council had by the 1970s absorbed not only substantial coal interests but even 
nuclear interests and became established as the most influential governmental advisory 
group on energy issues generally(Strangfeld 2006).  
It was not only the shared the financial, material, and institutional integration but 
the recognition of a common class enemy that drove the formation of the coal coalition. 
“There can be little doubt that by the mid-1960s a cohesive political coalition of coal-
related industries was evolving from post-World War II financial and technological 
interdependencies. Interlocked trade associations and industry advisory councils provided 
the institutional order for the coalition’s political activity. Environmentalism provided a 
common cause” (Vietor 1980:57). The easing of the energy crisis and falling prices for 
energy commodities in the 1980s appear to have shaken up the oil-coal ownership 
structure that helped form Vietor’s Coal Coalition. The percentage of coal production 
owned by oil and gas companies increased from thirty-two in 1976 to forty-four in 1986 
but had declined to less than thirty by the early 1990s (Energy Information Agency 1993). 
Today, the divestment trend appears to have continued. 
Since Vietor’s study there has been both continuity and divergence in the trends 
he recorded. At the State level, the West Virginia and Kentucky Coal Associations appear 
to have grown in influence and sophistication, and they continued to develop regional 
interstate ties through groups like Friends of Coal (Bell and York 2010). Evidence also 
indicates the coal industries of those states have continued to receive substantial direct 
and indirect government support. So much so that they constitute a net drain on state 
                                                        
50
 When the chairman of leading coal producer Ashland Oil was convicted of making illegal contributions, 
he defended it in a statement to shareholders saying, “There was a good business reason for making the 
contribution and, although illegal in nature, I am confident that it distinctly benefited the corporation…” 
(Vietor 1980:54-5). 
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budgets (undefined author and J. Bailey 2009; Boettner and McIlmoil 2010; McIlmoil 
and Boettner 2010; McIlmoil et al. 2010). Reflecting growing concentration, the National 
Coal Association and the American Mining Congress merged in 1995 to form the 
American Mining Association. According to their website their objective is “engage in 
and influence the public policy process on the most significant and timely issues that 
impact our ability to locate, permit, mine, process, transport and utilize the nation's vast 
coal and mineral resources” (National Mining Association n.d.). They were a major 
contributor to the Air Quality Standards Coalition formed in the late 1990s and chaired 
by the National Association of Manufacturers to oppose new EPA air regulations. 
Another important new policy group, the Center for Energy and Economic Development 
(CEED), emerged in 2000. The CEED has been a central actor in opposing climate 
change regulation and is the parent organization of Americans for Balanced Energy 
Choices, later renamed more forthrightly as the American Coalition for Clean Coal 
Electricity (ACCCE), whose members include many of the largest mining, rail, and 
utilities companies in the US. The group spent $30 million in 2007 and was the primary 
sponsor of a Democratic presidential debate in early 2008 at which climate change was 
never mentioned.  
Government advisory boards became more conspicuous during the George W. 
Bush administration. Vice President Dick Cheney’s National Energy Policy Development 
Group was a broader and even more secretive incarnation of Nixon’s NIPCC. Even 
identities of who met with this group was a closely guarded secret, with Cheney 
successfully fighting against disclosure for years until finally a Supreme Court ruling 
upheld exemption for executive privilege. Although the proceedings are still secret, 
leaked documents do show that “Jack N. Gerard, then with the National Mining 
Association, … [met with the group and]… urged the administration to give the Energy 
Department responsibility for promoting technology for easing global warming and to 
keep the issue away from the Environmental Protection Agency, which could issue 
regulations on greenhouse gas emissions” (Abramowitz and Mufson 2007). His advice 
appears to have been followed. Members of the coal coalition, the mega-utility Southern 
Company in particular, successfully lobbied for repeal of the Clinton era New Source 
Review (NSR) rule requiring utilities who upgrade generation capacity to install the best 
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available pollution controls.  There were an enormous number of NSR violations pending 
as George W. Bush took office and after the repeal these cases were dropped. Bush also 
placed the CEO of Peabody Energy, Irl Engelhardt, on his EPA transition team along 
with Peabody VP John Wooten on the Department of Energy team and others corporate 
coal leaders in that Department and Department of Interior. His chief of staff for 
Environmental Quality was the former head of the American Petroleum Institute’s anti-
climate science team (Goodell 2007).  
When G.W. Bush’s head of EPA, Christine Whitman, reiterated on national TV 
his campaign position of accepting the reality of anthropogenic climate change and the 
need to address it, it was an opportunity to see the class and institutional ties of the coal 
policy network swing into action. Thomas Kuhn, Bush’s Yale roommate and head of the 
Edison Electric Institute, dropped a personal call. The Competitive Enterprise Institute 
also lashed out, as did Southern Company’s lobbyist and former Mississippi governor, 
Haley Barbour. Within days the White House had rejected Whitman’s claims (Goodell 
2007). Similarly, when the courts ruled that mountaintop removal’s disposal of mine 
waste in streams was subject to the Clean Water Act, the fossil fuel-dominated 
Department of Interior issued a rule redefining mine waste as “fill” to negate the impact. 
G.W. Bush received record donations from the coal industry during his election campaign 
against Gore. Coal mining campaign contributions peaked in 2002 at about $3.7 million 
while lobbying expenditures exploded from less than three million at the start of the 
decade to consistently over fifteen million by the end. Obama’s stated support for clean 
coal did not sway the industry. In 2008 Democrats as a whole received only 27% percent 
of coal industry federal campaign contributions (Center for Responsive Politics 2014). 
Still this was nearly double what Democrats tended to receive during the Bush years, 
reflecting some hedging of bets.  
The most substantial new regulatory issue in the Twenty-first Century was 
obviously the possibility of climate regulations, but regulation of mountaintop removal 
mining in the Appalachian region has also become an increasingly pressing issue, 
creating tension between the Obama administration’s constituency of environmentalists 
and the Democratic congressional representatives of key coal states like West Virginia. 
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Nevertheless, at the national scale of politics the interests of coal and utilities in 
mountaintop removal regulation pale in comparison to those interests threatened by 
climate change. The nuclear and natural gas industries are the most obviously positioned 
large energy interests to leverage constrained coal use for their benefit. Coal, nuclear, and 
gas were in competition over energy priorities in the late 1970s but had developed more 
indirect network ties and cooperative lobbying by 1992 (Strangfeld 2006). In the absence 
of common ownership structure like that in the late 1970s, coordination in the face of 
competing interest would depend more than ever on the policy planning network 
organizations acting as mediator.  
The Climate Threat and Political Capitalism Response 
 Pressure for action to address climate change continued to grow in the first decade 
of the Twenty-first Century. Europe had implemented regulations in 2005 and as it 
became increasing likely that fossil fuel interests would face a US government controlled 
by the less loyal Democratic Party, some kind of climate related regulation seemed a 
strong probability. In early 2007, four environmental groups, including three of the 
largest mainstream groups, and ten major corporations, including major fossil fuel 
interests such as BP America, Caterpillar, Alcoa, and Duke Energy, announced the 
formation of the US Climate Action Partnership (USCAP). The group released a 
statement promising “to work with the President, the Congress, and all other stakeholders 
to enact an environmentally effective, economically sustainable, and fair climate change 
program consistent with our principles at the earliest practicable date” (US Climate 
Action Partnership 2007). In a much-anticipated ruling three months later, the US 
Supreme Court ruled that the EPA already had the authority to regulate greenhouse gases, 
raising the stakes for business further. An additional two environmental groups and 13 
firms had joined USCAP by 2008. The partnership was to be one of the primary 
architects of the cap and trade legislation put forward in 2008 and 2009 (Pooley 2010).  
 The lead environmental group was Environmental Defense, which, under the 
leadership of Fred Krupp, had become the leading advocate of market environmentalism 
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and the cap and trade approach.51 Major fossil fuel companies attracted to the group were 
those who already were exposed to similar legislation in the EU, such as BP and Shell. 
The other sector heavily represented was the utilities and energy technology sector 
desiring rationalization. With much of utilities’ generation capacity reaching the end of 
its lifespan these firms looked for predictability for their investments and security from 
policy initiatives outside their influence. Finally, there was the financial services sector, 
Lehman Brothers was a founding member, which stood to profit handsomely from the 
privatization and securitization of the atmospheric commons. Firms from other sectors 
also had readily identifiable strategic interests (Carney 2008). 
 Theda Skocpol (2013), in the most comprehensive study to date, has analyzed the 
failure to pass climate legislation in 2009, despite the support of major environmental and 
business organizations as represented by USCAP. Applying a form of pluralist state 
theory known as the “polity centered approach” (Skocpol 1992), she argues that 
grassroots ideological mobilization by elements on the fringe of establishment views, 
rather than widespread elite opposition, were the primary causes of the legislation’s 
failure. This analysis was echoed by the head of the EPA under George W. Bush, 
Christine Todd Whitman: “It's a shame that we find ourselves in this stalemate, as 
business leaders have not resisted capping carbon as some might assume they would. In 
fact, business leaders joined with environmental leaders [to ask for] consistent federal 
rules on carbon emissions” (Dickinson 2010). Skocpol focuses on the congressional 
politics and concludes that the root problem was a lack of any Republican support, but 
this was not a product of business dominance in politics: “ …business people are not, 
right now, the prime arbiters in the Republican Party. Ideological advocates, carbon 
industry dead-enders, and populist anti-government forces are…including billionaire 
elites and grassroots activists fiercely opposed to any and all government efforts to fight 
global warming” (2013:130). No evidence is presented as to asserted marginality of the 
carbon industry “dead enders” within the corporate community, other than the existence 
of USCAP, nor does Skocpol sufficiently address the substantive basis on which a 
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 Environmental Defense spearheaded the market environmentalism compromises into the 1990 Clean Air 
Act amendments that won over the assent of the Business Roundtable.  
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number of major environmental groups with a more justice oriented approach came to 
oppose the climate legislation being considered as a failure. 
 In fact, the National Wildlife Federation withdrew from USCAP in early 2009 
after determining that the process was hopelessly compromised and other more justice-
oriented groups such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth had been opposed to major 
tenets of their agenda such as free pollution permits and other loopholes from the 
beginning. Primary among the reasons for opposition by many greens and scientists was 
the legislation’s reliance on miraculous breakthroughs in carbon capture and storage 
technology or “clean coal” that were viewed as unlikely to occur on the timetable needed 
for carbon reductions, if ever. As top NASA climate scientist James Hansen put his 
opposition:  
The dirtiest trick that governments play on their citizens is the pretense that they 
are working on "clean coal" or that they will build power plants that are "capture-
ready" in case technology is ever developed to capture all pollutants…Cap-and-
trade is the Temple of Doom. It would lock in disasters for our children and 
grandchildren. It would do nothing to preserve a planet resembling the one that 
we inherited from our elders, and to allow continued existence of the remarkable 
species that co-habit Earth with humanity. (J. Hansen 2009a) 
Although never discussing the science in any detail, Skocpol dismisses such opinions out 
of hand, arguing that any legislation would a priori be a positive step toward more 
effective regulation in the future (Skocpol 2013). Such an outcome would be a contrast 
with the history of coal surface mine regulation, where a compromised bill effectively 
demobilized social movements for national legislation and has led to continued and 
accelerating ecological impacts through exploitation of loopholes around MTR (Montrie 
2003; Palmer et al. 2010). This is typical of disagreements between the class dominance 
and historical institutionalism approaches over the degree to which new agencies are 
accepted by function routinely once established (Domhoff 2014:210). 
 Skocpol compares the “insider bargain” strategy of USCAP unfavorably to the 
more successful and movement mobilization oriented Health Care for America Now 
(HCAN) effort to pass healthcare legislation during the same period. Although producing 
valid discernments into the superiority of the latter strategy for countering rightwing 
mobilization at the level of congressional politics, her polity approach comparison 
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overlooks major substantive differences in the nature of the legislation and its relation to 
class interests involved. A power structure approach, viewing these legislative processes 
through the lens of political capitalism, reveals major differences. Although both bills 
were fundamentally based on proposals from the capitalist policy planning network, 
Environmental Defense most prominently in the cap and trade case and the Heritage 
Foundation in the case of mandated private insurance, their final forms were received 
much differently by most central policy planning organizations and key trade associations. 
Furthermore the threat of irreversibility of climate change, affecting all future generations, 
poses an important policy distinction from healthcare reform on the feasibility of 
incremental change that the polity approach, lacking a materialist political economic 
grounding, is deaf to, instead seeing only a myopic ideological unwillingness on the part 
of left groups to work with business.    
By mapping the director interlocks of the EPPN and organizations’ climate 
change policy positions it is possible to examine the extent to which opposition to 
legislation was confined to “carbon industry dead enders” as well as how the level of 
integration into the wider corporate community correlates with environmental 
organization opinion on the cap and trade bill.  
Data and Methods 
I perform exploratory analysis on a network database constructed from data on 
directorate interlock ties retrieved from organizational websites, tax filings, Mergent 
Online, and the Wharton School Corporate Library database. My sample of firms consists 
of publicly held Fortune 500 companies for 2009, supplemented with any of the publicly 
held top 20 producers among electrical utilities (megawatt hours), along with the top 20 
producers and reserve holders for coal (tons), oil (barrels), and gas (BTUs) not already 
included. In addition, I added any of the firms in those sectors who were among the top 
20 federal political contributors in the 2008 or 2006 election cycles (Center for 
Responsive Politics 2014). Following Vietor I identify members of the coal coalition, 
beyond the top coal producers, as publicly held firms among the top 20 utility consumers 
of coal, the top 10 industrial consumers, the top 20 coal reserve holders, the top 3 rail 
haulers, and the 5 banks with the highest investments in coal. Finally, I also included 
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publicly available firms that were part of USCAP. The corporate sample includes 473 
total firms, 59 top energy firms, 20 coal firms and 46 firms in the coal coalition.  
My energy policy planning network sample builds from the organizations 
identified by Crawford (2012) as major policy planning groups involved in energy-
related policy and extends to organizations active on climate change. I was able to obtain 
director lists for the National Mining Association, Nuclear Electric Institute, and the 
American Coal Council that were unavailable for Crawford’s study.52 I also add the most 
prominent coal industry associations identified in the literature above, as well as 
additional prominent environmental organizations identified as involved in shaping 
climate policy. A total of 37 organizations are included in my EPPN sample (see table 
5.1).  
Table 5.1. EPPN Sample 
Organization Status 
National Petroleum Council  Advisory group to US DOE 
American Petroleum Institute Oil and gas trade association 
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America  Natural gas pipeline industry trade organization 
Independent Petroleum Association of America Oil and gas trade association 
American Gas Association Natural gas utility trade organization 
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association Cooperative electric utility trade organization   
Edison Electric Institute Shareholder-owned electric utilities’ trade 
organization Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear energy trade organization 
National Mining Association Mining/coal trade organization 
American Coal Council Coal industry trade organization 
American Coal Foundation Coal industry trade organization 
National Coal Council Coal industry trade organization 
American Coalition For Clean Coal Electricity Coal industry trade organization 
Bituminous Coal Operators Association Coal industry trade organization 
Solar Energy Industries Association Solar industry trade organization 
American Wind Energy Association Wind industry trade organization 
National Association of Regulatory Utilities 
Commissioners  
Public utility commission trade organization 
National Association of Manufacturers Trade organization 
The Business Council Trade organization 
Business Roundtable Trade organization/think-tank 
US Chamber of Commerce Trade organization 
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 I also include the Business Council. Although Mizruchi and others have remarked on the decline of 
influence held by the Committee on Economic Development, they should be included in my final analysis 
as well.  
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Committee for Economic Development Trade organization 
Conference Board Conservative think-tank 
Heritage Foundation Ultra-conservative think-tank 
The Brookings Institution Conservative think-tank 
Council on Foreign Relations Conservative think-tank 
American Enterprise Institute Ultra-conservative think-tank 
RAND Corporation Conservative think-tank 
Natural Resources Defense Council Environmental group 
Union of Concerned Scientists Liberal think-tank 
Resources for the Future  Environmental group 
Environmental Defense Fund Environmental group 
World Resources Institute Environmental group 
Alliance For Climate Protection Environmental group 
Climate Works Foundation Environmental group 
International Research Center For Energy & 
Economic Development 
Think-Tank 
Sierra Club Environmental group 
The Nature Conservancy Environmental group 
Greenpeace Environmental group 
 
Drawing conclusions based on public statements of policy groups can be difficult 
as they are sometimes contradictory and may reflect a public relations strategy or 
strategic goals rather than actual policy preferences: for example when a group opposes a 
policy ensured of passage in their favor as being too weak when they would support it if 
passage was questionable (Domhoff 2014; Union of Concerned Scientists 2012). To 
minimize the confusion stemming from contradictory statements and actions, I applied a 
simplified version of the methods used by Goldman and Rogerson (2013) in assessing 
trade and policy groups’ positions on climate change. I coded organizations into three 
categories, those that reject the climate science consensus, those that accept the scientific 
consensus but do not support “significant” action, and those who both accept the science 
and support “significant” action.53 Organizations without sufficient data to make a 
determination such as the Conference Board, or groups that do not take explicit policy 
positions as a matter of course like the Business Council, are treated as missing.  
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 This definition of  “significant” includes support for the cap and trade bill and so should be distinguished 
from “sufficient” action to realistically address climate change.  
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I construct an adjacency matrix of firms and EPPN organizations using UCINET 
software to describe the structure of the EPPN and the coal industry and wider coal 
coalition’s connections to it. For my exploratory purposes here, I do not distinguish 
between inside and outside directors and ties are treated as non-directional/symetrical.54 I 
then graph the network using the NETDRAW software’s Multi Dimensional Scaling 
graph theoretic layout that arranges network nodes in space according to similarity of ties. 
After comparing these exploratory findings on the networks’ properties, I analyze the 
relationship of organizational network location to positions of policy groups on climate 
change action. 
Results 
In 2009  the 20 major coal producers and reserve holders were relatively 
independent of major oil and other sectors that first drew the industry into the inner circle 
of national policy. Twelve of the major producers are independent, three are controlled 
by utilities, two by big oil, one by a railroad, and one by a conglomerate. However, 
despite this marked change from ownership structure of the coal coalition of the late 
1970s, coal firms exhibited robust interlock ties through the larger coal coalition to the 
EPPN.  
Figure 5.1 shows the coal coalition firms and the EPPN. Firms are represented by 
squares and the primary role within the coalition is indicated by color.55 The EPPN 
organizations are represented by circles and are colored green if they specialize in 
environment related policy or are a renewable energy trade group and colored red 
otherwise. Lines connecting the nodes represent ties formed by director interlocks; 
thicker lines indicate multiple shared directors. Every major coal producing or reserve 
holding firm is tied to the EPPN except the smallest, James River Coal Company, which 
is connected by other members of the coal coalition to the network. Coal firms outside of 
the bottom left corner are firms who, despite being a top producer or reserve owner, have 
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 Ties formed by vice presidents of EPPN groups who are not also directors are still included, but not in 
the case of firms, as the data from Wharton only included directors.  
 
55
 The National Petroleum Council is mislabeled as “American” in the graphs; there are also inconsistencies 
in capitalization. I have corrected these in the data and will rerun the graphs for the final draft.  
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their primary business in other sectors, primarily utilities. No firms are isolates, though 
several policy groups are, including the left leaning Greenpeace, the ultraconservative 
Heritage Foundation, and the solar energy trade association. The network exhibits a clear 
polarity between policy groups with ties to the coal firms and those with ties to 
environmental organizations. This polarity falls along expected lines of liberal and 
environmental organizations on one pole, moderate-conservatives in the center and 
ultraconservative policy organizations and the coal industry on the other pole. Utilities 
occupy an intermediate position between the main policy groups and the coal firms. 
Other than the extractive-oriented International Paper Company, the industrial coal 
consumers occupy a more central position, as do the railroads that are not also major coal 
producers/owners. The banks are the most consistently on the moderate-conservative side 
of the policy spectrum. 
Figure 5.2 shows the EPPN with their size indicated by their 2-local eigenvector 
centrality (the number of other nodes within 2 ties) and color coded according to their 
position toward climate change and climate policy with red representing hostility to 
science and policy, yellow indicating acceptance of climate science but lack of policy 
support, green representing significant policy support, and blue missing data. 
Unsurprisingly the ultraconservative groups are all hostile to climate science and policy. 
The major fossil fuel organizations with the exception of the gas industry are also. Gas 
industry trade associations are joined by the Business Roundtable in taking an 
intermediate position of accepting the science but not significant action. Thus, following 
the general political alignment the network is polarized between environmental and coal 
groups. Exceptional cases to this trend are the Edison Electric Institute and Nuclear 
Energy Institute trade associations that appear closer to the coal/ultraconservative end. 
Figure 5.3 shows the EPPN, coded for policy position as above, with ties to the 
top energy firms and USCAP firms, all with sizes based on 2-local eigenvector centrality. 
This network has one additional isolate, XTO Energy, and one fewer isolate; a board tie 
with the utility Calpine Corporation now connects Sierra Club to the network. Figure 5.4 
shows these nodes without labels for better examination of ties. The same rough spectrum 
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shows itself here with oil and gas in a generally more central position and USCAP firms 
more toward the liberal environmental end.  
Table 5.2 displays the centrality scores of the EPPN organizations using a variety 
of measures. Coding support for climate action on an ordinal scale (1,0,-1), centrality 
within the EPPN is negatively correlated with support for climate action. This correlation 
is statistically significant when centrality is measured by the eigenvector of geodesic 
distances or Bonacich’s power algorithm (rho= -0.483, p= 0.004). To further test this 
relationship I regressed climate stance as categorical variable to predict centrality using 
OLS. The results indicate that organizations supporting climate action are significantly 
less central within the network than those rejecting science and climate action (p= 0.01) 
but those groups accepting the science but not supporting action are not (p= 0.93). 
Johnson’s simple hierarchical cluster analysis indicates the environmental and “liberal” 
end of the moderate-conservative wing such as RAND, Brookings, and the Conference 
Board are groupings more similar and organizations related to coal have more similarity 
of ties with the ultraconservative think thanks. The cluster analysis dendogram is reported 
in the appendix. 
Discussion  
Coal’s increased autonomy from the ownership structure of previous decades presents 
both the potential opportunity of pursuing a more independent agenda and, alternatively, 
of being left out in the cold. It is difficult to distinguish between the role of network ties, 
general ideological positions, and the economy’s structural dependence on coal as cheap 
energy for economic growth in swaying the broad based multi-issue policy organizations 
such as the Business Roundtable against support for climate action. However, it is clear 
that coal’s director ties among the top companies have remained robust and kept it 
connected to the larger EPPN. EPPN organizations missing from earlier studies 
(Crawford 2012), The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and National Mining Association 
are clearly important nodes in the overall network with higher than average ties, and so 
their inclusion gives a better understanding of the overall structure of the network. 
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Table 5.2 Centrality Scores 
 Degree Bonpwr Eigen 
National Petroleum Council 14 2537.263 0.372 
Business Roundtable 11 2309.299 0.339 
National Association of Manufacturers 11 2506.914 0.368 
National Coal Council 10 2289.501 0.336 
Edison Electric Institute 9 2178.603 0.32 
American Coalition For Clean Coal Electricity 8 1627.481 0.239 
US Chamber of Commerce 8 1438.056 0.211 
World Resources Institute 8 726.539 0.105 
National Mining Association 7 1298.764 0.19 
Nuclear Energy Institute 7 1907.499 0.28 
The Business Council 7 1201.083 0.176 
American Petroleum Institute 6 1302.385 0.191 
Council on Foreign Relations 6 1079.132 0.158 
Resources for the Future 6 438.698 0.063 
The Brookings Institution 6 817.895 0.119 
American Coal Foundation 4 771.929 0.113 
American Gas Association 4 736.408 0.108 
Bituminous Coal Operators Association 4 505.175 0.074 
Conference Board 4 492.827 0.072 
Independent Petroleum Ass Of America 4 618.216 0.09 
The Nature Conservancy 4 195.171 0.028 
Alliance For Climate Protection 3 167.999 0.024 
American Enterprise Institute 3 532.69 0.078 
Climate Works Foundation 3 108.525 0.015 
Environmental Defense Fund 3 92.95 0.013 
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America 3 465.788 0.068 
Natural Resources Defense Council 3 108.525 0.015 
American Coal Council 2 325.646 0.048 
American Wind Energy Association 2 104.896 0.015 
Committee for Economic Development 2 64.243 0.009 
RAND Corporation 2 17.61 0.002 
Union of Concerned Scientists 2 17.61 0.002 
GreenPeace 1 1.141 0 
Heritage Foundation 1 1.141 0 
Sierra Club 1 1.141 0 
Solar Energy Industries Association 1 1.141 0 
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Figure 5.1. EPPN and Coal Coalition. Black indicates top coal producers and reserve owners (this coding takes precedence 
over others where there is overlap). Dark blue indicates top coal burning utilities. Purple indicates top industrial consumers of 
coal. Light blue indicates top coal hauling railroads. Gold indicates top coal financing banks.  
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Figure 5.2. EPPN. Green indicates support for climate science and significant action. Yellow indicates acceptance of science 
but not action. Red represents the rejection of science and action. Blue indicates no position or missing data.  
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Figure 5.3. EPPN, Top Energy Firms, and USCAP. Black indicates top coal firms. Grey indicates oil and gas firms. Dark blue 
indicates top coal burning utilities. Light blue indicates top utilities that are not also top coal consumers. Magenta indicates 
USCAP organizations.   
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Figure 5.4. EPPN, Top Energy Firms, and USCAP (No Labels).  Black indicates top coal firms. Grey indicates oil and gas firms. 
Dark blue indicates top coal burning utilities. Light blue indicates top utilities that are not also top coal consumers. Magenta 
indicates USCAP organizations
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Of the fossil fuel related industries that would be potentially negatively impacted 
by the regulation only the Edison Electric Institute had a favorable position on climate 
action. The Business Roundtable, though accepting the science, did not support 
legislative action and no environmental legislation has passed over its opposition since 
1975 (Domhoff 2014).  The aloof center and hardcore opposition of the majority of 
industry groups in the EPPN is in stark contrast to Skocpol’s (2013) comparison case of 
healthcare reform. The Business Roundtable commissioned a strongly supportive study 
for the legislation in that case (Hewitt Associates 2009). American Health Insurance 
Plans, the main insurance industry association, publicly supported the legislation as did 
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America and the American Hospital 
Association (Ungar 2012; Vaida 2011). The Affordable Care Act is a textbook case of 
political capitalism in action. A modified version of a healthcare policy crafted by the 
ultraconservative end of the policy planning network was embraced by the impacted 
industries and the moderate conservative center of the policy network.  However, the 
polity approach evidently finds these (polar opposite) positions of the most central 
business policy group and affected industry as unimportant for a case study comparison 
(Skocpol 2013). Indeed, the Business Roundtable vies are unworthy even of mention. 
Skocpol’s focus on mobilization of the masses and public opinion for influencing 
legislators on climate legislation is typical of the tendency of pluralist approaches to miss 
the way in which the terms of the debate had already been determined outside of congress 
(Domhoff 2014). Traditional pluralist assumptions of a flat and open policy formation 
process are undermined by the marginal position within the EPPN of the wind trade 
association (with only an indirect link to the central policy groups via an environmental 
group) and isolation of the solar trade group. The strong correlation between centrality 
within the EPPN and hostility to climate action betrays the notion that there is the kind of 
consensus within the corporate community implied by Skocpol or Whitman.  
Only two centrally connected organizations were climate action supporters. 
Because nuclear is a relatively low carbon energy source, the NEI had clear economic 
interests in proposed climate legislation and, like EEI’s embrace of action, NEI’s support 
came alongside highly favorable legislation providing (additional) massive government 
subsidies and loan guarantees in a context of the need for rationalization after a long 
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period of stagnation in their sector (Gonzalez 2013). EEI is the most anomalous case in 
terms of its interlock ties and climate position given its significant links to coal dependent 
utilities, although, this is qualified by its dense ties with the NEI as well. One key actor, 
Jim Rogers, tied major coal and nuclear utility Duke Energy to both EEI, who was 
helping to craft climate legislation, and ACCCE who was out to destroy it. Rogers was a 
key player protecting coal in the climate legislation negotiations inside USCAP, and he 
had a leadership role in EEI’s embrace of climate action. He was considered a visionary 
by groups like Environmental Defense, a conman by groups like Greenpeace, and a 
traitor by the coal industry (Pooley 2010). Regardless of his sincerity in the process (he 
eventually withdrew Duke from ACCCE, but remained in the Chamber of Commerce), 
Rogers is a prime case study of the role of director interlocks can play in shaping policy 
within the network. In return for EEI’s support the legislation proposed support for coal 
lavish enough to allow coal-supporter and Virginia Congressman Rick Boucher to point 
to EPA’s analysis that it would increase coal usage and usher in a “golden age” of coal 
use (Pooley 2010; Ward 2009). BP’s CEO Tony Hayward, shortly before his company 
joined others abandoning USCAP, complained to Rogers regarding the climate 
legislation “ you guys got everything you wanted and we got nothing,” to which Rogers’ 
attributed Duke’s “head start” in the policy formation process (Pooley 2010:437).   
In explaining Environmental Defense and NRDC’s continued involvement in the 
hopelessly compromised climate bill, Michael Dorsey, a Sierra Club board member and 
environmental professor at Dartmouth, concludes they were “well-meaning liberals who 
do not pay enough attention to political economy…They got outmaneuvered, they got 
hoodwinked, because they were in over their head” (quoted in Pooley 2010:379). While 
there is certainly some truth in the appraisal, this analysis shows the extent to which 
“well-meaning liberals” in major environmental organizations are integrated into the 
corporate community and its hegemonic capitalist norms and political sensibilities. It 
would be a mistake, in particular, to underestimate Environmental Defense’s commitment 
to the fundamental ideology shared by the moderate-conservative wing of the EPPN.  
Environmental Defense had 11 interlocks with capitalist firms in my sample, the Nature 
Conservancy eight, Resources for the Future four, and NRDC two. Even Sierra Club, 
which gave lukewarm support for the USCAP process at first before opposing the final 
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product, had an interlock connecting them indirectly with the EPPN. Sierra Club’s 
marginal connection to the corporate community mirrors their behavior of hovering “on 
the edge of supporting the USCAP effort” before rejecting it in 2010 (Skocpol 2013:101). 
Greenpeace (while having a prominent environmental sociologist on their board) had no 
corporate interlocks in my sample and were opposed to the route taken by the legislation 
from the beginning.  
Conclusion 
The analysis of the EPPN in this chapter shows significant divisions over the 
prospect even of legislation that would be primarily symbolic action on climate change. 
While the Teaparty was certainly a highly visible source of opposition and pressure on 
Congress, it would be a mistake to assume widespread support among big business 
leadership based on the actions of USCAP as Skocpol does or to write off the fossil fuel 
industry as marginal “dead enders”. If we consider the number of groups likely 
employing a co-optation rather than good-faith collaboration strategy this is even more 
apparent. Skocpol recognizes (and even normatively supports as pluralist functionalism) 
the duplicity of corporations involved in crafting climate policy:  
The corporations that participated in USCAP could double their bottom-line bets 
– [working] to hammer out draft climate legislation that was as favorable as 
possible to their industry or their firms, and at the same time participating in 
business associations likely to lobby against much or all of the terms of that 
insider bargain once it faced Congress or the general public. As they should do 
given their role as heads of profit-maximizing businesses… (Skocpol 2013:48) 
Former Businessweek editor (and future EDF board member) Eric Pooley (Pooley 
2010:385-6) summarizes the sensibilities of the liberal wing of the EPPN regarding need 
for accepting inequities and ineffectiveness in climate legislation: 
Unless powerful people and institutions stood to profit from global warming 
solutions, global warming wasn’t going to be solved…Without lobbyists from 
Goldman and Credit Suisse and USCAP pushing hard for a climate bill…coal and 
oil industries would never be defeated. 
However, as enticing as fees and derivatives markets for carbon may be to major 
financial institutions these must be weighed against the threat posed to them by the 
popping of the “carbon bubble” consisting of assets in the global economy, such as the 
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fossil fuel reserves of major extractive firms, whose valorization is premised on 
continued emissions. Between 2005 and 2011 Goldman and Credit Suisse invested 8.6 
billion and 12.1 billion dollars respectively in the coal industry; making them the 11th and 
9th largest investors in the sector globally. The rents and speculative gains offered by cap 
and trade would need to be formidable indeed if these assets were in fact to be rendered 
mostly valueless, as climate action requires. Beyond the carbon bubble, of course, is the 
strong interest of finance in overall growth rates potentially threatened by carbon limits.  
Overall, this study provides more support to the contention of those like Domhoff, 
who argue that in practice policy-planning groups tend to try and subordinate scientific 
discourse to the capitalist interests, as opposed to Scokpol’s assertion that they represent 
the independent professional assessments of objective science (Gonzalez 2001). Social 
and natural scientists who point to the incompatibility of controlling climate change while 
maintaining the growth rates required for a stable capitalism, much less without harming 
fossil fuel interests, continue to be marginalized within mainstream policy circles and 
sometimes even accused of politically counterproductive “catastrophism” on the left. A 
power structure analysis of the failure of climate legislation in 2009-2010 helps reveal the 
structural obstacles to meaningful regulation even when there is some division among 
capitalist elites. It further shows the limits of that division. The coal industry in 2009 
remained well connected and arguably influential in the EPPN. Further research is 
needed to trace the history of Vietor’s coal coalition through the 1980s and 90s and to 
examine more systematically the role of government advisory groups and appointments 
that are also part of the policy-planning network. On an issue with as far-reaching effects 
on the economy as carbon limit, the special interest approach to the study of policy, such 
as that put forward by Laumann and Knoke (1987), does account for the way which 
class-wide interests are debated and defended in the centers of the network. 
Mark Mizruchi’s most recent book the Fracturing of the American Corporate 
Elite (2013) lays out the case that between the 1930s and 1960s threats from rivals abroad 
and organized labor domestically pressured the leadership of the capitalist class to engage 
in rationalizing projects that stabilized society and legitimated the State. In the 1970s the 
capitalist class unified under a new banner and, led by the Business Roundtable, defeated 
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labor and ushered in a weaker, more subservient neo-liberal state (cf Dreiling and Darves 
2011). This victory, Mizruchi argues, has led to the atrophy of class unity but not class 
power. The result is a ruling class that cannot be defeated within existing political 
structures nor can it rationally deal with collective problems to the stability of the system 
such as climate change or financial risk. While Mizruchi ends his book with a plea for 
leadership from some sector of the corporate community this prospect appears no more 
likely than revolutionary social change to alter the politics of the US.  
The simultaneous cooptation and marginalization within the EPPN of business 
and policy groups sympathetic to the dangers of climate change lends credence to the 
argument that it is with social movements aimed at the radical transformation of the 
social metabolism of capitalist society that the best hope for the future lies (Angus 2009; 
M. Engler and P. Engler 2013; Foster 2009; Salleh 2009). Even in the highly unlikely 
event of successful carbon capture and sequestration technological developments, coal 
power would still be based on unequal exchange with the sacrifice zones because of the 
trend towards surface mining to cut fuel costs. A just energy policy can only be pursued 
with the goal of human development and a measure of the qualitative and many-sided 
values in nature that capitalist cost-benefit accounting cannot hope to reckon. While such 
a reckoning would dispense with concern for accumulation and vested interests such as 
the fossil fuel industry, it would be much more concerned with the fate of those 
communities whose labor and health have been sacrificed under the current fossil fuel 
regime.   
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CHAPTER VI 
STANDING ON A MOUNTAINTOP: MTR AS A NEXUS OF METABOLIC 
RIFTS 
Introduction 
Coal River Mountain (CRM) is located in Raleigh County, West Virginia. It is 
one of the last standing peaks in the Coal River Valley. The other missing peaks are 
among the over 500 mountains in the Appalachian region blasted apart and dumped into 
the nearby valleys through the process of mountaintop removal coal mining (MTR). 
CRM has been at the center of a conflict over two ways to produce electrical power from 
the mountain. One is to use MTR techniques to blast away the ridgeline and mine the 
coal seams beneath for burning in power plants. The other is for construction of a “farm” 
of wind turbines across the ridge. An economic study commissioned by a local 
community group and environmentalists found that the local benefits of the wind farm 
exceeded the surface mines’ at every stage when including measures for so-called 
“externalities” of negative health and environmental effects on the surrounding 
community (Collins, E. Hansen, and Hendryx 2012; E. Hansen et al. 2008). The 
advantage of the wind farm for sustainable human development in the long term seems 
clear. The MTR mines would complete their energy and economic contributions after less 
than 20 years while the wind farm could operate indefinitely. The ecological costs of the 
MTR mines, including the loss of the mountain’s wind power potential, would continue 
long after mining ends. The Federal and the West Virginia State governments have 
declined to intervene and mining preparation has begun on part of the ridge.  
 The apparent irrationality of the MTR mines appears even greater when 
considering coal’s central place in larger ecological crises, particularly climate change. 
NASA climatologist James Hansen (2009b) wrote: 
[CRM] is the site of an absurdity… The issue… is whether the top of the 
mountain will be blown up, so that coal can be dredged out of it, or whether the 
mountain will be allowed to stand. It has been shown that more energy can be 
obtained from a proposed wind farm, if [CRM] continues to stand. More jobs... 
More tax revenue …would continue indefinitely. Clean water and the 
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environment would be preserved. But if planned mountaintop removal proceeds, 
the mountain loses its potential… Someone needs to tell President Obama: 
[CRM] is a symbol of the promise and the hope and the possibilities for a brighter 
future. 
This situation presents a conundrum for ecological modernization theories that focus on 
technological innovation and fuller accounting of ecological costs (or “natural capital”) 
by placing front and center contradictory class interests. I examine the logic behind the 
“absurdity” on CRM using critical political economy’s insights into capitalist rationality, 
the larger region’s history of underdevelopment, and the economic and political power 
leveraged by the coal industry.  
The forces thwarting what Hansen calls the “the hope and the possibilities for a 
brighter future,” can be found deeply embedded in the structure and history of capitalist 
development. Marx’s Weltanschauung included not only a class-economic critique of 
capitalist political economy but also a critique of capitalist robbery of the environment, 
i.e., the theory of metabolic rift. For Marx (developing on Liebig) industrial capitalism 
removed food and fiber from the soil and transported it hundreds and sometimes 
thousands of miles to the city, preventing its recirculation to the soil, and resulting in 
urban pollution. This notion of a metabolic rift—or as Marx (1990) put it—an 
“irreparable rift in the social metabolism,” has been seen by sociologists as the key to 
Marx’s conception of ecological sustainability. Moreover, there is a direct connection 
here to class analysis—since the metabolic relation to nature is for Marx the labor and 
production process itself, which is alienated under capitalist society (Foster 1999a; 2000). 
Weber raised similar concerns in his analysis of the system of Raubbau associated with 
industrial capitalism--a concept derived from Liebig and Marx (Foster and Holleman 
2012). 
Austin and Clark (2012) have demonstrated the utility of Marx’s concept of 
metabolic rift in relation to MTR in Appalachia. This work responds to their call, echoed 
from McMichael (2010), to tackle the epistemic consequences of capitalism’s metabolic 
rifts by employing multiple vantage points of analysis to problematize the different 
spatial and temporal boundaries involved.  
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Method 
How should social scientists go about abstracting the process of MTR for analysis 
in such a way as to both present a broader critique of the system that produces it and 
inform political action?  
Marx’s method employs an ontology of “internal relations” that takes relations, 
and the processes they imply as the units of analysis (Ollman 2003; Paolucci 2007). 
Levins and Lewontin argue “What makes materialist science is that the process of 
abstraction is explicit and recognized as historically contingent within the science” 
(1985:149).56 When engaging in relational analysis, a vantage point or perspective must 
be established. From there, the horizontal extension (or spatial scale) of the relation 
under analysis, as well as the temporal extension within which to trace its moments, is 
crafted (Lewontin and Levins 2007; Paolucci 2007). This brings certain dynamics into 
relief while abstracting out others that are, for the moment, treated as “constants.” This 
multi-level conception of systems and causality emphasizes that the constraints of 
“broader” levels—of human societies in general for instance—shape but do not 
determine in mechanistic fashion the operation of systems at narrower levels of generality, 
e.g. that of class societies or capitalism. The potential also arises for chance occurrences 
at one level of causation forming path dependencies, i.e. structural constraints, at other 
levels. Therefore, an iterative process moving across levels of generality and between 
vantage points is required to elaborate the relation between the “whole” and its “parts.” 
Such a dialectical approach has shown itself invaluable both in understanding natural 
history and human history (Gould 1977; Haila and Levins 1992; York and Clark 2011; 
York and Mancus 2009). Marx’s method offers an encompassing perspective with which 
to integrate ecology and sociology while respecting the different forms in which social 
and material-ecological relations shape history (Foster and Clark 2008). Such 
conceptualization is vital for understanding the effects of contemporary environmental 
                                                        
56
 Ollman’s emphasis on the dialectic of internal relations and Lewontin’s on complex, interactive 
processes and contingencies constitute elements of a dialectical approach to understanding that goes against 
the more deterministic interpretations of structural Marxism (e.g. Althusser). On this see Ollman (Lewontin 
and Levins 2007; 2003 49-50; Thompson 1978). 
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problems, such as habitat destruction, on longer, broader issues like biodiversity and 
ecosystem resilience in the face of rapid climatic change.  
Because capitalist development is inherently uneven in space and time, how we 
abstract these processes critically affects our understanding of their meaning for human 
societies and the natural world (Bunker 2007; Harvey 2006; Hornborg et al. 2007). CRM 
today is at the base of an energy commodity chain central to the US economy but also 
global in scope. West Virginia exports 79% of the coal it produces beyond its borders 
(Energy Information Agency 2010). The social choices made regarding CRM can be 
situated generally within the political economy of modern capitalism, but the particulars 
are determined by the history of the region as an extractive periphery (Bunker 2007; 
Dunaway 1996a; Walls 1978).  
The threats to the local landscape and ecosystems in the lifetime of current 
residents and their children are simultaneously part of metabolic rifts that threaten the 
stability of the biosphere as a whole across a span of geologic time. I maintain that to 
understand the problem of MTR on CRM at least three vantage points must be employed 
in rotation: the perspective of ecology, of capital accumulation (political economy), and 
of human development (human “social” ecology); each at multiple levels of abstraction 
(e.g. of the community, the state/region, the nation, and the globe). A full analysis is 
beyond what can be attempted in this space. Instead, I will provide an overview, and then 
proceed with some examples in more detail.  
The Social Metabolism of MTR and its Metabolic Rifts 
The ecological disasters emanating from MTR are the result of the “social 
metabolism” of capitalism (Austin and Clark 2012; Meszáros 1995). The rational 
regulation of society’s metabolic relationship to nature (the flow and exchange of 
materials and energy) is inhibited wherever it threatens the reproductive needs of 
capital’s particular social metabolism (the flow and accumulation of surplus value). 
Capital typically responds to rifts in its social metabolism by shifting them elsewhere 
where they only reassert themselves at a vaster scale (Foster et al. 2010; Harvey 1981). 
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It is often claimed that simple substitution of green energy technologies will be 
sufficient to avert ecological disaster (Friedman 2008; Mol, Sonnenfeld, and Spaargaren 
2009). Yet, on CRM such alternative technological possibilities are being destroyed 
along with the mountain itself, contrary to the expectations of ecological modernization 
theorists. However, that such an agenda is being pursued cannot be attributed to mere 
ignorance, or short-sightedness on the part of the capitalists. Indeed, it is a reflection of 
the formal rationality (substantive irrationality) depicted by Weber (Foster and Holleman 
2012). The failure to substitute a wind farm for MTR mines at CRM is a product of 
capitalist modernity in extractive peripheries: high levels of absentee ownership, 
governmental capture by extractive capital, and the narrow time horizon of modern 
economic decision making (Austin and Clark 2012). CRM is a specific concrete case that 
reflects many essential relations of the crisis of our social and ecological systems in 
general. 
What is irrational from a perspective of human development is rational from the 
profit-maximizing standpoint of capital. Capital’s short-sightedness and indifference to 
quality of life was remarked upon by Marx from its earliest days:  
In every stock-jobbing swindle every one knows that some time or other the crash 
must come, but every one hopes that it may fall on the head of his neighbour, after 
he himself has caught the shower of gold ... Après moi le déluge [After me, the 
flood!] is the watchword of every capitalist and of every capitalist nation. Capital 
therefore takes no account of the health and length of life of the worker, unless 
society forces it to do so. (Marx 1990:381)  
Marx’s argument equally applies to ecological conditions as they relate to reproduction of 
the labor force and its quality of life. As Marx was aware, the phrase “Après nous le 
déluge” was used by German botanist Matthias Schlieden to describe the threat of 
regional climate change brought on by capitalist society (Foster 2011a). Principal to 
Marx’s analysis is the conclusion that capitalist production is a process of exploitation of 
both the soil (earth) and the worker (Foster 2000). We should, therefore, not be surprised 
by reckless disregard for both the health of the worker and the health of the land, which 
are viewed as either “free gifts” or disposable commodities—factors of production to be 
exploited to their fullest.  
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From these general contradictions presented by the system, I proceed to the more 
specific historical contradictions of CRM—an analysis rooted in the metabolism of the 
region. The vantage point of capital brings into focus only those narrower aspects of the 
problem that impinge upon the accumulation process. As an internal periphery, 
Appalachia’s people and resources have always been viewed by capital as expendable, 
and capital has never hesitated to liquidate them should it perceive doing so to be in its 
interests and power (Dunaway 1996a; Walls 1978). In contrast, the vantage point of 
ecology provides the basis for a broader materialist critique. After examining the 
ecological relations and capital’s system of metabolic regulation, the challenges facing 
real human development for the people of Coal River can be soberly considered.  
The Vantage of Point Ecology: 
MTR coal mining in Central Appalachia is an instructive vantage point from 
which to elaborate the relationship of global crises to the localized operation of our 
political economic system. Austin and Clark posit, “The ecological degradation linked to 
[MTR] is simply a microcosm of the unsustainable dynamics of an economic system, 
driven by the ceaseless accumulation of capital that is creating an ecological rift in the 
planetary boundaries” (Austin and Clark 2012:16). MTR is connected at multiple points 
to at least six of the “planetary boundaries” of the biosphere identified by Rockström et al. 
(2009), whereby natural systems are approaching or experiencing catastrophic failure: 
climate change, ocean acidification, biodiversity loss, freshwater depletion, the nitrogen 
cycle, and massive changes in land use.  
The life cycle of coal is full of quantitative (e.g., the amount of carbon in the 
atmosphere and oceans) and qualitative (e.g., toxic processing chemicals, species loss) 
problems suited to dialectical, metabolic analysis. Clark & York (2005) have analyzed 
climate-change as the result of a metabolic rift in the earth’s carbon cycle. The following 
analysis reiterates that the climate crisis is part of a larger and still differentiating 
metabolic rift between capitalist society and natural systems that threatens their resilience. 
For a detailed description of Marx’s theory of metabolic rift and its application to MTR 
see Austin and Clark (2012).  
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Air. The proposed MTR mines on CRM would eliminate the potential for future 
wind development in the area. The steep contours and elevation of the mountains are 
partially responsible for the potential to generate power at a viable rate (E. Hansen et al. 
2008). It is also doubtful the new ridgeline constructed from the “reclaimed” rubble 
leftover from mining would be stable enough to anchor wind turbines.  
Weekly, a Hiroshima bomb’s equivalent of explosives is used in Appalachian 
MTR operations. This blasting, compounded by coal processing and transportation, 
spreads fine-grained particles of pulverized minerals and chemical residue. These are 
linked to respiratory problems in humans and presumably could be affecting wildlife as 
well (Aneja, Isherwood, and Morgan 2012; Epstein et al. 2011).  
The mining itself is a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions that 
contribute to climate change and ocean acidification. The mining process, including the 
disruption of the soil and forest as well as fuel for extraction and transport, adds an 
estimated additional 7 to 17% to the CO2 emissions of the coal’s actual consumption (J. 
F. Fox and Campbell 2010). Projections indicate that if mining trends continue the 
Southern Appalachian forests will switch from a net carbon sink to a carbon source 
between 2025 and 2033 (Elliott Campbell, J. F. Fox, and Acton 2012). Methane, a 
greenhouse gas with a shorter life span but 25 times higher potency than CO2, is also 
released during the mining process. 
Finally, the combustion of coal itself creates, in addition to more CO2, nitrogen 
oxides (NOx) that contribute to corrosive ground level ozone. Ozone and particulates 
from coal plants are major contributors to respiratory disease (Epstein et al. 2011).    
Water. Changing the shape and surface of the mountains can alter rainfall patterns 
and the clearing of forest and filling of streams with debris is associated with increased 
flooding that can damage farms, homes, and businesses (Palmer et al. 2010). Given the 
disruptions of the hydraulic metabolism wrought by the coal industry in the Coal River 
Valley, the watchword of capital there has quite literally become “Après moi le déluge!” 
Beyond the quantitative flows of water, the quality of water bodies is negatively affected 
by changes in temperature, dissolved oxygen, sediment load, chemical composition, and 
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pH. Over one-tenth of the surface areas of numerous watersheds in WV have been 
disturbed by MTR (Palmer et al. 2010). Blasting can change water tables, damaging or 
drying up wells (Environmental Protection Agency 2004; Palmer et al. 2010).  
Chemicals that were previously stabilized in geologic formations are exposed to 
air and water, becoming toxic pollution that affects aquatic life and human residents’ 
drinking water (Environmental Protection Agency 2004; Palmer et al. 2010). The 
processing of coal after mining to remove certain chemicals and impurities to enhance its 
price has produced hundreds of billions of gallons of toxic coal slurry across the region 
that is stored in earthen dams or injected underground. The former pose the risk of failure 
and flooding in addition to water contamination, while the later has been associated with 
residents well water contamination and health impacts (Burns 2007; Epstein et al. 2011). 
West Virginia alone has 126 slurry impoundments with over 110 billion gallons of coal 
processing waste (Epstein et al. 2011). This pre-sale processing of coal is one example of 
modern “clean coal technology” whereby harmful environmental effects of the coal life 
cycle are diverted from the burning stage to extractive communities.  
The effluent from mine sites is usually channelized into retention ponds requiring 
perpetual treatment to limit the outflow of the toxic heavy metals and acid drainage. The 
pollution containment efforts are widely ineffective and contaminants from surface 
mining in the Appalachian headwaters have been detected throughout the waters they 
feed, thus exacerbating the larger freshwater supply problem. The spread of water 
contamination will continue from many of these sites and raises question of who will pay 
for continued monitoring and treatment. Significant water degradation has been detected 
downstream two decades after MTR sites have been “reclaimed” (Lindberg et al. 2011). 
A wider temporal extension of the problem brings into focus climate change induced 
weather patterns as the range of precipitation levels exceeds that under which mine site 
reclamation has been engineered for “acceptable” risk levels. A trend toward greater high 
precipitation events has already been detected and many communities in the area have 
experienced flooding off of mountains with MTR and clear-cut operations (Burns 2007; 
Epstein et al. 2011; Palmer et al. 2010). 
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Further down the coal consumption process, coal plants produce large amounts of 
toxic coal ash that threaten water (Ruhl et al. 2010). One impoundment at the Kingston 
Fossil Plant in Tennessee ruptured in late 2008 flooding homes and the Emory River with 
5.4 million cubic yards of coal ash slurry rich in toxic metals concentrated by the burning 
process (Dewan 2008). Coal ash impoundments (an additional “clean coal technology”) 
are another case of the shifting around of the problem of pollution without solving the 
underlying rift.  
Coal combustion is a significant contributor to the nitrogen rift (Mancus 2007), 
accounting for 20 % the total NOx emitted, of which some is later deposited into 
watersheds by precipitation (Environmental Protection Agency 2003; Rockström et al. 
2009). Such air deposition accounts for greater than half, on average, of riverine nitrogen 
that contributes to eutrophication crises in coastal areas (Epstein et al. 2011). 
Land Use, Habitat, and Biodiversity. Capitalism’s metabolic rifts affect energy 
and nutrient cycles linking many species across multiple ecosystems in complex ways 
that make analysis challenging. While the three MTR mines permitted on CRM will 
disturb around 6,450 acres (10 square miles) and bury 9 miles of streams, their effects 
will reach further, undermining the already damaged resiliency of the species endemic to 
the mixed mesophytic forests of the region. As species population sizes and habitat 
ranges shrink their risk of extinction over time increases.  
During mining, the area being blasted and or buried under rubble is, of course, no 
longer suitable for its previous inhabitants. According to the USGS, mining in the Central 
Appalachian region has been associated with 65% of all changes in land cover between 
1973 and 2000, with 4.4% of the region’s surface area transformed from forest to mining. 
During that period, the surface area consumed by mining at any given time accelerated 
two-fold (Sayler 2008). In that latter decade, research indicates approximately 1,200 
miles of streams were damaged, over 700 miles buried completely, and at least another 
535 miles were permitted to be damaged with 66 percent of those to be buried 
(Environmental Protection Agency 2004; Ward 2008). However, a recent study indicates 
there are 1,700 miles of impacted waters in southern West Virginia alone, suggesting the 
1,200 mile regional figure is a serious underestimation (Bernhardt et al. 2012).  
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Current Federal policy regarding species conservation in the mining region is that 
by implementing surface mining permitting laws regulatory agencies automatically meet 
their obligations under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), without the necessity of 
actually surveying for any endangered species in mining areas. This makes data on 
species relatively scarce, but from what is known of Appalachian forest and stream 
ecology there are likely a significant number of endemic species as yet unidentified 
(Epstein et al. 2011). In 2010 the Center for Biological Diversity filed a petition for 
federal listing as threatened or endangered under the ESA 30 aquatic, riparian, or wetland 
species that “are specifically threatened by [MTR]” (Center for Biological Diversity 
2010:19). Selenium levels are decimating fish populations downstream from MTR mines 
(Lindberg et al. 2011; Palmer et al. 2010). The mountains of Central Appalachia are not 
only the source of waters for the larger region; they are also habitat for species that 
traverse the continent. For example, the migration of bird species that make their home in 
the Appalachians in the spring to reproduce is disrupted by MTR. Detrivore insects 
consume leaf litter washed into headwater streams, cycling nutrients both into useable 
forms for aquatic organisms downstream and, later, during their adult stage, back into 
terrestrial forest ecosystems (e.g., as a food source for migratory birds) (McQuaid 2009). 
When headwater streams are mined through or buried this cycle is disrupted.  
Biodiversity is thus negatively impacted by both outright habitat destruction and 
long-term degradation that extends beyond the immediate mine site via the disruption of 
wider food webs (Palmer et al. 2010). The loss of biodiversity weakens the resilience of 
the ecosystem over the medium to long term and makes it more vulnerable to catastrophic 
reorganization, for example, under pressure from climate change (Gunderson and Holling 
2002). The ecological rifts at the long-term global scale could easily reinforce and 
exacerbate the local effects of MTR on CRM—again illustrating the importance of 
iterative multiple levels of analysis.  
Events unfolding on CRM reveal that, paralleling the global ecological crisis, 
there is a tendency by the government toward reductionist or simplistic framing of the 
problem and biological issues involved. Palmer et al. summarize the failure of ecological 
modernization in MTR: “Current mitigation strategies are meant to compensate for lost 
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stream habitat and functions but do not… Mining permits are being issued despite the 
preponderance of scientific evidence that impacts are pervasive and irreversible and that 
mitigation cannot compensate for losses” (Palmer et al. 2010:149).  
The broader metabolic relationships within the region and globe are threatened by 
capitalist development. Capitalism is, above all, a system of accumulation of capital. 
Hence, the economic mode of production of capitalism in general finds its specific forms 
in various phases of accumulation.  
The Vantage Point of Capital 
The exchange of commodities is the process in which the social metabolism, in 
other words the exchange of particular products of private individuals, 
simultaneously gives rise to definite social relations of production, into which 
individuals enter in the course of this metabolism. (Marx 1970:51-52) 
Exchange value is the lifeblood of capital’s social metabolism. But unlike 
economies of simple commodity production [C-M-C], simple circulation is insufficient 
for capital’s metabolism—its circulatory system requires a constantly increasing supply 
of its lifeblood. Productivity and efficiency are defined in terms of the creation and 
appropriation of surplus value.  
Most of the metabolic rift created by MTR is invisible from the vantage point of 
capital because it is external to its considerations and interests except where imposed by 
material necessity or struggle. 
[A] basic contradiction of the capitalist system of control is that it cannot separate 
‘advance’ from destruction, nor ‘progress’ from waste—however catastrophic the 
results. The more it unlocks the powers of productivity, the more it must unleash 
the powers of destruction; and the more it extends the volume of production, the 
more it must bury everything under mountains of suffocating waste. (Meszáros 
2010:91) 
The suffocation of valley stream systems underneath the remains of mountains does not 
register within the vantage point of capital, but it unleashes greater production of coal and 
profits (Austin and Clark 2012; Burns 2007; J. Fox 1999). Researchers have tried to 
calculate the ecological and human costs accruing outside markets in price terms as 
“externalities.” “Externalities” in general, and the case of MTR and CRM in particular, 
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reflect the conflict between the human metabolism with nature for use-values that must 
characterize production in general with the historically specific, and self-undermining, 
domination of production for exchange-value in the capitalist mode of production (Foster 
et al. 2010; Paolucci 2007). The dialectical identity-difference relation between use-value 
and exchange-value is crucial for avoiding reified conceptions of production by 
abstracting into focus class antagonisms (Burkett 1999a; 2006). Mainstream economic 
theory and policy derived from it universalize the interests and form of valuation 
important to capital. McMichael warns against analysis that does not both recognize and 
transcend such a vantage point: “[T]he metabolic rift is not only assuming greater 
significance in how we analyse the historical moment, but also both its material and 
epistemic consequences need to be overcome. Restoring the social/natural metabolism to 
promote ecological sustainability will only materialise when we transcend the value 
calculus through which capital rules the world” (2010:622). 
The bold attempt by Hansen et al. (see also Collins et al. 2012; 2008) at a cost-
benefit analysis of coal versus wind on CRM to sway policy makers presents an 
opportunity to examine how thoroughly ecological and human considerations do not 
factor into the logic of capital but rather are actively “externalized”. On the benefit side 
of the ledger, Hansen et al. include increased jobs, earnings, and economic output. On the 
cost side, they quantified externalities arising from wind or MTR development in terms 
of “excess deaths and illness, and environmental damage” (E. Hansen et al. 2008). 
Because the mining operation would last only seventeen years, cumulative benefits 
diverge more sharply over time. They find that under conservative estimates about the 
extent of local manufacture for wind operations, cumulative earnings from wind will 
surpass surface mining after approximately 100 years. Cumulative county jobs from wind 
take about 80 years to rise above and neither wind’s cumulative energy output or 
contribution to economic growth approach that of the surface mines scenario in the study 
period. The strength of the study’s argument for wind, absent future investment in local 
wind manufacturing, rests largely on the inclusion of externalities whereby the MTR 
scenario generates large negative earnings for the county over its life of operation. Also, 
the time horizon for all capitalists is constrained, earnings are valued less the further into 
the future they are. After applying a standard “discount rate”, the landowners receive a 
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net present value of $63 million in revenue from MTR and only $19 million from wind 
(E. Hansen et al. 2008:42). 
The study was never meant to convince landowners, however, who had already 
sold the coal rights. Cost-benefit analysis, by its premises, obscures the unequal class 
(and often gendered and racial) division of who bears costs and who reaps benefits as 
well as the incommensurability of money, nature, and human life. Yet, it is the 
hegemonic form of discourse for the current government in questions of private property 
use and the public interest. Movement actors, therefore, face the difficult choice of 
employing, and perhaps unintentionally lending legitimacy to that form of political 
economic discourse that reflects capital’s vantage point, in order to object to destructive 
development. Foster et al. remark that: 
Although such attempts are important in bringing out the irrationality of the 
system, they run into the harsh reality that the current system of … 
account[ing] does accurately reflect capitalist realities of the non-
valuation/undervaluation of natural agents (including human labor power itself). To alter 
this, it is necessary to transcend the system (Foster et al. 2010:71). 
The unevenness of capital’s social metabolism, its unequal flows of use-values 
and exchange-value, has been keenly felt in Appalachia. Communities suffer from the 
degradation of their own ecosystems while gaining little of the use-values and exchange-
value resulting from coal production and consumption. Regional economic 
“development,” from the vantage point of capital, is concerned with capital accumulation 
and circulation in the form of wages and investments. For the absentee capital which 
dominates in mining, the concern is future profitability in general and with respect to 
their asset holdings specifically. The “sunk” nature of extractive investment makes 
political defense of these assets a higher priority than in other types of industry where 
companies can liquidate assets more easily (Barham and Coomes 2005). The dominance 
of the coal industry is a case typical of extractive peripheries where the dominant industry 
retards the growth of others and contributes to underdevelopment (Bunker 1984). While 
opportunities for continued accumulation for the owners of surface mined lands may be 
conceived in theory, only six percent of mine sites across the region, four percent in WV 
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have seen post mining business (Geredien 2009). Several projects such as a prison and 
big box stores that have been undertaken have seen their construction costs vastly 
increased due to the instability of the reclaimed land. Therefore many MTR sites fail the 
permitting requirement of leaving the terrain flattened for “higher and better use,” even 
by capitalist standards.   
As Bunker (1985; 2007) has argued, capitalist extractive activity is inherently 
self-undermining as resources are depleted. For capital all sources of value are 
equivalent—so such depletion is little issue, it can simply move on. For extractive 
communities with ties to place and particular forms of real wealth found in their 
environment this points to an inevitable decline—a source of suffering, resistance, and 
efforts for transformation (Montrie 2003; Pfleger et al. 2012; Puckett et al. 2012).  
Without transcending the system, victories by social movements are still possible 
but the underlying ecological contradictions central to capitalism are not resolved away 
but simply shifted and displaced (Foster et al. 2010:73-87). These shifts occur both 
within and between capital’s labor and ecological contradictions. Fox (1999) notes how 
regulatory attempts to reduce acid rain pollution from coal power plants (a market-based 
procedure celebrated by ecological modernization theorists) contributed to increased 
surface mining and ecological destruction in West Virginia, rendering it an 
“environmental sacrifice zone.” Through decades of bitter struggle, coal miners’ won 
improved wages and safety, putting upward pressure on labor costs. Mining capital’s 
response, as in most industries (Schnaiberg 1980), has been to harness more powerful 
technologies to increase productivity. More powerful cutting and loading equipment used 
underground increased dust and health problems for miners even as they reduced the 
labor force and increased the power of management over the labor process (Couto 1993; 
Podobnik 2008). New struggles had to be fought for Black Lung benefits (Judkins 1993). 
The most incredible of these new productive strategies are surface mining in general and 
MTR in particular.  
Political investments in the form of political donations and propaganda are 
factored against returns in the form of subsidies, taxes, and regulation. The institutions of 
the state and local governments may have longer-term interests in conflict with capital, 
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but the time horizon of most elected officials is still quite short and the power structure is 
dominated by coal and other absentee capital (Bell and York 2010; J. Fox 1999; Veblen 
1964). The power of the industry in West Virginia is well documented (Bell and York 
2010; Burns 2007; J. Fox 1999; Shnayerson 2008). There is evidence to suggest that the 
coal industry is actually a net drain on the state budgets of Central Appalachian states, 
highlighting the relationship of the state and monopoly capital (undefined author and J. 
Bailey 2009; Boettner and McIlmoil 2010; McIlmoil and Boettner 2010; McIlmoil et al. 
2010). Surface mining allows profitable extraction of thinner seams uneconomical for 
deep mining but also importantly allows for the fuller, more profitable, extraction of 
thicker seams that could be deep mined. Industry representatives claim: “the facts are that 
the disturbance is limited, and the type of mining is controlled by the geology” (McQuaid 
2009:5). The profitability of mining hinges on the price of coal versus costs of regulatory 
compliance, labor costs, the tax/subsidy balance, alternative uses of the land for timber, 
development, tourism, securitization and speculation etc. These social factors interact 
with geology to determine not only how coal is mined but also whether it is mined at all. 
As the depletion of higher quality coal reserves continues, the importance of regulatory 
neglect and state subsidy to maintain profits grows.  
Returning to the case of CRM shows the Après moi le déluge reign unfolding. 
Rowland Land Company, the major absentee owner of CRM, began speculating on coal 
and timber lands in the late 19th century and remains one of the county’s largest 
propertied interests. The coal company awarded the permits to mine CRM, Massey 
Energy, became the largest coal company in West Virginia under the fiercely anti-union 
leadership of Don Blankenship. At Massy there was reportedly a saying “A man is like a 
tool. If it’s bent or broke, get rid of it, and get you a new one” (Shnayerson 2008:29). A 
federal investigation into an explosion at one of Massey’s mines that killed 29 workers 
confirmed this sentiment finding the “root cause” was “a pervasive culture that valued 
production over safety” (Mine Safety and Health Administration 2010:157). The 
company also became the most aggressive in applying MTR in the region. 
Once, every mine in the Coal River Valley was a union operation. Now, thanks to 
Blankenship, hardly a union mine remains… with more mountaintop mines than 
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any other…Nearly all the sites in the Coal River Valley and its environs are 
Massey mines. (Shnayerson 2006) 
Surface mining employs fewer workers and uses skills with earthmoving equipment that 
often are less specialized and regulated than those of underground miners making 
“replacement workers” easier to come by (Bell 2009; Burns 2007). The decrease in coal-
related employment has spawned public relations campaigns to bind the cultural 
identities of residents to coal (Bell and York 2010). Massey Energy accumulated 60,000 
days of violations of the Clean Water Act over a period of six years without any action 
from State regulators. When Federal authorities finally intervened in 2008, Massey paid 
less than one percent of an estimated $2.4 billion in penalties. In the year after the 
settlement, the company’s number of violations appears to have increased (Ward 2010). 
Struggles of environmentalists and community groups versus the coal industry 
have sometimes played out in the form of battles over whether primary regulatory 
jurisdiction over mining should reside at the State versus Federal level (Montrie 2003; 
Shover et al. 1986). However, explaining regulatory inaction at the federal level requires 
tracing the coal industry’s power relations throughout the broader national context of 
directorate interlocks, federal advisory boards, and energy policy formation network 
(Crawford 2012; Domhoff 2010; Goodell 2007; Vietor 1980), a task only the first stages 
of which are completed in the previous chapter.   
The Vantage Point of Sustainable Human Development 
“Human development” has been fostered by social scientists as a concept 
distinguished from mere economic growth by focusing on quality of life relations such as 
freedom from poverty, and high levels of health, education, measures of “social capital,” 
etc., (Bagchi 2005). In this sense, it is more closely related to the vantage point of 
ecology, taking into account externalized social costs (Kapp 1978), than the vantage point 
of capital. Social problems like poverty or lack of education are only problems for capital 
to the extent they limit effective demand, threaten reproduction of the labor force, or raise 
the cost of labor power by a shortage of workers with the minimum skills required. 
Burkett (Burkett 2005) has argued that Marx had his own concept of sustainable human 
development that shares common features with modern conceptions. It saw the labor 
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process itself, defined by Marx (Marx 1990:283-290) as the metabolic relation between 
human beings and nature, as structured to encourage the growth of human health, abilities, 
and self-expression—in accord with the rational regulation of the human-nature 
metabolism. Lebowitz (2010) proposes that the question of productivity for a socialist 
society must be concerned with the production of human beings—all commodities, 
productive processes, etc. must be optimized to that end. This is consistent with a 
fundamentally ecological point of view. 
As Paul Baran presciently noted in his work on economic growth and 
underdevelopment, the “optimum” output of a rational and humane society is a matter of 
meeting finite human needs through appropriate ends—it is a qualitative and well as 
quantitative view of production:  
The meaning and contents of the “optimum” involved are essentially different 
from those attached to this notion in bourgeois economics. They do not reflect a 
configuration of production and consumption determined by profit considerations 
of individual firms, by the income distribution, tastes, and social pressures of a 
capitalist order; they represent a considered judgment of a socialist community 
guided by reason and science. …a scientific policy of conservation of human and 
natural resources, and the like.  
Nor does this “optimum” presuppose the maximization of output ... It may well be 
associated with… a voluntarily shortened labor day, of an increase in the amount 
of time devoted to education, or of conscious discarding of certain noxious types 
of production (coal mining for example). (Baran 1962:42-43) 
Such “noxious types of production” have effects on the land that cannot be separated 
from their effects on the people. Studies are linking coal extraction and MTR to elevated 
birth defects (Ahern, Hendryx, et al. 2011a), lower birth weights (Ahern, Mullett, et al. 
2011b), cancer mortality (Hendryx, Fedorko, and Anesetti-Rothermel 2010) and 
generally poorer physical, mental health (Zullig and Hendryx 2011). Although the exact 
mechanisms of these effects have not been isolated, declining water quality in streams is 
associated with cancer rates in humans (Hitt and Hendryx 2010). Experimental studies 
have also linked dust from MTR to cardiovascular disease (Knuckles et al. 2013). There 
is also evidence that educational progress in children is stunted in mining communities by 
some combination of social or ecological harms (Cain and Hendryx 2010). The basic 
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reproduction and healthy development of future generations is a foundational, rather than 
external, question from the vantage point of human development.  
What constitutes “efficient” use of CRM is tied up in the question: efficient to 
what end? Hansen et al. (2008) note that on average wind energy has a higher energy 
return on energy invested (EROI) of 18 to 1, than coal with 8 to 1. Daly’s (1991; 2007) 
concept of use-value oriented efficiency offers a four-part model that considers efficient 
use of both human artifacts and ecosystem stocks. This model, more useful from the 
vantage point of human development, considers both sustainability and equitability of the 
distribution of use-values. Piercing the veil of money, the choice of MTR over wind 
would constitute a gross inefficiency of both ecosystem maintenance efficiency and 
ecosystem service efficiency. Human development must take into account substantial 
ecological considerations and, given its open-ended historical development, may come to 
include a very broad cultural need/relation to nature depending on the path of history. We 
should not lose sight of the cultural ties to the land and life existing on it that many 
residents of the region have mourned as being lost to the process of MTR. 
For Marx, and some ecological economists, human needs are historically 
developed. Therefore, we cannot definitively say today what future generations may 
decide their needs are. Yet, the economy on Coal River is geared to liquidating use-
values in nature and the depopulation and scattering of communities. Whether or not the 
natural degradation of MTR has subverted local accumulation definitively, when MTR is 
coupled with an intentional depopulation of communities in the Coal River Valley (Bell 
2010; Burns 2007), the possibility of human development there is lost with its people. It 
is an economy that supports an ever-smaller numbers of workers.  
Because there is a contradiction between the value of money as the highest 
expression of exchange-value and natural forms of use-value, sustainable human 
development requires the application of reason and planning outside of markets. Planning 
is also required to account for proper valuation of forms of labor that are not involved in 
commodity production (e.g., reproductive or subsistence labor). Such “meta-industrial” 
labors form a crucial basis for the conditions of production and yet are commonly also 
treated as “external” (Salleh 2009).  
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Sustainable human development requires a process of production where the 
diverse use-values of the different parts of nature are accounted for and considered (e.g., 
EROI) and decided on collectively rather than remaining the narrow prerogative of the 
owning class who consider only their projected, and discounted for the future, profits. 
Indeed, such discounting raises fundamental problems of equity for future generations, 
exposing how deeply embedded capital’s après moi le deluge maxim is.   
Ultimately, human development in Appalachia does not seem suitable to the same 
intensity of systematic analysis as the other two vantage points because it is 
fundamentally dependent on communities as subjects of their own history. What can be 
shown is that capitalist development places structural constraints on the choices available 
to communities and must be superseded for sustainable human development. Analysis 
from the vantage point of human development raises the necessity of social control over 
the metabolic regulation of society’s relation to nature.  
Conclusion 
While there are many campaigns to halt MTR, an essential aspect of the struggle 
over CRM is that it is not simply a fight to end king coal’s reign but also to heal the rifts 
it has wrought and put forth in its place a sustainable human alternative. The alienated 
social metabolism of capital accumulation is fundamentally antagonistic to the 
requirements of a healthy and sustainable ecological metabolism. Although the wind 
proposal for CRM represents the promise of sustainable human development, the 
looming triumph of MTR within the current system—if not directly challenged on a 
thoroughgoing class-ecological basis—constitutes a concrete manifestation of what 
Mészáros (2008) calls the “destructive uncontrollability” of capitalist relations of 
production. It is a stark reminder that it is these very social relations must be confronted 
to heal the metabolic rift. “Après moi le déluge!” continues to be the watchword of the 
capitalist system—as shown by MTR and the destructive uncontrollability of fossil-fuel 
capitalism. Marx (1990:959), in contrast, defined socialism as a society in which “the 
associated producers govern the human metabolism of nature in a rational 
way…accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most 
worthy and appropriate for their human nature.” Above all, the concern should be one of 
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maintaining the earth for “the chain of human generations” (Marx 1990:754) From this 
material vantage point, MTR stands as a symbol of the ultimate destructiveness of 
capitalism, and of the dire need for a sustainable human alternative.  
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION: TOWARD AN ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY OF 
EXTRACTIVE ECONOMIES 
 This dissertation has examined the underdevelopment of the Central Appalachian 
region at multiple scales, from multiple vantage points, to demonstrate the political and 
economic relations that distinguish it as an extractive periphery shaped by successive 
modes of extraction. The concept of mode of extraction draws attention to the ways in 
which successive sociometabolic regimes have each developed out of the social and 
ecological consequences of the previous one. By analyzing the contestation of 
externalities and rentier behavior by elites as two different aspects of the same 
contradiction of capitalist valuation we can overcome reified conceptions of the “resource 
curse” in the development literature. While the productive relations involved in the social 
formations around extraction in Central Appalachia have varied, they have always been 
heavily reliant for their reproduction on the markets and dominant classes of capitalist 
productive regions. The features of a mode of extraction can be abstracted as operating 
within the general concrete of the capitalist world system. Comparison with the Amazon 
further underscores the range of diversity possible in the way productive relations are 
arranged within the social formations surrounding a mode of extraction. Regions 
dominated by modes of extraction have an external orientation that defines them as 
peripheral and the nature of value relations around extractive economies draw our 
attention to the transfer of surpluses. But beyond these conceptualizations of a mode of 
extraction as a specific abstract capitalist social formation, the details of particular 
regions are determined by the contingencies of their histories of the peoples and lands 
involved. Their continued peripheralization is not inevitable, but is the product of how 
class relations shape the sociometabolic regimes of extraction. Not only the dominance of 
extractive interests within the region but elites’ political integration into larger political 
structures determines their ability to successfully reproduce their dominance in the face 
of challenge.  
Chapters II and III demonstrate that despite some limited victories by local reform 
movements, coal’s hegemony has been resilient in Central Appalachian counties and state 
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governments. The most serious progressive threats to the reproduction of the region’s 
mode of extraction and its dominant classes have come when local movements linked 
with wider social movement organization bases to press for change, capitalizing on 
political opportunity structures at the national level. The first of these was posed by 
organized labor, which threatened the highly labor intensive sociometabolic regime built 
upon a system of profits by deduction and free appropriation of household 
reproductive/subsistence labor. The movement was beaten into abeyance in the heart of 
the region’s coalfields after the First World War only to re-emerge with the rise of the 
CIO and federal labor protections won nationally by class struggle. The new 
sociometabolic regime built upon greater free appropriation of nature and externalization 
of costs that emerged afterward faced its most serious challenge from the local resistance 
by catalyzed a network of anti-poverty workers. This movement, when allied with 
national environmental groups, threatened the surface mining practices underpinning the 
new metabolism. But the movement for abolition of mining practices causing irreparable 
environmental damage was divided from organized labor and undercut by mainstream 
environmental compromises, with the result that it ultimately failed to achieve its goals. 
Social movements have mitigated, but never stopped, the flow of unequal exchange 
contributing to the region’s underdevelopment.  
Rather than acts of charity, federal projects and transfer payments to the region 
should be viewed as a return flow smaller than the large outflow of unequal exchange.  
Many of the federal projects implemented in the name of regional development, because 
they did not address the fundamental political economic foundations of the mode of 
extraction, were in large part appropriated by it. The Appalachian Regional Commission 
formed to reverse the region’s underdevelopment was not able to alter the trajectory of 
the extraction dependent counties. State and local governments’ spending priorities 
reflected the underlying power relations. The funding for anti-poverty organizers in the 
1960s was successful, in spite of the planners’ analysis of the nature of the region’s 
problems, because so many of the volunteers, even if only indirectly, confronted the class 
relations in the region. The structural imperative for unlimited capital accumulation plays 
out at the national level of politics in favor of the extractive regime around fossil fuels. 
Elites dependent on the mode of extraction have been able to utilize the real or perceived 
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threat to economic growth posed by restricting the coal industry’s ability to externalize 
costs. The evidence analyzed in chapter V, contrary to the prediction of ecological 
modernization theories, provides little hope that internal class divisions will provide 
sufficient political opportunity structures for the policy-planning network to produce 
legislation to seriously address the problems of fossil fuel use and extraction. However, 
exogenous developments in the fossil fuel market are creating a crisis for coal’s 
dominance as an electrical energy source in the US.  
The summer of 2014 will mark the ten-year anniversary of the formation of the 
region wide anti-mountaintop removal organization Mountain Justice (Pfleger et al. 2012; 
T. Shapiro 2010). In those ten years the movement has steadily grown and in recent years 
the issuing of new permits has slowed, first due primarily to legal challenge and later 
from pressure on federal regulators. Coal production in the region is increasingly seen as 
having reached a point of permanent decline given the changes in the structure of the 
energy market. Today coal’s sociometabolic regime in the region faces increasing 
exhaustion from depletion of prime reserves and increased competition from natural gas 
produced by the fracking revolution (Marley and S. Fox 2014). Because coal dependent 
elites cannot effectively influence the glut of natural gas or the declining quality of coal 
reserves the reproduction of the mode of extraction in Appalachia today is primarily 
concerned with defending its ability to externalize costs. Central Appalachian elites, from 
both political parties, loudly proclaim their besiegement by a “war on coal” waged by 
federal bureaucrats. State primacy of enforcement remains a pivotal issue. For example, 
in Kentucky in 2010, citizens’ groups found through public records that dozens of mines 
owned by the state’s two largest coal producers had, for years, consistently committed 
over 20,000 violations of the Clean Water Act by exceeding emissions, falsifying 
emissions reports (often by submitting old reports with the dates simply scratched out and 
written over). One day before the groups’ lawsuit was to commence state regulators 
preempted the suit with a settlement for less than one percent of the maximum $740 
million in fines and dismissed the criminal violations. Under public pressure, the state 
lost its legal fight to exclude the citizens’ groups from the settlement process and in the 
end had to agree to third party monitoring of its own regulatory activities. Such 
regulatory capture in mining remains characteristic throughout the region. State 
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governments have also joined coal industry associations in lawsuits against the EPA over 
promulgation and enforcement of mining and air pollution regulations. States’ federal 
legislators have proposed numerous, as of yet unsuccessful, bills to roll back federal 
authority and regulations around surface mining and successfully defeated new 
regulations to protect coal miner health and safety underground. The regime’s survival, 
perhaps more than ever, hinges on the undermining of the two sources of real wealth, 
land and labor, through increasing their externalization costs and free appropriation of 
that wealth. Meanwhile, those areas with more internationally valuable metallurgical coal 
seek increased export capability to realize those rents waiting on the global market.57 
These behaviors are fully consistent with the value framework I have proposed as 
governing modes of extraction. 
The ambiguity of my findings in chapter 4 on the influence of coal production 
within coal producing counties reflects, along with chapter 6, that recognizing the terms 
of unequal exchange as increasingly debilitating in the long run does not negate the 
devastating effects of economic exclusion when the extraction an area is dependent on 
falters or is exhausted. Already elites within the region are beginning to look to natural 
gas extraction as a replacement for lost coal revenues. In order for a social movement 
capable of bridging the need for healing metabolic rifts in the coalfields, as well as the 
global rift around climate, the ecological and social debt created by the history of unequal 
exchange between Central Appalachia and the nation’s centers of development must be a 
central part of the discourse. The same issues arise in the timberlands of Oregon, on the 
Black Mesa Native Reservation, and other extractive peripheries as they face the 
economic dependency, underdevelopment, and governmental capture. The climate bill 
produced by the EPPN in 2009 sought to offer enough class fractions the prospect of 
rents and rationalization of accumulation within a political capitalism framework to win 
passage. That approach failed politically, but more importantly it failed to meet the needs 
of actually addressing climate change. Anticipating the limits to purely technological 
                                                        
57
 Western coal producers in the Powder River Basin also have some of the lowest production costs in the 
world due to their seam thickness. As demand has been undercut in the US, these producers face the classic 
case of economies of scale and diseconomies of space described by Bunker and Ciccantell (Bunker and 
Ciccantell 2005). As a result they are struggling to create new export capacity along the West Coast even as 
the climate movement struggles to stop them.  
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fixes for climate change acceptable to the ruling class, Gonzalez advises “those 
environmental groups and activists interested in protecting the environment…should 
withdraw from the polity and seek to mobilize the public on both local air quality and 
global warming issues…It appears that only through a confrontational social movement 
will the dominant position of local growth coalitions, industry, and the energy sector over 
land use, energy, and transportation policies be challenged” (2005:107). 
For such a mobilization to be successful it will have to offer areas dependent on 
extractive economies a more promising future. An environmental sociology that hopes to 
contribute to such transformative project for Central Appalachia cannot come from the 
“new exemptionalism” within the discipline that abandons “other social criteria and goals, 
such as the scale of production, the capitalist mode of production, workers’ influence, 
equal allocation of economic goods, gender criterion, and so on” (Mol 1996:309-10) in 
favor of a “foot in the door” in the elite environmental policy planning process (Foster 
2012). The movements inspired by ecological modernization can offer extractive 
peripheries only new ways to sacrifice and, like the power elite whose favor they court, 
ask them to put their faith new technologies of fracking, carbon capture, and a nuclear 
renaissance instead of social change (e.g. Trembath et al. 2013). They propose new 
national sacrifice zones for the health of fracking communities (and gamble on the levels 
of their fugitive emissions) as a way to phase out coal while avoiding addressing the 
social relations upon which the current system is based. In a similar way, at every major 
point of historical challenge, the coal industry has promised that new technology has 
already rendered the social and environmental costs motivating the drive for regulation 
moot. But the problems of the coalfields lie not simply in the technology of mining, but 
in the larger sociometabolic regime of the underlying class relations.  
Appalachian studies scholar Ronald Eller has pointed to new mobilizations of 
regional and local groups linked to the climate justice movement targeting financial 
institutions supporting mountaintop removal as symbolizing  
an important change in the way America understood Appalachia . . . the region 
now had become a symbol of the larger dilemma of people’s relationship to the 
land and responsibilities to each other. . . . The Appalachian experience reflected 
the social, environmental, and cultural consequences of unrestrained growth, and 
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it echoed the voices of powerless people struggling to survive in a changing world. 
Saving Appalachia now meant confronting the larger structures of global injustice 
as well as challenging local power brokers, corporate greed, and government 
apathy. (Eller 2008:258-9) 
While coalfield elites are dismissive of science, the national policy-planning network 
even when it accepts science, eschews, and indeed sometimes attacks directly, the very 
conception of climate justice. As Brooking Institute Senior Fellow Chris Foreman wrote 
for the Breakthrough Institute:  
climate justice activism will likely enjoy one overriding success: the sheer 
generation of often misguided discourse…‘justice’ activism has … proven to be a 
distraction from more effective efforts. Rather than moralize about climate debt 
and reparations, those who truly care about poverty and the climate should focus 
instead on the kind of disciplined and pragmatic forms of advocacy it will take to 
build a prosperous and equitable future for the poor. (Foreman 2014) 
Such analyses dismiss the realities of unequal exchange and associated debts as, at best, 
irrelevant to projects for a more equitable and sustainable future and more often 
counterproductive to “pragmatic” progressive politics. An analysis of underdevelopment 
and ecological crisis through modes of extraction provides not only a framework for 
evaluating the extent of unequal exchange and ecological debt but also the internal 
pathologies of the class structure and ideology that dominate the region. So-called 
“pragmatic” policies that do not address these local and national issues of power are most 
likely to simply reproduce them upon new bases, as they always have. In perhaps one of 
the earliest books in environmental sociology Charles Anderson identified the 
irrationality of the current technological priorities and the importance of addressing 
ecological debt in developing future applications. “A rationally ordered economic system 
could put science and technology to use in an environmentally constructive manner and 
reduce the ecological debt while simultaneously raising life quality” (C. H. Anderson 
1976:143). Any environmental sociology that discards examination of the types of 
rationality determining technological development, capitalist rationality, in its analysis of 
extractive economies and sustainability generally can only represent a regressive research 
program (Lakatos 1989). “The fact is that environmental degradation and social 
inequality are interrelated in numerous ways and neither can be reversed without 
fundamentally altering the course of the other” (C. H. Anderson 1976:139). 
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 There was a hope at the founding of environmental sociology that it would not 
remain a sub-discipline but would rather transform the discipline as a whole. While this 
has not come to pass, the most promising developments have been those in the Marxist 
metabolic analysis tradition that as a recent review of the field concluded, “connects 
current research to classical theory and links sociology with an interdisciplinary array of 
scientific literatures focused on ecosystem dynamics” (Pellow and Nyseth Brehm 
2013:233). Moving this research tradition forward will require increasingly explicit 
application of the process of abstraction in dealing the sociometabolic processes, as there 
is always the danger of losing the dialectical roots that set it apart. The case of Central 
Appalachia’s history shows the integral relation of the political, economic, and ecological 
moments of extractive regions’ development and its future prospects. Clarity about the 
historical limits and possibilities of extractive economies and the political economic 
dynamics at multiple scales is crucial for peripheries around the world hoping to capture 
resource rents for development strategies (Veltmeyer 2013). Future research must better 
connect the ecological forms of unequal exchange and free appropriation of non-human 
natural wealth with that of households’ gendered reproductive relations. The role of 
household reproduction within modes of extraction must be better theorized if it is to 
continue to grow in usefulness as an important tool for environmental sociology moving 
forward in its larger integrative goal. Those involved in the struggles against the 
degradation of extractive communities are already forming linkages between their 
systemic problems, from the coalfields of Kentucky to those in Colombia (Bennett 2009; 
Chomsky and Striffler 2014). It is the duty of environmental sociology to pursue an 
analysis of extractive economies’ that facilitates the inclusion of those economies 
historical victims into a new historic bloc capable of challenging the larger irrationality of 
the system that threatens us all.  
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APPENDIX 
 ADDITIONAL ITEMS 
 
Table A.1. Variable Correlation Matrix 
 Poverty Unemployment Education Income 
Surface 
Mining 
Tot. 
Product
ion Urban 
Manufacturin
g  Service  
Pop. 
Change 
Unemployment 0.7364 1         
Education 0.7743 0.6206 1        
Income -0.6791 -0.6996 -0.8127 1       
Surface 
Mining 0.2801 0.0857 0.2712 -0.229 1      
Tot. 
Production 0.1134 0.1446 -0.0347 0.0792 -0.3769 1     
Urban -0.57 -0.4553 -0.6937 0.5325 -0.1547 -0.0022 1    
Manufacturing -0.25 -0.3973 0.0774 -0.0445 0.2816 -0.553 -0.0008 1   
Service -0.128 -0.1718 -0.566 0.6058 -0.1765 0.3003 0.3647 -0.5473 1  
Pop. Change -0.0662 -0.3238 -0.049 0.2059 0.3204 -0.2863 -0.1071 0.3857 0.0241 1 
Tot. Population     -0.4746 -0.3031 -0.4937 0.3907 -0.3605 0.2330 0.7147 -0.2193 0.2348 -0.2936 
 
 
 190
 
Figure A.1. EPPN Cluster Dendogram 
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